Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Xenophon »

Agesilaos wrote 9 Aug P.11
I found a map of the terrain about Kerkyra, the line of the walls and the positions of the gates being determined archaeologically. The Spartan troops are in 500 man blocks, those with Mnasippos eight deep the others four; as you will observe it would be difficult to cover the ground were the others also eight deep, we know the extreme left was close to the northerly gate and also that Mnasippos, could observe the flight of his left and centre and be close enough to have intervened, had he not been occupied among the tombs. The only way that a flank could have been presented would be if the mercenaries set their left flank towards the enemy gate which is militarily improbable. The Kerkyraians are not to scale but the Spartan frontages are; I changed the original which was way over scale. The salient in the walls makes the case for the source of the weakness being the formation’s depth inevitable and that in turn makes the translation of ‘ep’okto certain as ‘[the individual units] in eight files’ rather than ‘eight deep’.
Mnasippus originally had an unknown number of “Spartan troops” and “at least 1500 mercenaries”[XH VI.2.5], perhaps something of the order of up to 2,000 hoplites in all initially. Later, confident the city will fall, he discharges “some” of the mercenaries.The Corcyreans receive reinforcements in the form of 5-600 Athenian peltasts [XH VI.2.10; Diod XV.47.4], and in a sally, according to Diodorus, they kill 200 of the besiegers. We might reckon Mnasippus’ force as perhaps less than 1,500 hoplites in all. Mnassipus forms his troops into a single line/phalanx [‘paretacos’;form up side by side in battle order].

In a single phalanx 8 deep in close order, this phalanx would be less than 200 yards long and if Agesilaos’ map is any way accurate, following the walls, the gates are well over 600 yards apart, and well over 500 as the crow flies. However, if the 8 deep is in open order (closing up to 4 in close order), then there is a frontage of 400 yards or so. With Mnassipus and the right in front of one gate [Typically, a road leading from a city gate would be lined with tombs], then the Corcyreans coming out of the other gate would be around 100 yards – charge distance – from the extreme left of the line. [ Evidently, the left of the Spartan line did not ‘mask’ the other gate, and the Corcyreans seem to have emerged unhindered in ‘aqroi’ which in a military context means 'in a compact body, or column in close order']. It is at this point that the left wing attempts its ‘anastrophe’ – an about turn in order to rally back. As I mentioned before, the likely reason may not have been in order to double depth, but rather simply to move backward out of the way, for the whole of Mnassipus phalanx must have been relatively close to the wall ( depending how far the tombs extended down the road), and thus their flank would have been threatened, the remedy to which was to move back out of reach, but as they did so, the Corcyreans took it for flight and redoubled their attacks, and the manoeuvre did indeed become real flight.....

‘ep okto’ does not refer to individual units, Agesilaos has added these words for his interpretation, and that is not what Xenophon actually says. It is the whole phalanx [phalaggos] which is"'arrayed in line/battle order [tetagmenoi] in eights”/epi okto, hence it must refer to depth( or the formation must be in column if they are 8 abreast) – likely 8 deep in normal or open formation.

At least Agesilaos recognises the problem of the shortness of Mnassipus’ phalanx drawn up 8 deep in close order !! ( less than 200 yards). And we agree they would probably have been 4 deep in close order – though for different reasons. :) :D
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Paralus wrote Sun 10 Aug
“This is to 'telescope' matters more severely than Diodorus at his worst while ignoring other evidence.”
....and quite deliberately so! I simply touched on the subject in as succinct a manner as I could, for I did not wish to open up a bagful of digressions upon digressions, and end up having a many tens of thousands of words discussion on the history of Greece in the ten years or more after Leuktra !!!
Even your longish post here is but an abstract or epitome of the considerable history of just how and why the Arcadian League briefly rose and fell in power in the Peloponnese. I’ll try and keep my comments brief on some of your more controversial points.
“This appeal is clearly late in the year and near certainly during the winter.”
In the next year following Leuktra, the Mantineans resolved to restore and rebuild their city from the four villages the Spartans had previously split them into.( synoecism – the combination of villages into a ‘polis’/ city.) In Tegea, a civil war broke out between the pro-Spartan Stassipus and the aristocratic oligarchs on the one hand, and another faction on the other. Meanwhile the Mantineans attacked the Peloponnesian Orchomenus with a regular army of 5,000 full time soldiers, recruited from the many Arcadian mercenaries.( incidently, many more 'professionals' than Sparta possessed, for only the 'Homioi' were full-time soldiers)

The Spartans sent a small force under Polytropus (1,000 hoplites and 500 Argive and Boeotian refugees) to the aid of the Orchomenians, who were unsurprisingly defeated and Polytropus killed. Meanwhile, Agesilaus had already invaded Arcadia, and was ravaging it and its crops – so evidently it is early in the campaigning season, not late. It is at this point the Arcadians send to Athens, then Thebes, which process need have taken no longer than the Thebans doing the same immediately after Leuktra ( Athens and then Jason of Thessaly in their case).

The Thebans, whilst agreeing to help as allies did not come immediately, but a considerable time later, after Agesilaus had returned home, despite him remaining in the field into winter. Why ? On their own reckoning, Leuktra had not been a ‘decisive’ battle, and they were reluctant to take the war into the Peloponnese. Instead, they were more interested in campaigning against ‘easy pickings’ in their own backyard – attacking and destroying Thespiae. Boeotian Orchomenus too would have suffered this fate but for the intervention of Epaminondas. However it was only a temporary reprieve, for it was destroyed in 364 BC. All this must have occurred in the summer campaigning season, and perhaps into the Autumn. It was not “late in the year” nor “near certainly during the winter”.

The Arcadians eventually unified their forces and Agesilaos was forced to retreat, famously extracting his army from a narrow valley. It was only now mid-winter when Agesilaos went home [XH VI.5.20], and he had been campaigning in Arcadia all season, and on into the winter. In Xenophon’s words:
....he seemed to have brought the state some relief from its former despondency, inasmuch as he had invaded Arcadia and, though he laid waste the land, none had been willing to fight with him.” ....not quite true since the Arcadians, outnumbering him, had eventually forced his retirement.

Only after this withdrawal do the Thebans finally arrive at Mantinea, and the Arcadians retired to join them. As Xenophon says [VI.5.23] :
“[23] When they had joined forces, the Thebans thought that matters stood well with them, inasmuch as they had come to bring aid and there was no longer an enemy to be seen in the land; they accordingly made their preparations for going back. But the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans urged them to lead the way with all speed into Laconia, pointing out the number of their own troops and praising beyond measure the army of the Thebans”.

Another sign of Theban luke-warmness to entering the Peloponnese is that of the Boeotarchs, only the more resolved Epaminondas led the army, the others staying home.
In fact it was not until late in 370 that Thebes contracted an alliance with the Arcadians. That Agesilaos waited in the field “hoping for a chance to avenge Leuktra” and Thebes “timidly waited until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese” is little more than an entertaining rhetorical flourish.
As can be seen, whilst we are not told specifically when the alliance was concluded, it was almost certainly early in the season rather than late, though the Thebans didn’t act until winter for the reasons given ( the campaign against their fellow Boeotians).

Almost certainly Agesilaos must have known of this alliance, and the most likely reason for lingering in the field was in hopes the Thebans would come. ( you can’t do much ravaging in winter fields)
If my phraseology was rhetorical, then I was simply influenced to take a leaf out of Paralus’ book.... :wink:

Thus, even at this point, with overwhelming numbers, and even some of the perioikoi deserting Sparta, the Thebans hesitated to invade Laconia, despite the urgings of the Arcadians and others, and the temptation of a Laconia unravaged for six centuries. It would not be until next year that four massive columns would invade Laconia........

To cut a long story short, by 362 BC, the Arcadian League had split, after being undermined by Thebes, and at the battle of Mantinea, she and others were supported by Sparta, while Tegea supported Thebes. Epaminondas was killed, and the long term outcome was that Thebes gained no territory, and little more power and influence, than it had before Leuktra, while Sparta, though weakened by the loss of Messenia and its helots, still dominated the Peloponnese, with the Arcadian cities returning to the fold. The only significant long term effect of Leuktra was arguably the setting up of an independent Messene, and consequent weakening of Sparta, but this did not have much benefit for Thebes........

But all that belongs in its own thread, or perhaps as a digression in the “Leuktra thread’.......

This thread is supposed to be about the Greek and Macedonian phalanx, its drill/technike tactike and the manuals that record it in its highest theoretical sense.

Now that Agesilaos accepts that Xenophon’s drill does indeed describe breaking down into half-files, even if he is squirming and wriggling on the basis that this does not involve ‘hoplites’ as such – despite Xenophon repeatedly calling the fictional Cyrus’ infantry ‘hoplites/men-at-arms/heavy infantry’ or ‘thorakaphoroi/ armoured infantry/heavy infantry. I rather think the original Xenophon knew what a ‘hoplite’ was better than Agesilaos’ artificial distinctions !!

Moreover, since real Persian organisation did not incude 'half-files' - only Greeks did - the point is moot anyway, and it doesn't really matter exactly what Xenophon had in mind for his fictional Persian army reforms. Xenophon can only have had Greek hoplite drill in mind when describing the dinner drill ( which also explains why the organisation described is clearly different from the fictional Cyrus')

Perhaps we can finally get to the drill of the Macedonian-type phalanx.....???
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Agesilaos wrote Sun Aug 10 – and what an enormous post ! Almost 3,000 words of criticism and ‘spin’ to support Agesilaos’ contention that, yes, drill to form in half-files is decribed in the Cyropaedia, but the troops concerned aren’t intended to be ‘hoplites’ – even though Xenophon consistently calls them ‘hoplites’/men-at-arms/heavy infantry or 'thorakaphoroi’/armoured men/heavy infantry throughout !! ( the two terms are synonymous). And since he is the inventor of these new, reformed Persian infantry, he should know what he intends them to be !!
Xenophon wrote:
Xenophon calls these half-file leaders ‘pampadarchs’ and refers to them several times in his various works. He also describes the drill to form up four deep, by the pampadarchs/half-file leaders leading up the rear half-file, in ‘Cyropaedia’ II.3.21 et seq [ By the way, the file leaders are called ‘dekadarchs’ c.f. Macedonian manuals]. Obviously, quarter-files and 18 inch frontages for hoplites were not possible ( the formation would have been too thin at 2 deep, nor would the larger ‘aspides’ of the hoplites allow this). Because the 80-90 cm diameter aspides were all but touching, to a hoplite ‘close order/pyknosis’ was also ‘locked shields/synaspismos’ and the term is used in this way by Xenophon.
Agesilaos wrote:
From your post, 3 July; that’s right you started the digression that allegedly saddens you so much LOL! Still I am always heartened when Xenophon begins his posts with an air of assumed superiority, as it inevitably proves to be just that, assumed. ‘It saddens me to have to correct various errors and misconceptions…but alas it is necessary.’
It is not the ‘digression’ that saddens me – discussion of the hoplite phalanx’s drill is a necessary precursor, and foundation of, the later Macedonian phalanx’s drill. Rather, as you have correctly quoted,I was referring to all the various errors and misconceptions in your post.....
Xenophon wrote:
Oh dear ! It would seem we are going to have to start with the definition of ‘hoplite’, and go on from there.

