Crossing the River

[Nicator]

Hello fellow Pothosians,Arrian states that Alexander planned on crossing the Danube, but after seeing the Getae amassed on the other side, decided against it. He decided instead on a nightime crossing on small boats and bivoucked tents. Here it seems is another indication that the crossing of the Granicus was made not in a full frontal assault, but rather as Diodorus put it...downstream, in a dawn crossing. Thoughts please?later Nicator

[agesilaos]

The Danube presented a much more formidable obstacle and was patently unfordable unlike the Granicus; Arrian has it right. The crossing of the Jaxartes is more analagous to the Danube.

[aen]

Well, ye old adage that his nibs was not a man who liked to 'steal' his victories does not tally entirely with the history as we understand it. At Hydaspes, he had few qualms about a flanking manoeuvre under cover of darkness; in fact he looks to have prepared for it consistently over an extended period (the false alarms for the benefit of Porus and co). Consequently, I've always been a bit ambivalent about the contradicting accounts of Granicus.On the one hand, there is the anomalous location of the Greek mercenaries - evidently someway to the rear where they are later to be caught badly. It might be possible to explain this if Alexander had waited for a surprise dawn rush, thus drawing the fastest (mounted) Persian elements out of camp and off to the river bank, whilst isolating the foot (or at least, some of it) behind. If the battle was a speedy affair, largely decided by the cavalry tussle on the right, this strange location makes even more sense, for the mercenaries would have had no time to deploy aggressively. One must also consider DariusGÇÖ later insistence that his men remain in formation throughout the night at Gaugamela. This might have been on foot of a costly lesson meted out to his satraps and Memnon at Granicus. On the other hand, a pal of mine researching his film script visited the site, and insists that Alexander would have attacked in the evening as the setting sun would have been on his back and shining directly into the Persians' eyes. People are prone to forgetting how important this is for hampering oneGÇÖs response to repeat volleys from arrows and slingstones (less so javelins). The arrows tend to reach up on a forty five degree arc and drop at about twenty to thirty. If your able to discern them at all, you're going to loose sight of them twice if the sun is low and in front of you. Slingstones, travelling more flatly from out of the sun, are as good as invisible until immediately before impact. For Persian formations, which did not, as far as we know, have the same disciplined shield walls as their Hellenic counterparts, this would have been very bad news.I wrote an extended piece on this question years back for a professor of mine. I eventually came down on Diodorus' side ( ie, the dawn rush) for various long boring reasons. Now, however, I'm not so sure. One thing is certain, though: it is highly unlikely the battle lasted long, whichever way you cut it up. And its result was emphatic. Laters, Aengus.

[Nicator]

Hello Aen,
One wonders whether or not it was even possible to land a beach head as it were on the opposite bank under such hostile conditions. How much of a beach head was available? I picture something like 5 GÇô 10 feet deep, and maybe 20 feet wide (at the most). Hardly enough to achieve a substantial foothold with any real numbers (certainly not the kind of numbers needed to maintain a foothold and press an attack). Certainly, Memnon and the Persians were smart enough to pick a spot which was as defensible as possible. This naturally precipitates the narrowest beach head possible. Why would they pick a spot where the Macedonians were likely to get a foothold? It was reported in Arrian that Alexander could be seen on the opposite bank with his entourage surrounding him. Indeed, if it was possible to see each other, then it seems likely that arrows and other assorted missiles could easily dislodge one or the other from the river bank before any crossing was attempted. Referring to the earlier battles in the north against Cleitus and Glaucias, Alexander used this tactic after escaping from the narrows between the hills and town walls. Alexander was just too intelligent to rush in blindly, overexposing his vulnerable troops to such a great risk and robbing them of their greatest strength. Though his own personal safety seems to have been another matter entirely. Another interesting though seldom mentioned phenomenon was the direction of travel of the Granicus. Was it north to south, or opposite? This is important in deciding which side should lead off first into the river. If it was north to south, then it seems likely that the right should be the first into the stream (as it was according to Arrian). My reasoning here is that if the left entered first and the stream dislodged anyone, they would pass in front of the center and left, possibly impeding their crossing and causing confusion. If the right enters first, and are dislodged by the stream, they would float harmlessly downstream without impeding the other troops. Thoughts on this anyone?
Later Nicator

[marcus]

Hi Aengus,"Well, ye old adage that his nibs was not a man who liked to 'steal' his victories does not tally entirely with the history as we understand it. At Hydaspes, he had few qualms about a flanking manoeuvre under cover of darkness; in fact he looks to have prepared for it consistently over an extended period (the false alarms for the benefit of Porus and co)."I don't think that contradicts the adage about Alexander not wanting to 'steal' victories. The business about crossing the Hydaspes was about getting across in order to slug it out with Poros - not about fighting the battle itself. Once he was across, the battle was fought in daylight, in conventional manner.All the bestMarcus

[aen]

Absolutely, Marcus.IGÇÖm not saying there was anything underhand about his approach to warring. And at Hydaspes he fought out one of the most brilliant conceived battle plans ever. But our friend had more than his fair share of tricks up his sleeve. Witness all those flying Hypaspists standing above mountain strongholds in the morning light, to the petrified astonishment of the locals below. Or phalanx displays for the benefit of goggle-eyed Illyrians. Trickery, deception, surprise: theyGÇÖre part and parcel of successful generalsGÇÖ repertoires.Consequently, IGÇÖm reluctant to rule out a surprise dawn attack solely on the grounds of AlexanderGÇÖs temperament. I like to believe there are more viable reasons why it might or might not have taken place.For me the greatest piece of trickery was one of HannibalGÇÖs ruses: trapped in a depression, with Romans on the heights all around and his men chronically short of supply, he tied flaming brands to the horns of cattle and, in the middle of the night, had them stampeded up the slopes so as to give the impression his army was in disorganised flight. The Romans started moving helter-skelter to intercept, only to find the Carthaginians had slipped off in another direction.Incidentally, Hannibal rated Alexander above himself. Modest fellow!

[aen]

NicatorI think the Persians chose ground that offered no beachhead, but were countered by AlexanderGÇÖs tactical ability to improvise one through manoeuvre. Once Amyntas attacked out wide right, he drew a lot of Persian cavalry to oppose him. So when Alexander attacked the Persian centreGÇÖs left, it was already under strength. Also, Arrian reports that as Alexander forged into this area, wave after wave of Macedonians GÇÿeasilyGÇÖ crossed the river. No doubt into the space Alexander was creating with his advance.The Granicus runs from south to north. Often the received wisdom was to commence any fording upstream with cavalry so as to break the current. Downstream, another cavalry body would act as a barrier for any one swept away.Laters. A.