‘Hopla’ broadly means ‘equipment or tools’ and in a military context means men-at-arms armed for hand-to-hand fighting, as opposed to missile troops

Oh dear! First patronising jibe first two mistakes, we’ll forgive the ‘hopla’ meaning a man-at-arms, that is ‘ὁπλίτης’, but confusion over parts of speech seems to be an on going theme; but nothing stops missile armed troops being described as ‘hoplites’; the Indian archers at the Hydaspes are so described at Arrian V 15 vi
It was indeed ‘hoplite’ that I was defining. By a typo, the word ‘hoplite’ was missing from between ‘context’ and ‘mean’s and so should have read “....in a military context hoplite means men-at-arms...” as I am sure most readers would have realised. No confusion at all. I’ll forgive the unnecessary and wrong jibe.

Secondly, I believe you are quite wrong. ‘Hopla’ , like most words, has several meanings. In a military context, it has the generic meaning of ‘tools of war’, probably best translated as ‘arms’ or in some contexts ‘weapons’. It also has the specific meaning of heavy infantry equipment for hand-to-hand fighting, the equipment of hoplites who fight hand-to-hand in close order.

Xenophon tells us unmistakeably that the new ‘hopla’ that Cyrus’ equips his men with are of the latter variety ( not generic ‘arms/opla’ ) [II.1.9 et seq and 16-18] What is more, they are organised and carefully drilled for this new close quarters hand-to-hand combat.


κατὰ στόμα τε γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τῶν ὁπλιτῶν προσβαλλόντων εἴργεσθαι καὶ καταπατηθήσεσθαι ἐπιστρεψάντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐλεφάντων.


These Indians are either archers, or javelinmen both armed with long broadswords and thus unlikely to be packed shoulder to shoulder – ‘hopla’ just means ‘arms’ and caries no implication about the distance at which troops fight nor their interval. But, of course you never meant anything other than Greek hoplites when you formerly spoke of them so this is sheer flim-flam.
As for Arrian’s reference, he does NOT say Indian ‘archers’ at all!

Besides he[Porus] thought that none of the enemy would have the audacity to push themselves into the spaces between the elephants, the cavalry being deterred by the fright of their horses; and still less would the [Macedonian]infantry do so, it being likely they would be kept off in front by the heavy-armed soldiers/hoplites falling upon them, and trampled down by the elephants wheeling round against them.

I agree with Agesilaos that missile troops would not be in close order – they need room to ply their weapons. However, a little later we hear of these hoplites being in a ‘dense/compact/close order phalanx’/pyknos phalaggos – in which array we agree archers could not fight, but which was quite normal for heavy infantry/hoplites. These troops are also distinguished from Porus’ other troops – ‘pezoi’/infantry behind the ‘hoplites’, most of whom would have been archers etc. The Indian ‘Arthasastra’ notes that armoured infantry should be deployed in front of archers, as here. To a Greek of course, armoured infantry in close order for hand-to-hand fighting are 'hoplites'.

As far as I am aware, ‘missile’ equipped troops – archers, peltasts, slingers etc are never referred to as ‘hoplites’.

The “sheer flim-flam” is the idea that these hoplites are archers – they are exactly what they are called – hoplites/heavy or armoured infantry.



Agesilaos wrote;
Sometimes I wonder if you re-read your posts...
I always read, and often amend, my posts several times – and check the accuracy of them before posting, which Agesilaos apparently does not judging by the numbers of plain errors of fact, and mistaken readings.
... you assert without a qualm:
‘The ‘gerrhon’ was a large shield equivalent to the Greek 'aspi's, and was certainly not ‘light’. ( indeed some archaic Greek hoplites may have carried ‘gerrha’, referred to as the ‘Theban’ shield)’
And in the very next paragraph:
the gerrhon has a ‘boss’ and is in fact held by a horizontal handgrip ( like a Roman scutum), not the porpax/arm-grip shown on the right-hand figure. Xenophon points out the disadvantages of this arrangement at [ VII.1.33-,34 ], when Egyptians, with 'porpax' equipped shields physically push back with their shoulders Cyrus' Persians who have only hand-grips.’
So ‘gerrha’ are not at all like hoplite shields! And the interesting thing about the passage you cite is that, it is the Egyptians who are described as ‘hoplites’ and the Persians are contrasted with them and thus clearly NOT being thought of as ‘hoplites’.
Good grief ! ‘hoplites/men-at-arms’ are not restricted to just Greeks, which you are well aware of, but seem to have forgotten, and not all hoplite shields are the classical Greek circular ‘aspis’. Any large shield will suit a close-quarters fighter, including the gerron. The Egyptians and Persians are both close quarter hand-to-hand fighters, with appropriate defensive and offensive equipment – hoplites in other words. Xenophon here is extolling the virtues of a porpax equipped shield against a hand-held one. Xenophon does not ‘contrast’ the two forces – they are all of the ‘hoplite’ type, in phalanx, fighting each other hand-to-hand.

Not to mention that Xenophon specifically says the Persians are ‘hoplites/men-at-arms’ or ‘thorakaphoroi’/armoured men many times.
VII 1 xxxiii
ἔνθα δὴ δεινὴ μάχη ἦν καὶ δοράτων καὶ ξυστῶν καὶ μαχαιρῶν: ἐπλεονέκτουν μέντοι οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις. τά τε γὰρ δόρατα ἰσχυρὰ καὶ μακρὰ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν, αἵ τε ἀσπίδες πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν θωράκων καὶ τῶν γέρρων καὶ στεγάζουσι τὰ σώματα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὠθεῖσθαι συνεργάζονται πρὸς τοῖς ὤμοις οὖσαι. συγκλείσαντες οὖν τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐχώρουν καὶ ἐώθουν. [34] οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ἅτε ἐν ἄκραις ταῖς χερσὶ τὰ γέρρα ἔχοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχάζοντο παίοντες καὶ παιόμενοι, ἕως ὑπὸ ταῖς μηχαναῖς ἐγένοντο. ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον, ἐπαίοντο αὖθις οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων: καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ οὐκ εἴων φεύγειν οὔτε τοὺς τοξότας οὔτε τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνατεταμένοι τὰς μαχαίρας ἠνάγκαζον καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν
33] Here, then, was a dreadful conflict with spears and lances and swords. The Egyptians, however, had the advantage both in numbers and in weapons; for the spears that they use even unto this day are long and powerful, and their shields cover their bodies much more effectually than corselets and targets, and as they rest against the shoulder they are a help in shoving. So, locking their shields together, they advanced and shoved. [34] And because the Persians had to hold out their little shields clutched in their hands, they were unable to hold the line, but were forced back foot by foot, giving and taking blows, until they came up under cover of the moving towers. When they reached that point, the Egyptians in turn received a volley from the towers; and the forces in the extreme rear would not allow any retreat on the part of either archers or javelinmen, but with drawn swords they compelled them to shoot and hurl.
Firstly, a translation error – the Persian ‘gerron’ is not a “little” shield as can be seen from Agesilaos’ earlier illustration. It is a large shield, suitable for hand-to-hand fighting – but evidently not as large as the fictional Egyptians shield.
For those who have been spared the joy of Kyroteadia, Kyros has allegedly deployed his men two deep to face these Egyptians, who are 100 deep ‘as is the custom of their land’. Kyros backs his thorakites with ‘akontistai’ javelinmen, ‘toxatoi’ and a veteran corps of ‘ouragoi’ presumably also two deep making an eight deep formation; the moving towers? Kyros has a tower for each taxis in the army, hauled by eight oxen and manned by twenty men, in an essay on ‘how to conduct hoplite warfare’?
Secondly, at [VI.3.21] Cyrus tells his Taxiarchs and Lochagoi to form a phalanx with each separate lochos “in twos/eis duo”. If this is the Taxis of the dinner drill, then each separate/individual lochos is to be formed in two files, which might be 12 deep if the taxis is the four lochoi one, or 25 deep if it is the two lochoi one. This is evidently the understanding of whoever added what appears to be an emendation, evidently thinking of the ‘dinner drill’ [Now each lochos consisted of 24 men]. Personally, I believe here as elsewhere Xenophon has the Spartan file depth of 12 in mind, and that as in the ‘dinner drill’ it would close up to half-files six deep to fight. The ‘akontistai’/javelin men are drawn up behind the ‘thorakaphoroi’/heavy infantry, not as part of the heavy infantry formation, and the ‘toxotas/archers’ separately behind them. Behind these come a rearguard/’teleutaious’, again separate. (they are not ouragoi=file closers, the last man in a file.)
What there is here is a clear reference to ‘othismos’ actually meaning pushing men back in combat with the shield, but I suppose that one can ignore that part.
...thank heavens for that !!
The so-called Boeotian shield, also called Dipylon is indeed a similar shape to the Gerrhon, although it has a significant camber that gerrha lack. This is because, far from being the sort of shield anyone actually wielded, it is an artistic fossil, a remembrance of the figure of eight shields used in Mycenaean times and thus not germane to this discussion.
My point about the ‘Theban’ or ‘Boeotian’ gerron is that Greek artists saw nothing odd in hoplites being equipped with such shields. As to whether it really existed, that is still debated.Any large shield would be suitable equipment for a hoplite.

It will also be seen that the quote above makes no mention of a ‘porpax’ nor is it likely that Egyptian shield s possessed them, they were like the old ‘tower shield’
This, to use Agesilaos’expression,is complete “guff” !! Egyptians never used bronze-age Mycenaean type ‘tower shields’. Their traditional shield shape was oblong, with a rounded top. Xenophon described troops at Cunaxa as having wooden shields reaching to their feet whom people “said” were Egyptians. These shields are called ‘aspides’ – which may be defined as a type of shield held by a porpax type grip. ( HerodotusVII.89 describes Egyptian marines with “concave broad rimmed aspides” that sound as if they were circular). Moreover, how could you push a tower shield with your shoulder ?
Xenophon had encountered Egyptian infantry at Kunaxa and describes them Anab I 8 ix

[9] There were horsemen in white cuirasses on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported, of Tissaphernes; next to them were troops with wicker shields and, farther on, hoplites with wooden shields which reached to their feet, these latter being Egyptians, people said; and then more horsemen and more bowmen. All these troops were marching in national divisions, each nation in a solid square.
[9] καὶ ἦσαν ἱππεῖς μὲν λευκοθώρακες ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τῶν πολεμίων: Τισσαφέρνης ἐλέγετο τούτων ἄρχειν: ἐχόμενοι δὲ γερροφόροι, ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὁπλῖται σὺν ποδήρεσι ξυλίναις ἀσπίσιν. Αἰγύπτιοι δ᾽ οὗτοι ἐλέγοντο εἶναι: ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἱππεῖς, ἄλλοι τοξόται. πάντες δ᾽ οὗτοι κατὰ ἔθνη ἐν πλαισίῳ πλήρει ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον τὸ ἔθνος ἐπορεύετο


Note that here too, the gerrhon is contrasted to the xylinais aspis. So the gerrophoroi are not ‘hoplites’ nor the gerrha a hoplite style heavy shield.
You seem to be confusing the fictional Cyrus’ ‘hoplites’ who carry ‘gerra’ and fight hand to hand, with the real Persians at Cunaxa, equipped with ‘gerra’, and who did not fight at close quarters, hence could never be hoplites. The most suitable shield for close quarter fighting must be large, but not necessarily heavy e.g. Roman scutum or Greek aspis, neither of which were in fact overly ‘heavy’ ( I’m assuming you mean ‘heavy’ literally rather than ‘heavy’ in the sense of suitable for ‘heavy infantry’)
Since you happily bandy the ‘sparabara’ ‘takabara’ terms I had assumed you were aware of the suggested tactical system implied therein; for those not in the know, it posits that the Persian army of the early Achaemenid period consisted of a front rank of spearmen carrying large pavise like wicker shields which the propped up as a barricade from the shelter of which the greater proportion of their units, archers would shoot, in addition there were bands of men armed as Xenophon describes Kyros’ New Model Army and as are depicted on several Greek vases, though none I could find online sadly, who would rush upon the enemy once they had been disrupted by the arrow storm. Herodotos describes the Persians falling upon the Greeks in small bands and it is these men to whom he is assumed to refer.
I am quite familiar with what is known of Persian fighting systems – not a great deal. (sigh!) I fear another digression coming on. What you say is incorrect.
The terms ‘sparabara’ and ‘takabara’ stem from no primary source, but Greek lexicons ( e.g. Hesychius) say 'spara' is a Persian word for the Greek gerrha (woven or wicker shield) and 'tak'a is used in inscriptions and may mean "small shield" (or perhaps more likely a Macedonian sunhat!)

The words were first suggested in Nicholas Sekunda's, “Achaemenid Military Terminology.” Archaeologische Mitteilungen Aus Iran 21 (1988) pp. 69-77. Nick Sekunda’s ‘Sparabara’ are the front rank large pavise bearers, which Greeks called ‘gerrha’ (confusingly this is really a generic name for any wicker/woven shield, but in modern times is used to denote the oval violin shaped shield – which may not have been wicker at all !!)
Both these words are now commonly accepted by wargamers and re-enactors and even the Cambridge Ancient History. It was Sekunda who suggested that a Persian troop type were called ‘takabara’, but personally I think it unlikely, as do others.

What are now called ‘Takabara’ are essentially tribal ‘peltasts’ and the so-called ‘taka’ a similar crescent shaped shield to a 'pelta', albeit slightly larger.They appear in Greek iconography from around the 460’s BC, but are javelin equipped tribal type ‘peltasts’, not close quarter fighters. They didn’t apparently exist during the time of Herodotus’ Persian Wars, and so couldn’t be the troops referred to at Plataea. These peltasts are also certainly NOT the troops described by Xenophon, who fight with hand-to-hand weapons, are called ‘heavy infantry/hoplites/thorakaphoroi’, and whom Xenophon tells us specifically were made to abandon bows, javelins and missile weapons !!

Agesilaos grows ever more desperate, and is clutching at straws, in his unconvincing attempts to suggest that what Xenophon had in mind for the fictional Cyrus’ ‘New Model Army’ was anything other than ‘hoplites’ who fight in close order hand-to-hand, and are drilled in this ‘new’ type of fighting, which is superior to fighting at a distance with missiles, and allow them to beat superior numbers ( just as historically Greek hoplites beat Persians). Xenophon tells us all this quite plainly [ in Book II – the re-organisation of the army especially II.1.9 ff]

Even if this were correct, which it isn't, it doesn't matter, for since only Greeks had 'pempadas'/half-files, but not real Persians, Xenophon can only have had Greek hoplites in mind when writing of the dinner drill.
The Dinner drill, of course has no mention of order at all and could be performed in open intermediate or close order, nor is any move from open order to close order implied nor in any Classical author is there a mention of the measurements that might be described by these terms.
Not measurements per se, and if there were we would no doubt be debating just which Greek city's measurements are being referred to ! But both Thucydides and Xenophon tell us that Greek hoplites fought shield to shield i.e.in close order, 3 ft aprox per man. The final formation of half-files must therefore be ‘close order’ ( for the formation cannot double down any further ) and the whole point and purpose of the drill is to decrease depth, and increase numbers on a given frontage, in other words to get into close order – as must be obvious to even the meanest intelligence. It cannot “be performed in open intermediate or close order” – there was no such thing as ‘intermediate’ order in Xenophon’s time for a start. These three terms were made up by Christopher Matthew, and are incorrect translations/interpretations of the Hellenistic manuals normal/open order, close order/pyknosis ( not intermediate) and synaspismos/locked shields ( not close order).
Cod is a synonym for fake, our Civil Service release cod-faxes to scupper Government policies of which they disapprove; yes the British Government still uses fax, Foreign Office excepted, they still have pigeons.
:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

Yes, Cyrus’ army is fictional, and there are anomalies arising from mixing Persian and Greek details, but the ‘dinner drill’ is not – it must be the standard drill of aGreek phalanx, and Cyrus’ army is reported as forming up in files 12 deep, like contemporary Spartans ( even though 12 doesn’t divide into the decimal ‘100’ men of a ‘taxis’, hence reference to “dodekadarchs” and “hekadarchs”. Since these terms are used only once by Xenophon, and occur nowhere else as far as I can determine, they may be words he has made up to emphasise his advocacy of a 12 deep formation.

And here we have the crux, absolutely nothing says that the Dinner Drill was standard to anything, apart from your continual and unsubstantiated assertion; the most laughable point is that it is definitely conducted by files of TEN and the lochoi end up four abreast and five deep.
That a hoplite phalanx marched and deployed initially in files in normal/open order is beyond doubt – the counter-marches of the phalanx/battle line described could only be performed in open order. Equally, it is beyond doubt that they fought in close order – see references in Thucydides and Xenophon. The question therefore is how they got from open order of files, to close order. There are only two ways. Close up laterally, resulting in a halving of frontage ( described in the Hellenistic manuals but as far as we know only done once at Kynoskephalae ) or by altering the depth – referred to by Xenophon a number of times – e.g. XC VIII.5.15:
He believed also that tactics did not consist solely in being able easily to extend one's line or increase its depth, or to change it from a long column into a phalanx, or without error to change the front by a counter march according as the enemy came up on the right or the left or behind; but he considered it also a part of good tactics to break up one's army into several divisions whenever occasion demanded, and to place each division, too, where it would do the most good, and to make speed when it was necessary to reach a place before the enemy—all these and other such qualifications were essential, he believed, to a skilful tactician, and he devoted himself to them all alike.
Note that the phalanx is in a position to counter-march, hence must be in open order, and of course the changing of depth( from open/normal order to close order) is described by the dinner drill – the files double down into half-files.
I am afraid to say that your post of the 7th demonstrated nothing more than that your lack of understanding of the necessary mathematics is compounded with a wilful ignorance of the language; you have painted yourself into a corner with broad strokes of error and wishful thinking....
See previous posts – it is your arithmetic that is flawed !! Nor do I show any ‘wilful’ ignorance of the language. Not being fluent in Greek, I take the trouble to check and double check meanings. Rather it is you who, despite your knowledge of Greek, has mis-translated several times.
.... all you need do is admit that your interpretation of the Dinner drill is flawed, strangely at the beginning of the thread you do not seem to have considered the lochoi ending in four files so crucial; but maybe that was my misconception of your position.
My position was, and is, that Xenophon did not specify the size of the files or lochoi in the dinner drill, probably because he was speaking of general drill rather than the fictional Cyrus’ specific organisation. ( As I have noted, it is different, with 4 lochoi of an unknown size making up a taxis, also of an unknown size rather than Cyrus’ taxis of 100, made up of 2 lochoi of 50.

The whole point is that regardless of the original file depth, the drill for files/half-files works ( e.g. 8 or 12, or a Persian 10 )

Since in the Anabasis it is the ‘etaxqsan/battle array/ battle line’ that is formed ‘in fours’, it can only mean ‘four deep’, and cannot mean ‘four abreast’, because that would be a column.

“ ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων:” is literally “so they formed up the battle array/line in fours” ( Xenophon uses ‘oun’ as ‘so’ a number of times). Since the whole line is in fours, it can only mean four deep, not four abreast. Xenophon’s words are quite clear !

Oh, and for another reference to a phalanx being four deep; Xen Hell III.4.13 :
And when the two squadrons saw one another, not so much as four plethra apart, at first both halted, the Greek horsemen being drawn up four deep [‘epi tettaron/in fours’] like a phalanx, and the barbarians with a front of not more than twelve, but many men deep. Then, however, the barbarians charged."

The contrast between Greek depth and Persian depth is unmistakeable – no possibility that ‘epi tettaron’ means four abreast here. ( No struggle at all! )
Do you deny, then that the Spartan enomotiai at Mantineia 418 BC were not arranged in four files? Thus showing that a battle line can be formed with the lowest unit formed in four files. You will struggle to find an example of one four DEEP.
Poor methodology! You are comparing a different battle, described by a different author, in different words. Thucydides ‘enomotia’ of 32 formed 4 abreast/in line [zugos] and averaged 8 deep [bathos...epi octo ]. That formation must be in open order – unless you wish to postulate the whole Spartan army occupied a frontage of less than 450 yards ? ( to which should be added around 3,000 allies Diod. XII.18.4 ). In fact, as Thucydides himself realised, he had the numbers somehow wrong ( not realising that the Spartans had, not 7 lochoi, but rather 7 ‘morai’ of two lochoi each. Thus there were in fact over 6,000 Lakedaemonians present, making a total of 9,000 odd. The battle took place at the ‘Mantinea gap’ between Mantinea and Tegea, and 8 deep in open order would occupy a frontage of 2,250 yards. Guess how wide the Mantinea gap is ? Yup ! 2,300-2,500 yards at its narrowest – just enough for the phalanx and a few cavalry on each wing !!

Another battlefield that makes much more sense with the hoplites initially 8 deep in open order...... :) :D

Agesilaos wrote:
As for 8 deep being considered "weak" against massed formations, the Spartans - "seasoned troops"- were evidently concerned that attrition might wear down an 8/4 deep line, and increased it to 12/6 deep. Do you think Spartan tactical responses to massed formations "preposterous"?

Since you have failed to explain what these ‘Spartan tactical responses’ were it is impossible to say whether they are ‘preposterous’ or not, your suggestions here certainly are! I think you are suggesting that the mercenaries who are eight deep, according to you, make a quick calculation about attrition and decide to, somehow increase their lines depth by one half and in shortening their front expose their flank?! No wonder they were caught trying to execute this supposed manoeuvre, you fulminate against Paralus suggesting that a formation might double its depth in open order and temporarily end up on an eight cubit interval which is never mentioned in the Sacred Manuals and post THIS!!? Reference it in a manual, if you can.
You have this all wrong, as Paralus has pointed out. The Spartan tactical response was to increase the depth of the file to 12 (6 in close order), not because they feared a deep column bursting through, but so that their line would not be breached by casualty attrition.
Let me tell you how you should have proceeded. There are two issues, the meaning of ‘ep’okto’ and the meaning of ‘anastrophe’. Now I looked at all of Xenophon’s uses of this term and in each it signifies no more than a retreat in the opposite direction to which one was facing; modern commentators have confused the manoeuvre of Agesilaos with a description of what ‘anastrophe’ means, Xenophon mere says that part of the manoeuvre was ‘anatrophe’ and then goes on to describe the subsequent evolutions, similarly in the Kyrou Paideia VII 5 iii, Xenophon has Kyros fold back each of his wings in order to specifically double his depth, yet there is no hint of an ‘anastrophe’.
At last, something we are all agreed on !! Anastrophe is an ‘about turn’ and move in the opposite direction ( the rear here). I suggested earlier that the ‘anastrophe’ was not necessarily to ‘double depth’, but to get out of the danger of a flank attack by moving back....At XC V.4.8 we even hear of chariots overturning from trying to reverse direction/anastrophe too sharply. [see also LSJ definitions]
This does, at least, suggest why they were feeling ‘weak’; they were too close to walls, as indeed was proven by their getting caught whilst retiring. So they were not trying to deepen the line only put more distance between then and the walls. The reason why a formation in the standard depth should think this expedient is still unclear, although why a weak line should is clear enough.
Because, as can be seen from your map, the left end of the line was in danger of being taken in flank.
Now, I must own to a gaff of my own making, I missed out a ‘not’ the line should have read


Greek and Latin both allow words to be ‘understood’, so the fact that enomotiai are NOT mentioned is unimportant.


This in response to your suggestion that since no lesser units are mentioned the whole army must be meant, this is simply untrue.
What a fallacious argument ! This is extreme ‘special pleading’! Individual units aren’t mentioned, but we should assume individual units are meant, even when the whole phalanx is specified ? When individual units are so many abreast, we are told so, to avoid any ambiguity – e.g. the Thucydides passage at Mantinea above wherein each enomotia four abreast;or in the dinner drill, each lochos formed in twos....etc

Agesilaos wrote:
Xenophon wrote:
How can the fact that the ‘taxqhnai/battle formation’ was ‘in fours’/four deep, as Xenophon very specifically tells us “strengthen the case for them being eight deep”(presumably in close order) ? You’ll be saying black is white next.....
Oh dear! Liguistic problems again; the Greek is Anab. I 2 xv
Your are seeing supposed linguistic problems, when in fact there are none. It is becoming tiresome, and repetition of this allegation same will not make linguistic problems.

[15] ἐκέλευσε δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς νόμος αὐτοῖς εἰς μάχην οὕτω ταχθῆναι καὶ στῆναι, συντάξαι δ᾽ ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ. ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων:


He ordered [ἐκέλευσε] the Greeks [δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας] to form up and stand [ταχθῆναι καὶ στῆναι] as if for battle [εἰς μάχην οὕτω] according to their custom [ὡς νόμος αὐτοῖς], each organised his own men [συντάξαι δ᾽ ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ]. They were formed up [ἐτάχθησαν] thus [οὖν] by fours [ἐπὶ τεττάρων].
This is a poor translation, and does not agree with the majority I have checked. A far better one is:

He ordered the Greeks to form their line/battle array and take their positions just as they were accustomed to do for battle, each marshalling his own men. So they formed up the battle array/line in fours.” [ universally translated as ‘four deep’, because it is the whole array or entire line which is in fours] According to the LSJ, ‘epi’ means on or upon, but not ‘by’ and moreover :
LSJ
4. [select] with numerals, to denote the depth of a body of soldiers,ἐπὶ τεττάρων four deep, id=Xen.; ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγων i. e. in a long thin file,id=Xen.; ἐφ᾽ ἑνός in single file, id=Xen.
In fact, I don't think this is entirely correct, but one gets the idea of 'communis opinio'.
ταχθῆναι is a verb, aorist infinitive in fact, rather than a noun, ‘to draw up’ not ‘battle formation’, Xenophon does not ‘very specifically say’ that the line was drawn up four deep, that is your interpretation based on what you want it to say; I say it strengthens the case for the meaning being ‘four abreast’ and hence eight deep, because the formation is described as ‘according to their custom for battle’ and by far the majority of mentioned depths are eight, neither linguistically nor logically challenging methinks.
Not just my interpretation, rather everyone but yours. All translations I can find are in no doubt that ‘four deep’ is meant and the various forms of ‘taxqhsan’ specifically mean ‘to draw up in battle formation/array’, not just ‘draw up’. The LSJ translates this passage as “in four lines”( i.e. four deep).

So you are saying that “in fours/eights” is ambiguous, and can mean abreast or deep, depending on which you want it to be ?
Yet we examined the various references to depth previously, including the half-dozen references to 'epi/eis number', and in context it turned out all these had to refer to depth. ( see my post page 9 Aug 5).

I don’t think I ever said or implied that one could just choose what one wants it to mean; this is surely your method LOL! And I seem to remember concluding that some references had to concern frontage and others could be ambiguous whilst your ‘analysis’ consisted of simple contradiction.
Not so, if you look at that post, we agreed some of your references could only be depth, whilst I pointed out why others[ epi/eis] – all you referred to in fact – had to mean ‘depth’, mainly because it was the whole phalanx/battle line/array being referred to. I gave reasons in each case, not just contradicted you. What is more, from the outset and my diagram on page 1, I accepted that in some contexts ‘epi/eis low number’ could mean abreast e.g. ‘eis duo’/in twos in the dinner drill meaning two files abreast.
So let’s run through that check list

In summary then, this; “The notion that Xenophon was disguising hoplites as his reformed Persians founders once one reads the text;” is completely wrong. In fact the opposite is true, as most commentators recognise. The fictional Cyrus’ reforms his army of Persians into heavy close-order infantry – hoplites, so that Xenophon can expound on hoplite ‘taktike’.


As usual a self arrived at conclusion at odds with the evidence but supported by anonymous testators and the tale is a moralistic drag not a tract on taktike.
Again, not just my conclusions, but those of all the commentators I am familiar with. As usual, your eccentric views are in a minority of one. ‘Moralistic drag’ it may be in your view, but nevertheless, in this fictional work Xenophon takes the opportunity to go into technical and tactical matters he could not do within the bounds of his historical works – and thank heavens we have this !
1. re-equipped with ‘hopla’ =arms for close quarter fighting[II.1.9-21], oops! not what ‘hopla’ means.
Wrong! In the context, the ‘hopla’ which Cyrus re-equips his Persians with are arms for close quarter fighting, as Xenophon very specifically tells us [ e.g. XC II.1.9 “ ...And if you provide these weapons/hopla, you will make it the safest procedure for us to fight at close quarters with the enemy...” The weapons are specifically close quarters weapons.
2. Drilled in close order drill [II.3.21] – no mention of order
All drill is in’ order’!( Did you ever hear of drill being performed in disorder?).
The order is obvious from the context. The men are drilled in close quarter fighting, that is, close order drill.
3. fight in ‘lines’ that advance in good order [VII.1.10 and 26] - not many troops do not.
Only ‘regular’ troops who have been drilled fight in ‘good order’ – most, e.g. barbarian tribal levies, do not.
4. form phalanx[VII.1.22] – LOL so do CHARIOTS! VII 1 xxx.
A phalanx is simply a 'battle line', but your comment is Irrelevant, we are here concerned with infantry formed in phalanx – invariably close order troops, even if others are attached to it ( such as peltasts or archers)
5. stop and dress their ranks 3 times [VII.1.4] - Before they came in sight of the enemy, he halted the army as many as three times. – halting but no dressing, more ‘reading into’; the enemy are out of sight and Kyros has determined on a slow advance as he knows they intend to surround him.
Your reading and comprehension skills may need a refresher course. At the time, Cyrus does NOT know the enemy intends to surround him. Croesus only forms the intention of outflanking Cyrus AFTER coming in sight of each other.[VII.1.5] In fact the halts are so that the army may align itself with Cyrus’ standard – in other words, what we call ‘dressing’.
6. advance in even step (like Spartans) [VI.1.4]. – amazing because at III 3 lvii they advance ‘at the double’ and then at III 3 lxi ‘at the run’ most unSpartan, are you cherry picking or using salami tactics?
See above. Cyrus intends to advance in even step, like Spartans, at the fictional battle but he and his men become excited and break into a run ( one is reminded of Cunaxa, in which Xenophon took part)
The rest is equally guff, the social conventions throughout are Greek, Xenophon needs an excuse for his unending symposiai, nor was he in Persia for any great length of time like Ctesias, much of his Persianism recalls Herodotos to me. The work is fiction for a Greek audience written by an old man with limited knowledge of Persia and its customs, it is for the indulgent fantasies of a pseudo-Sokratic or do you credit the ‘moving towers’? The Persians described in Book II are clearly and emphatically NOT hoplites Xenophon is clear about that therefore his drill is not hoplite drill, nor indeed, is it even a sensible procedure,; your other ‘oft mentioned prop’ Anderson, even says on page 390, having forgotten that the officers leading the files are dekadarchoi rather than the dodekadarchoi he names, ‘In practice it might sometimes be more convenient to deploy each lochos separately before bringing it up to its place in the line.’ Tacitly recognising the essential unreality of Xenophon’s; though he does recognise that the frontage of each lochos moves to four ‘and a depth of six’. Zeus even without being here your allies are falling away, it is the kyropedia
Yes indeed the work is intended as enlightenment for a Greek audience, and pushes several morals, including extolling a Spartan type society with its peers/homioi, its agoge and its military methods for hoplites.
“The Persians described in Book II are clearly and emphatically NOT hoplites Xenophon is clear about that therefore his drill is not hoplite drill, nor indeed, is it even a sensible procedure”
This is the crux of your case. It cannot be denied that the drill Xenophon describes comes down to half-files ( as your own reconstruction on page 1 demonstrates). To make your case therefore, you must have it that the troops concerned are not ‘hoplites’. I don’t know how you define ‘hoplite’, but I think I prefer Xenophon’s version. After all he was undeniably a General of ‘hoplites’ and knew all about them. You will therefore understand that you saying that despite everything Xenophon says, these troops are not ‘hoplites’ just has no credibility. Not only do these fictitious Persians fit the bill in every way as close order heavy infantry – hoplites - but Xenophon tells us a number of times that these troops specifically ARE hoplites !!
To allege otherwise is complete nonsense – as all commentators I have read agree that they are hoplites, and modelled on Spartan ones at that, except of course you !! I believe you are, as the psychiatrists say, “in denial” !

As to Anderson, you obviously don’t understand what he is saying, nor do you appear to have read the whole book. For he refers to ‘open’order of 6 ft and ‘close’ order of 3 ft or so, and rear half-files coming into line, just as I do ( see e.g. P101). He also points out the flaws in Xenophon’s arrangement for the huge numbers he allocates, which indicates that Xenophon hadn’t appreciated the problems of ‘scale’. For example, 30,000 men in single file would be over 17 miles long even in ‘close’ order of 3 ft intervals !![X C II.4.1-6]
‘In practice it might sometimes be more convenient to deploy each lochos separately before bringing it up to its place in the line.’
This sentence is taken out of contex, for what Anderson is pointing out is that if the dinner drill is applied from single file to multiple lochoi, then some of the intervals have to be 9 or 10 feet wide, and he is saying that whilst still in column it would be easier for each lochos to deploy into file in ‘open’ order, with intervals of only 3 ft, and then have the lochoi deploy beside one another – an obvious drill movement that even the lowliest corporal could work out. There’s no “essential unreality of Xenophon’s”. Even today, drill is taught in exactly Xenophon’s way - small units first, beginning in single file, then modified as necessary when these are put together and drilled in larger units.Nor does he “forget” the officers are ‘dekadarchs’ ( why do you say this ?). He refers here in this example only to ‘dodekadarchs’, files of twelve and half-files of six. He has taken Xenophon’s generic drill, with no numbers given for any unit, and applied it in his example to files of 12 ( he could just as easily have chosen a file of ten, as you apparently want him to, or eight, as I did in my diagram). No “allies falling away”.All perfectly consistent.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that you have not taken to heart Paralus’ homily about accepting the source material unless you have evidence that it is incorrect....
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote Mon Aug 11:
I don't think Xenophon of Brisvegas is suggesting that the mercenaries at Corcyra performed such calisthenics as to move from eight to twelve deep at all. Rather I believe his contention is that the Spartans, in general about this time, adopted a depth of twelve as a reaction to increased Theban depths.
Just so.
Actually, 'fulminate' does not quite convey it. I was, in fact, accused of full scale 'invention' of fact to support a view. An accusation that still stands I believe.
The ‘invention’ in question was not an alleged invention of fact, but rather your explanation of Philip’s manoeuvre at Cynoscephalae ( back in May !! ). You postulated a file of 32, standing at 12 ft intervals from its neighbours, to support your view of what Polybius meant. None of our sources refers to files of 32, nor intervals so large, hence this formation is your invention rather than being source based (yes, there are reference to depths of 32, but these are two 16 man files one behind another as I have alluded to elsewhere, not a single merged file of 32)

I won’t comment further on the matter of the meaning of ‘anastrophe’ since I am still savouring the fact that this is a rare moment when we are all in perfect agreement !!

Agesilaos wrote Mon 11 Aug:
Since he contends that depth is of no help in hoplite warfare, which is how Leuktra reared its ugly head in the first place, it is rather contrary to now suggest that the Spartans adopted twelve deep to counter it, though only fighting six deep of course did they not know that three or four is deep enough to stop any amount of people?
That is a gross distortion of what I said, which was that depth does not increase the chances of a ‘charge’ bursting through a thinner line, and that modern evidence suggest a line 3-4 deep is extremely hard to ‘break’ or burst through. ( Depth has a number of advantages, but that’s another story). One of the advantages of depth is that in a battle of attrition ( you kill one of theirs, they kill one of yours), then over time a deeper formation might prevail. In order to guard against this, the Spartans seem to have increased their depth to twelve [ 6 in close fighting order].
The sarcasm only serves to show that Agesilaos seems not to understand this.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Paralus wrote Wed Aug 13 :
I don't recall that it was in private discussions (though there have been many); I think you'll find it was here...
We actually had that discussion back in 2009, and amidst the blizzards of tens of thousands of words over many months in this thread, I forgot I had referred to it here.....
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Good grief! Another 2,000 or so word post which adds little to what has been already said, and is full of errors, mostly of supposition
Agesilaos wrote Fri Aug 15 :
Having now read the whole of the Education of Cyrus we can now add the references to depth or frontage from that work and add a few general observations.

For those phrases compounded with ‘bathos’ or a variant we have II 4 ii, τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐφ᾽ ἑκατόν a depth of one hundred; and in the same paragraph ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς ἄγοντα τὴν τάξιν the taxis coming up in single file and τὸ μὲν μέτωπον ἐπὶ τριακοσίων the frontage was three hundred. A little further on at 4 iv we have , παρήγγειλε τῷ πρώτῳ ταξιάρχῳ τὴν τάξιν εἰς δώδεκα τάττειν βάθος he ordered the first taxiarch to draw up his taxis twelve deep. None of these are controversial, nor is the single file ‘eph enos’a t V 3 xxxvi.
Other than, as I have commented previously, Xenophon fails to appreciate the problems of scale for the massive numbers he invents – 30,000 men in single file, assuming a ‘close order’ allowance of 3 ft per man comes to a line over 17 miles long ! And passing orders by word of mouth along 300 file leaders would take quite some time too !
Book VI however has both clear indications of depth, 3 xix πάντες τεταγμένοι ἐπὶ τριάκοντα τὸ βάθος they [Kroesos’ troops] are all arrayed thirty deep; except the Egyptians who are 100 deep εἰς ἑκατὸν which is shown to mean depth by Kyros’ wish xxiii, ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τοὺς εἰς ἑκατὸν τούτους ὁπλίτας εἰς μυρίους ἂν μᾶλλον βουλοίμην τετάχθαι For my part, I would rather have these11 hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep . The question is what deos Xenophon mean when he says Kyros ordered his own men xxi παραγγείλατε δὲ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις καὶ λοχαγοῖς ἐπὶ φάλαγγος καθίστασθαι εἰς δύο ἔχοντας ἕκαστον τὸν λόχον “So instruct your taxiarchoi and lochagoi to form a line with each separate lochos eis duo.”

Our Xenophon wanted this to mean twelve deep ie in two files at the beginning of the thread, but has since claimed that eis + a numeral ALWAYS refers to depth so presumably sees this a s a two deep formation, unfortunately this ois the only time we are told of the depth of Kyros’ line so if it is not twelve here the oft mentioned parallel to the Spartans resolves itself to the one mention of standing guard about Kyaxares’ tent.
Yet another over-simplification and distortion of what I say – a favourite tactic of Agesialos, it would seem, and the second time this false allegation is made. I did not say that epi/eis + number always refers to depth, rather that in the examples you gave, the context always implied depth – and gave reasons. “In twos” or whatever is going to depend on context as to whether this refers to ranks or files. I also explained earlier why this most likely meant files here – which the anonymous probable emender who added <Now each platoon contained twenty-four men.> seems to have also thought.
Except that Cyrus’ lochos consisted of 50 men, not 24. In which case Xenophon has Cyrus’ phalanx 25 deep, though I suspect he was indeed thinking of 12, like the Spartans....
Were this an historical battle we could compare frontages and arrive at an answer, this being pure invention from an author with a slender grasp on his material it will prove more difficult. Xenophon is vague about Kroesos’ numbers aside from 120,000 Egyptians, Kyros’ spy, Araspas tells him that the Lydian front is forty stadia long and that they are thirty deep. The first question is does this figure include or exclude the Egyptians? Since they form the centre of the line it would be odd to exclude them from the frontage, so we could deduct 1,200m or six stadia to cover them, leaving 34 for the others which assuming a metre a man would give 6800 in the frontline and a total of 204,000 men. The maths tend to point in the other direction , though; if we take the 40 stadia as exclusive of the Egyptians we arrive at an army of 240,000, i.e. twice the size of the Egyptian contingent; Xenophon was most likely thinking in round numbers and does not seem to have allowed for any variation in troop density even between the foot and the horse or chariots. This is because such matters are unimportant to his purpose, which is to demonstrate Kyros’ cunning and bravery.
Agreed. As we have seen before, Xenophon has not thought through his large numbers, rather somewhat plucked out of the air. We are specifically told the number excludes the Egyptians:

“Well,” he replied, “with the exception of1 the Egyptians, they are all drawn up thirty deep, both foot and horse, and their front extends about forty stadia; for I took especial pains to find out how much space they covered.”

Their front is about 8,000 yards, and we don’t know how many are horse and how many are foot, nor the necessary intervals between squadrons of horse. We therefore cannot even begin to estimate the hypothetical numbers Xenophon may have had in mind, assuming he bothered to make a calculation.. If they had been all infantry, hypothetically they could have numbered 240,00 in close order, or Xenophon more likely had in mind a possible maximum of 120,000 infantry in open order, but this hypothetical total must be much less when cavalry are taken into account....
When we come to the battle we are told that Kyros’ army was surrounded on three sides and was like a small tile set with a larger one, which sounds to me as if we are talking of three equal fronts, presumably each of 120,000, with Xenophon forgetting that the deeper Egyptians present a shorter front, despite having made the point himself!
Nothing suggests three equal sides – indeed just the opposite, for when we look at Greek tiles set one within another seen edge on, they have a long ‘front’ and short ‘sides’. In which case, Xenophon did not ‘forget’.
The Persian infantry certainly seem only to engage the Egyptians whose imagined front may be 1200m or 4,000m, if Xenophon has nodded.
1200 yards if 100 deep in ‘close order’, or a more likely 2,400 yards if 100 deep is ‘open order’ ( 12 x blocks of 100x 100 )
The Persian consist of 30,000 of the original expedition and 40,000 new re-enforcements (V 5 iii).
The 40,000 are archers and peltasts, and at the battle are apparently placed behind the heavy infantry/thorakaphoroi.[VI.3.24]
Of the originals 10,000 have been made into cavalry (VI 2 vii). So there are 20,000 to form the front line and the rear lines. A frontage of 5,000m if two deep or 833m if twelve deep, 2,000 men are absent however ( VI 3 xxxi) hiding in the baggage to ambush the enemy, since these are all from the ‘thorakophoroi’ there are only 8,000 to form the main body which matches the incorrect front of 4,000m for the Egyptians if two deep and leaves 666 in the front rank if twelve deep.
This ‘ain’t necessarily so’.Cyrus decides to form cavalry, and their equipment is described at [IV.3.8 ff], but no numbers are given, though we are to understand they are to come from the ‘peers’. At [V.2.1] there are 2,000 of them, whose squires carry infantry equipment so they may fight on foot as necessary. At VI.2.7 the “ranks had now filled up” to 10,000, which sounds like 8,000 re-inforcements had arrived, rather than more hoplites being converted.

We cannot really make much of these rather airy-fairy numbers, probably conjured out of the air. For example the 40,000 re-inforcements are described as archers and peltasts rather than the original 30,000 who form a heavy infantry phalanx.
Kyros says in his battle plan


According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful.


He is not intending to make his line shorter than the enemies but to match it, making two deep the most likely choice of meaning (this also explains the worries about the shallow line versus the deep). We can further describe his line as two thorakophoroi (the only hoplites mentioned in Kyros’ army come in Book VIII, after the inclusion of the Egyptians but most probably a simple lapse from the author), then five akontistai (javelinmen), five archers and then two ouragoi, much like Alexander’s experimental phalanx (he had read this book) only with peltast-types replacing the phalangites.
Given that he intends to match the Egyptians front, hypothetically 2,400 yards in open order and 50 deep when closed up, Cyrus’ phalanx of around 28,000 ( i.e. less the original 2,000 cavalry) would be – surprise ,surprise – 25 deep in open order, in round numbers! This is consistent with his earlier lochos, 50 strong, drawn up ‘eis duo’ in two files.

The javelinmen/akontistai are not part of the phalanx, but drawn up behind it ( they could not be in close order, needing room to throw). Similarly the archers are drawn up behind the javelin-throwers, and would also need room to shoot....
So ‘eis duo’ here ‘two deep’ but in the next book , VII 5 xvii, we find Kyros marshalling his horse and chiliarchies ‘eis duo’ in order to enter Babylon via the river bed of the diverted Euphrates so ‘two abreast seem more appropriate, the river is not half a kilometre wide where it enters the walls of Babylon.
As can be seen, I think it more likely that ‘eis duo’ here is two files of 25 each abreast – see previous calculations. Having said which, I would not press any hypothetical calculations too far......
Book VIII is the last one, Zeus be praised! It is also the longest and most boring, but has further examples of depth and frontage. Kyros arranges a procession the 4,000 doryphoroi guarding it are said to be ‘eis tetteras’ which since they line the route must mean ‘four deep’ 3 ix.
Sorry you find the ‘technical stuff’ of the Cyropaedia so boring. I have read it many times, and my annotated copy is falling apart! Every time I read Xenophon’s various works, I always seem to find something interesting I hadn’t noticed before....
Xenophon has some interesting things to say in the Cyropaedia about marches, morale and logistics – but that is all outside our topic!
Two sections later, 3 xi, bulls are led to sacrifice ‘eis tetteras’ four abreast here! They exit the Palace Gates so frontage makes most sense here.

VIII 3 xviii has the chariots in the procession ἐπὶ τεττάρων τεταγμένα , four abreast, there were three hundred chariots , the roads of Babylon would not accommodate seventy-five abreast and four deep, yet the walls were said to allow four chariots abreast to drive along them. This phrase certainly recalls Anabasis I 2 xv ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων .

So, study of usage in the Kyrou Paideia confirms the ambiguity of Xenophon’s language in that it is neither always one thing nor another but must be conditioned by the context.
Agreed!!.....but the majority, especially with a number 4 or above turn out to be depth.....
Book VIII also gives the lie to claims of Kyros’ NMA being substitutes for hoplites, at 5 xi they are once again differentiated ὁπλίτας δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰ μεγάλα γέρρα the hoplites and those with the large wicker shields and 8 xxiii states καὶ οἱ πεζοὶ ἔχουσι μὲν γέρρα καὶ κοπίδας καὶ σαγάρεις ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπὶ Κύρου τὴν μάχην ποιησάμενοι The infantry still have their wicker shields and bills and sabres, just as those had who set the battle in array in the times of Cyrus; so they never were hoplites.
I don’t think so. The subject is the arrangements in the camp, and who should form the outer ring.The heavy infantry/hoplites together with those who carry ‘megala gerra/large wicker shields’.
These are not mentioned elsewhere, and sound like’sparabara’, who may still be a part of the archer infantry. ( Greek lexicons e.g. Hesychius states that ‘spara’ is the Persian name for a ‘megala gerron’ )

The second part doesn’t follow. And you’ve left out of your quote the most important part, by your selectivity changing the meaning.VIII.8.23 says:

( After describing the supposed decline in Persian cavalry)
The infantry still have their wicker shields and bills and sabres, just as those had who set the battle in array in the times of Cyrus; but not even they are willing to come into a hand-to-hand conflict.”

Xenophon’s point is that ‘modern’ Persians, unlike their ancestors, don’t close and fight hand-to-hand .i.e. they are no longer ‘hoplites’, not that they never were hoplites.

You’ve also overlooked VII.5.3 where Cyrus infantry consist of a bodyguard of 10,000 Persians, drawn from the hoplites, and these are flanked by the rest of the hoplites. In front of Babylon they ‘fold back/anaptussontas’ the wings to double their depth.
In all, Xenophon calls Cyrus’ Persians ‘hoplites’/men-at-arms some 7 or so times, and ‘thorakaphoroi’/armoured men ( a synonym ) half a dozen times. The Persian heavy infantry are never called anything else.
Xenophon also supplies a list of what he thinks comprises ‘Taktike’ at 5 xv

He believed also that tactics did not consist solely in being able easily to extend one's line or increase its depth, or to change it from a long column into a phalanx, or without error to change the front by a counter march according as the enemy came up on the right or the left or behind;2 but he considered it also a part of good tactics to break up one's army into several divisions whenever occasion demanded, and to place each division, too, where it would do the most good, and to make speed when it was necessary to reach a place before the enemy—all these and other such qualifications were essential, he believed, to a skilful tactician, and he devoted himself to them all alike
καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν δὲ εἶναι οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἡγεῖτο εἴ τις ἐκτεῖναι φάλαγγα εὐπόρως δύναιτο ἢ βαθῦναι ἢ ἐκ κέρατος εἰς φάλαγγα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἐκ δεξιᾶς ἢ ἀριστερᾶς ἢ ὄπισθεν ἐπιφανέντων πολεμίων ὀρθῶς ἐξελίξαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶν ὁπότε δέοι τακτικὸν ἡγεῖτο, καὶ τὸ τιθέναι γε τὸ μέρος ἕκαστον ὅπου μάλιστα ἐν ὠφελείᾳ ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ ταχύνειν δὲ ὅπου φθάσαι δέοι, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τακτικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι καὶ ἐπεμελεῖτο τούτων πάντων ὁμοίως.

Not a hint of the allegedly essential interjection of half files.
....Except the very explicit dinner drill, of course, mentioned earlier in his book. Having explained in detail once, you’d hardly expect him to repeat it. Also, how do you expect a phalanx to alter depth, unless the dinner drill is used ? Again note that counter-marching can only be performed in open order, but that fighting is done in close order. The ‘divisions’ referred to are ‘Taxeis/companies’
Nor is Xenophon’s purpose to provide a manual for hoplite drill, he tells us his purpose at 8 xxvii


"I think now that I have accomplished the task that I set before myself. For I maintain that I have proved that the Persians of the present day and those living in their dependencies are less reverent toward the gods, less dutiful to their relatives, less upright in their dealings with all men, and less brave in war than they were of old. But if anyone should entertain an opinion contrary to my own, let him examine their deeds and he will find that these testify to the truth of my statements".

To imagine that Xenophon had only one purpose is an over-simplification. The Cyropaedia killed a number of birds with one stone. If his sole purpose was the stated one, then there was no need to go into technical details of how an army should be armed, drilled, supplied, marched, tactically deployed and so forth.
Xenophon took the opportunity to expound his thoughts on these subjects, which could not be easily fitted into his historical works.
So what can be said for the theory that hoplites entered the battleground in open order and then closed to a 3ft frontage by half-file insertion?

1) It is not mentioned as occurring in any ancient source at all.
Our sources on technical information on hoplites, Greek and non-Greek, is scanty to say the least. Leaving aside odd bits of information in plays and poetry, we have only Herodotus, who tells us almost nothing by way of technical information, Thucydides who tells us a few tid-bits, and Xenophon who, outside his historical works, gives us more technical information in his Cyropaedia and Cavalry Commander than all other Classical authors put together.I have mentioned already that some things, like Thucydides accidental rightward drift, are only referred to once in our sources. In the Cyropaedia, the dinner drill describes in general terms ( since no numbers are given), basic hoplite drill – and in all the detail we might wish for. To say it is not mentioned as occurring in any ancient source is a misleading falsehood – it is mentioned in the Cyropaedia and in detail.
It should not surprise that basic drill is generally not referred to in histories, for Herodotus’, Thucydides’ and Xenophon’s readers were all perfectly familiar with that drill, and we are very lucky that Xenophon took the trouble to describe it.
2) The text from which it was inferred, the so-call Dinner Drill does not actually represent hoplites or the like doing anything, its purpose is purely to demonstrate Kyros rewarding drill (we do not hear much about the next taxiarch who is rewarded for teaching his men to simply about face and carry on with the worst men now in front! Is Xenophon denying the validity of the countermarching he later considers a good part of Taktike?)
As I have repeatedly said – and you can read this for yourselves gentle reader - the fictional Cyrus’ equips his Persians for close quarter fighting, drills them for same, and this is the function of ‘hoplites’. Xenophon specifically calls them hoplites on a number of occasions. Are we expected to accept that Agesilaos here knows better than Xenophon of Athens ? When is a hoplite not a hoplite? When Agesilaos says he is a ‘Takabara’ – a troop type which probably never existed, and who was in fact a peltast ? Anyone who believes in the cockamamie theories of C. Matthew clearly lacks an in-depth knowledge of classical Greek warfare and hoplites and therefore has little or no credibility. Ranged against him are really knowledgable scholars such as Anderson and Connolly, who agree with me regarding the system of files and half-files – which hypothesis has stood essentially unchallenged for 35 years or so!
3) We are asked to believe that the Greeks continually referred not to fighting depths when speaking of the depth of lines but to the initial approach depth in open order, apart from those odd numbers which do not fit viz. the 25 Theban depth at Delion.
A hoplite phalanx, whether on the march or arrayed in phalanx/battle line, spent virtually all its time in files in open order – only closing up into half-files briefly for actual combat, as any middle class Greek would know. What more natural than to refer to files in this order – so natural or ‘normal’ that the formation had no special name ? Unless some other order – close order –is specified, it is this ‘normal’ order that is being referred to in our sources.
4) The passage in Anabasis supporting a four deep norm is subject to more than one interpretation. And when looked at holistically is more likely to mean that the troops were on a unit frontage of four and a depth of eight, certainly the most commonly reported depth.
This is simply not true. Even to suggest this, Agesilaos has to distort the translation ( see above) for the Greeks don’t ‘form by fours’, they “form in battle order/array [etaxqhsan –check the meaning yourselves, readers, via the LSJ] in fours” i.e the whole formation is in fours which can only mean a four deep line. Every translation you will find agrees this means ‘deep’ here – except Agesilaos, who is simply wrong.
5) Modern analogies with riot police are deceptive as the situations are not the same; and both Ukranian and Korean police can be seen formed eight deep to resist rioters. Even if four is sufficient depth reserves are required as someone in the front rank is bound to die making a weak spot. Once broken through phalanxes tend to break.
Just so. In riots the front ranks aren’t (usually!) killed – a breach can be created by attrition – it is for this reason the Spartans prudently increased their file depth to 12 ( 6 in half-files )
6) The theory relies on a unique translation of ‘paragein’ in a passage that does not refer to hoplites.
Not a unique translation – check the LSJ. It is once again Agesilaos’ version which is an incorrect translation. And for the ‘n’th time, the troops here can be nothing but hoplites. What other troop type would be drilling in formation to achieve close order ? ( and Agesilaos’ idea that the drill can be done in any order does not compute – see above)
7) The theory presupposes that every state was organised down to Spartan levels which they clearly were not and we are frequently told they were not by the sources.
This is illogical, and obviously incorrect. For a hoplite phalanx to function at all, it had to be able move from open order to close order. This is basic follow-the-leader stuff that could be taught in minutes, and was probably known by all from boyhood. It is not 'Spartan levels'. Spartan drills were indeed more sophisticated.

That File/half-file drills and formations were known by all hoplites is proven by Xen Hellenica VII.2.7 – a reference outside the Cyropaedia to hoplite half-files. (remember only Greek hoplite armies are known to have had half-files – they did not exist in the real Persian army ). In the very small ‘polis’ of Phlius in the Peloponnese, Xenophon casually mentions a Phliasian‘half-file’/ pempadas. If the smaller state’s hoplites were organised into files and half-files, then it’s pretty safe to assume all were. That one reference alone pops the balloon of Agesilaos’ eccentric view that the dinner drill of files and half-files was not Greek hoplite drill, especially considering only Greeks had half-files, and real Persians didn’t.
8. The theory cannot cope with the weakened centre of the Athenians at Marathon without assuming they were two deep in combat, good enough for Kyros and his tower backed Persians but hardly a real option.
Herodotus VI.111.3:
“As the Athenians were marshalled at Marathon, it happened that their line of battle was extended as long as the line of the Medes. The center, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep, but each wing was strong in numbers.”
Since the centre companies were actually ‘broken through’ this is consistent with what was said earlier about a line 4 ranks deep being sufficient to avoid this – obviously the Athenian line here was stretched to less than 4 ranks deep. So yes, it likely did happen, especially as it occurred inadvertently. The plain was around 2,464 yards wide for most of its length, but longer at the Greek end. ( as I mentioned on 31 july). A line of 9-10,000 hoplites 4 deep in close order just fills this, and would be somewhat stretched especially at the outset.
9) Xenophon’s description of Mnasippos’ defeat t Kerkyra contradicts the theory however one interprets it.
That is simply not true. Against a ‘mass’ of men, 8 deep in open order might well seem a ‘weak’ formation, especially as 12 was the contemporary Spartan norm. From the map too, it is apparent that with the phalanx relatively close to the wall, the flank would threatened. The obvious solution, as I’ve said several times now, was to move back out of harm’s way – by an about turn and move to the rear ( anastrophe). The danger with such a move is that a ‘tactical’ retreat becomes the real thing, as happened in this instance.
Theories based on mis-interpretation (Dinner Drill), mistranslation (paragein) AND a total lack of ancient reference are rarely correct.
Let’s see. It is you who have repeatedly mis-interpreted ( and mis-represented) the dinner drill ( only performable by Greek hoplites in real life since Persians didn’t have half-files. Like I said, you are clearly “in denial” to insist otherwise – see above).
It is also you who mistranslates ‘paragon’ and its variations a number of times ( see ante and compare LSJ translation ) and there are plenty of ancient references, considering the paucity of sources I referred to above !!

The system of files and half-files is the only hypothesis that is consistent with all the evidence, and no other that I have seen is. Moreover, it is verified by extrinsic evidence - the size of known battlefields and the numbers of troops involved.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by agesilaos »

No, Arrian does not use ‘dekadarchos’ as a ‘generic file-leader’ but for specifically Macedonian ones, just as he uses ‘dekados’ for the file; these terms are exclusive to the Macedonians and certainly do not reflect any general usage , appearing only here at VII 23 iii.

In the Cyropaedia Xenophon changes his organisation on a whim from tens to twelves, nothing suggests this is not Xenophon’s own lapse.

However, in the Hellenica there is reference to a Phliasian ‘pempadas’[ VII.2.6] lit: squad of five, but since so far as we know Greeks were not organised on a decimal system, this likely means ‘half-file’. ( The only reference to 10 is Agesilaos’ “9 or 10 files” which was an ‘ad hoc’ arrangement on the march, and likely dictated by terrain in the narrow valley
No ‘pempadas’ just means a ‘group of five’ and Greek expresses our ‘one in five’ as ‘one in each group of five’, no organisation is implied, there are fifty guards and ten watch during the day, it is an ad hoc assignment. Think about your next statement, ‘the Greeks were not organised on a decimal system’, with which I agree, why would they name their officers for a system they did not use? The Macedonians were originally organised decimally because they were under Achaemenid rule, hence their decades.

If you read your Hellenika, it is clear that the depth of ‘nine or ten shields’ refers to when Agesilaos has left the valley and has again formed his line, so neither ‘ad hoc’ nor constrained by the terrain, the strange numbers reflect the losses at Leuktra and the subsequent diminishment of Spartan territory.

I can see you are quite confused here about what I am saying; pempadarchs command five men, and dekadarchs ten, hexarchs six and dodekadarchs twelve, these are all within the ranks. Lochagoi are supernumary and command in the first instance twenty men so that a lochos contains twenty one men, and in the second a lochos is twenty-five. Yes Xenophon says that they should be fifty but he has forgotten what he has written, these are not ‘generic drills’ they are authorial gaffs. The 100 deep files have to be four lochoi (organisationally the same as the dinner drill but not numerically) of twenty five because forty-nine does not divide into twelve nor does fifty.

You seem to have read DOdekadarchs as dekadarchs, they are different and Xenophon uses them to mean different things he just can’t remember what he has said, this inconsistency merely demonstrates that he is not writing accurate Taktike, the so-called drill is background fluff.

GIGO, yet the next paragraph concedes I might be right, double-think? Have you considered that Paralus might come down on my side of the argument more than yours because I have the stronger arguments, a statistician would interpret your perceptions thus (I think Paralus capable of independent thought and judgement…except when he disagrees with me of course!).

More to follow….
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote:A gross exaggeration. ‘Medising’ first occurs in Herodotus to describe the total submission of a city-state to Persian rule, by the sending of earth and water.[e.g Herodotus VII.138]. States that ‘medised’ were vassals of Persia and took up arms against the independent Greek city-states and were regarded as traitors by them.
I see. We are now to make 'Medising' a technical term to be defined by the giving of "earth and water" and becoming "vassals of Persia"? Let me apply your malleable get-out clause to Greek terms and insist that this changed as the environment changed. Yes, "Medising" was consorting with the enemy by taking up arms against other Greeks at the time of the Persian invasions. This was not the case afterwards. When there was no Persian invasion "Medising" was consorting with the enemy to gain advantage. Thus Agesilaos could famously counter claim that Persia 'Lakonised' to counter the view that Sparta was (plainly) 'Medising'. Thus Isokrates could rail at the King being the 'arbiter of all Greek affairs' due to the 'trafficking with the Persian'.

How the Greeks saw "Medising" during the first half of the fourth century was rather somewhat different than your static, set in stone version.
Xenophon wrote:It seems to me that there is little to choose between the two similar accounts of embassies to the Great King, and certainly not the huge contrast Paralus would have us believe. Xenophon simply gives a brief account of the statements of both parties, and the fact that ultimately both embassies failed to achieve their goals. Indeed Pelopidas gets more praise for his efforts than the Spartan Antilcidas.........

One can only conclude that Xenophon was reporting the two embassies in much the same factual manner, without any particular bias.
Again it seems you don't really understand the King's Peace and the events leading to it or your namesake's views. If you did you'd realise that what you've quoted is the desperate mission of Antalkidas in 392 to secure a "deal" and support of Persia on behalf of a hegemon clearly losing the battle (as any reading of 4.8 will show). This is not the embassy from Sparta which resulted in the King's Peace: that Peace would be agreed six years after what you claim are the negotiations for same. To equate these two notices is incorrect. One is to secure a koine eirene and the position of 'prostatai' which Sparta had enjoyed since 386; the other is Sparta looking to Persia for money and alliance against Athens or "put an end" to Persian aid to Athens. Also, what you leave out - possibly out of ignorance of it - is the fact that those who followed Antalkidas to Tirabazus were the Athenians and "ambassadors from their allies" when they found out Sparta had sent Antalkidas - not 'the other cities' (Greeks in general). Of the negotiations with the King which actually sealed Sparta's deal with Persia (sans the other Greeks) we are told nothing. At 5.1.6 Antalkidas sails to Ephesos as Nauarch and then delegates his command. We are then told (5.1.25) that he returned "from the Persian capital" with the resultant peace. No one involved other than Sparta and the Persians.

Now, no one disagrees that Sparta's pitiful surrender of the "Greeks of Asia" was part of that deal; it is in the royal rescript. What Xenophon doesn't tell anyone is that the rescript was read out in Sparta - just like Thebes. I'd be most pleased if you could anywhere point to Xenophon stating that "the Spartans schemed for hegemony of Greece and sought the help of the Great King in that scheming" with respect to the King's Peace (or any of its subsequent iterations with her as prostatai). I will not hold my breath for such a slander of Sparta never appears in his pages.

*Edit for clarification and lowering the 'combative' level...
Last edited by Paralus on Thu Aug 21, 2014 6:59 am, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by agesilaos »

So, your case is that θωρακοφόρος is a synonym for ‘hoplite’, well, this word is used outside Xenophon’s novel, by Herodotos, in fact, whom Xenophon had surely read. Lo and behold it is applied to Egyptian marines VII 89 iii
οὗτοι δὲ εἶχον περὶ μὲν τῇσι κεφαλῇσι κράνεα χηλευτά, ἀσπίδας δὲ κοίλας, τὰς ἴτυς μεγάλας ἐχούσας, καὶ δόρατά τε ναύμαχα καὶ τύχους μεγάλους. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος αὐτῶν θωρηκοφόροι ἦσαν, μαχαίρας δὲ μεγάλας εἶχον.

The Egyptians furnished two hundred ships. They wore woven helmets and carried hollow shields with broad rims, and spears for sea-warfare, and great battle-axes. Most of them wore cuirasses and carried long swords.
Lycian marines armed with cornel wood bows, no need to press for Indian archers these chaps are hoplites armed only with bows, if the words are synonyms; VII 92
λύκιοι δὲ παρείχοντο νέας πεντήκοντα θωρηκοφόροι τε ἐόντες καὶ κνημιδοφόροι, εἶχον δὲ τόξα κρανέινα καὶ ὀιστοὺς καλαμίνους ἀπτέρους καὶ ἀκόντια, ἐπὶ δὲ αἰγὸς δέρμα περὶ τοὺς ὤμους αἰωρεύμενον, περὶ δὲ τῇσι κεφαλῇσι πίλους πτεροῖσι περιεστεφανωμένους: ἐγχειρίδια δὲ καὶ δρέπανα εἶχον. Λύκιοι δὲ Τερμίλαι ἐκαλέοντο ἐκ Κρήτης γεγονότες, ἐπὶ δὲ Λύκου τοῦ Πανδίονος ἀνδρὸς Ἀθηναίου ἔσχον τὴν ἐπωνυμίην.

The Lycians furnished fifty ships; they wore cuirasses and greaves, and carried cornel-wood bows and unfeathered arrows and javelins; goat-skins hung from their shoulders, and they wore on their heads caps crowned with feathers; they also had daggers and scimitars. The Lycians are from Crete and were once called Termilae; they took their name from Lycus son of Pandion, an Athenian.
And finally at VIII 113 ii
ὡς δὲ ἀπίκατο ἐς τὴν Θεσσαλίην, ἐνθαῦτα Μαρδόνιος ἐξελέγετο πρώτους μὲν τοὺς Πέρσας πάντας τοὺς ἀθανάτους καλεομένους, πλὴν Ὑδάρνεος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ (οὗτος γὰρ οὐκ ἔφη λείψεσθαι βασιλέος), μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Περσέων τοὺς θωρηκοφόρους καὶ τὴν ἵππον τὴν χιλίην, καὶ Μήδους τε καὶ Σάκας καὶ Βακτρίους τε καὶ Ἰνδούς, καὶ τὸν πεζὸν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἵππον

When they had arrived in Thessaly, Mardonius first chose all the Persians called Immortals, save only Hydarnes their general who said that he would not quit the king's person, and next, the Persian cuirassiers and the thousand horse and the Medes and Sacae and Bactrians and Indians, alike their infantrymen and the rest of the horsemen.
So, unless you wish to argue that both archers and cavalry CAN be hoplites, your point fails. The Persians in the Kyrou Paideia are only termed hoplites in book VII 5 iii, and VIII 5 xi and xii. They are ‘thorakophoroi’ six times.

‘Thorakophoroi’ only means ‘wearing a thorax/bodyarmour’ it is never applied to Greek hoplites and is thus not a synonym.

You continually say that no numbers are given in the Dinner Drill, yet they clearly are, pempadarchs and dekadarchs mean files of ten and half files of five or files of five and double files of ten. As much else stems from these two erroneous points I'll leave it there.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Xenophon »

Here's a little reminder of Paralus' perspicacity, and of how, despite many months and well over 100,000 words this thread is very much a case of 'plus ca change, plus ca meme chose.'.............

Xenophon wrote,Way back on page 3 Sat July 6 :
Paralus wrote:
This will be a debate that will consume pages; even more than it already has! Arguments have been called into question and method queried. Xenophon has praised the ‘collaborative’ approach to gathering and assessing the evidence (such as it is) and I agree. Xenophon has also drawn attention to forcing of evidence and translations (though I don’t necessarily sit with the latter). In that vein I offer just a couple from top of my head after a quick read of the recent posts.

I hope not! I have already spent far too much time and effort on this subject....in effect writing a book on it in response to Ageilaos' so far unsubstantiated [ by evidence] assertions of his own views, contra those of Anderson, Connolly and myself which have held for 40 years. Hopefully, rather than the somewhat negative attacks he has thus far put forward, he will make a more positive case, supported by evidence to support his conviction - if he can - rather than mere bald assertions without full explanation.
Now, we are not only into Xenophon's fictional Persian 'hoplites' not being hoplites at all, purely on Agesilaos' say-so,but 'pempadas', ( and pempadarch) used by Xenophon to refer to a half-file in the Cyropaedia, doesn't mean 'half-file' in the Hellenika !! It means 'group of five' ! Yes, that is its literary origin, and what the LSJ says, but there is no doubt whatsoever that Xenophon uses the term in connection with files and half-files.[e.g. XC IV.5.5] A 'group of five' IS a 'half-file' in Xenophon, not a random collection of people that just happens to number five !! Xenophon's 'group of five' is a sub-unit of a 'group of ten'[dekad] which is a file led by a 'dekadarch', and has a formal leader [pempadarch ] who commands it, and sets an example for it.[XC II.1.22]

As per the above, another bald assertion without evidence, or even why Agesilaos thinks so....and one which contradicts what Xenophon actually says (Again !!!)

Reminds me of the 'Monty Python' game of "cheese-shop". I name a cheese and Agesilaos as shopkeeper has to come up with an excuse as to why he hasn't got it........ :lol: :lol: :lol:

Agesilaos wrote:
‘Thorakophoroi’ only means ‘wearing a thorax/bodyarmour’ it is never applied to Greek hoplites and is thus not a synonym.
I shan't repeat your examples. Yet again, you adopt the illogical argument of trying to compare apples and pears. Yes, Herodotus uses 'thorakaphoroi' only to denote barbarian armour wearing troops. Xenophon's fictional Persians are also 'thorakaphoroi' ( a total of 6 times according to the LSJ) in the Herodotian sense,[barbarian armoured infantry] BUT he also calls these same troops 'hoplites' ( a total of 5 times, according to the LSJ in the passages you refer to). Where two words or terms are used to refer to the same thing, they are synonyms ( Oxford dictionary).

Xenophon uses 'thorakaphoroi' and 'hoplites' as synonyms, though Herodotus doesn't. Savvy ?

[digression: Why do you think the Persian 'thorakaphoroi' at H. VIII.113.2 are cavalry? Nothing suggests they are, and the translations I have seen translate 'thorakaphoroi' as 'armoured infantry' or even 'spearmen'.]
You continually say that no numbers are given in the Dinner Drill, yet they clearly are, pempadarchs and dekadarchs mean files of ten and half files of five or files of five and double files of ten. As much else stems from these two erroneous points I'll leave it there.
That depends on whether 'dekadarch' which obviously originated as 'leader of ten' ONLY means 'ten' - earlier you at one point talked of files of twelve and six for half-files in your calculations as well, evidently confused. I could take a leaf out of your book, with Herodotus, and illogically argue that since Arrian tells us a 'dekadarch' commanded a file of sixteen, that must be what Xenophon means, but I won't, for obvious reasons! Do you now see why your comparison is illogical ? :lol:

Xenophon certainly refers to 'dekads' etc meaning literally 'ten' with reference to the fictional hybrid Persian troops, re-organised in Greek fashion, but in the dinner drill, he can only be referring to GREEK practice, for real Persian army organisation didn't have 'pempadarchs' ( nor 'lochoi' either), only Greek, and hoplite files were not organised into tens, so the terms are unlikely to be literal numbers here.

Now of course it is not strictly true that Hoplites weren't organised in files of 10, at least theoretically. For example, Spartans served in the army from their 21st to 60th years, thus producing theoretically 40 men in an enomotia, in 4 files of 10, and would each be commanded by a 'dekadarch'. In reality, the older men very seldom took the field.[ the only time we are told of is after Leuktra]. Thus, at Mantinea the call-up would have consisted of those up to 31 years from manhood, producing Thucydides 4 files of 8 - each still commanded by its 'dekadarch', and at Leuktra we are told that those 35 years from manhood were called up, formed in 3 files of 12, but each would have been still commanded by its 'dekadarch' - it is unlikely that title nomenclature would change every time the file depth did.(c.f. Roman centurions, whose centuries varied in numbers over time or different campaigns, but were never 100, or a more contemporary example, in the real Persian army a 'Sataraptis' [ translated by Greeks as ' taxiarch'] , commander of 100 , in reality commanded 50-60 men,[ at least in garrisons] as shown by ration documents). A stated number under command does not mean that number was actually commanded.

Thus, 'dekadarch' ,strictly speaking, 'file leader of ten', very likely came in practice to mean command of actual files of 8 or 12, depending on the age-classes actually called up.

So Xenophon's usage of 'dekadarch' and 'pempadarch' in the dinner drill doesn't necessarily literally mean 10 and 5 respectively, but as with the Spartan model he has in mind, could mean some other (unknown) number - which is unimportant anyway, because the drill works with any even number, hence Xenophon not referring to a specific number.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote:Here's a little reminder of Paralus' perspicacity, and of how, despite many months and well over 100,000 words this thread is very much a case of 'plus ca change, plus ca meme chose.'..............
Seems I'm fine on the 'yet to come'....
Xenophon wrote:We actually had that discussion back in 2009...
But not so fine on the memory. The nursing home cometh...
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Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.

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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote:
I see. We are now to make 'Medising' a technical term to be defined by the giving of "earth and water" and becoming "vassals of Persia"
I hope this is a misunderstanding by you, and not a wilful misreading, of what I wrote? In your quotation of me you'll notice I said "first occurs in Herodotus", to explain how the term arose and why it had such pejorative connotations of slavish submission and treachery.
Thus Agesilaos could famously counter claim that Persia 'Lakonised' to counter the view that Sparta was (plainly) 'Medising'. Thus Isokrates could rail at the King being the 'arbiter of all Greek affairs' due to the 'trafficking with the Persian'.
An accusation of 'medising', with the connotations I mentioned, was a serious insult. To Agesilaus, an accusation of 'Medising' just because of negotiating with the Great King was an absurdity - hence his joke about say rather that Persia was 'Lakonising'.
As for Isokrates, that pan-Hellenic crusader might rail against the Great King's influence in Greece, but he certainly doesn't, and wouldn't accuse any Greek state of 'medising' in this passage.

My point is that Xenophon doesn't accuse either Sparta or Thebes or Athens or anyone else of 'medising' ( with its connotations) in respect of sending embassies to the Great King to curry favour.

That accusation is yours, and clearly an exaggeration, not present in Xenophon.
Again it seems you don't really understand the King's Peace and the events leading to it or your namesake's views. If you did you'd realise that what you've quoted is the desperate mission of Antalkidas in 392 to secure a "deal" and support of Persia on behalf of a hegemon clearly losing the battle (as any reading of 4.8 will show). This is not the embassy from Sparta which resulted in the King's Peace: that Peace would be agreed six years after what you claim are the negotiations for same.
More 'misunderstanding' ? I never said the passage I quoted was in reference to the Kings Peace. As you say, what Xenophon has to say about the King's Peace is fairly brief [XH V.1.28 -35], and he does not say what the Spartan ambassador, Antalcidas , a son-in-law of the Great King, said to that monarch - most likely because at his estate at Skyllas, no specific information came to Xenophon about the negotiations - especially as no other states were involved. Nor, according to Xenophon, was Antalcidas' mission a 'desperate' one, and it was certainly very successful - the other states all had their motives to make peace, hence this attempt succeeded in an agreed peace, unlike other occasions already referred to. Your accusation of "ignorance" is wrong and insulting - I am just as familiar with the 'Hellenika' and the period generally as you, if not more so ! :wink:

My aim here, as I think was obvious, was to compare two examples of 'peace embassies', one Spartan, one Theban as described by Xenophon, and that there was no significant 'bias' in Xenophon's accounts. Perhaps I should have clarified that this was not a reference to the 'King's peace' by giving the date, for those not knowledgeable of the period, but that did not occur to me - the knowledgeable such as yourself would have known the passage, which I fully referenced anyway.
I'd be most pleased if you could anywhere point to Xenophon stating that "the Spartans schemed for hegemony of Greece and sought the help of the Great King in that scheming" with respect to the King's Peace (or any of its subsequent iterations with her as prostatai). I will not hold my breath for such a slander of Sparta never appears in his pages.
Perhaps he does not, but he is quick to criticise Sparta's actions with her new found hegemony - e.g. the forcing of Mantinea in Arcadia, to disband into its four constituent villages, referred to previously. The largest intervention was a campaign in 382 BC to break up the Chalcidian League in northeastern Greece, as violating the autonomy principle of the Great King's decree.
On the way there, in 383 BC the Spartan commander Phoebidas, invited by a pro-Spartan faction, seized the Theban Kadmeia (the Theban acropolis) and left a Laconophile oligarchy supported by a Spartan garrison; even the pro-Spartan Xenophon could only attribute the act to 'hubris' . [ see e.g. V.4.1 or VI.3.4.ff for example]

As I have said, all this belongs in another thread - not one about 'taktike'.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote: Nor, according to Xenophon, was Antalcidas' mission a 'desperate' one, and it was certainly very successful - the other states all had their motives to make peace, hence this attempt succeeded in an agreed peace, unlike other occasions already referred to. Your accusation of "ignorance" is wrong and insulting - I am just as familiar with the 'Hellenika' and the period generally as you, if not more so ! :wink:
You might well be more familiar with the Helleika than myself but you are hardly as familiar with what I've written. Antalkidas' mission was indeed desperate. Spartan naval power in the Aegean had been crushed so fully that a Persian fleet sailed the Aegean uncontested. Athens' walls were rebuilt. His mission was also unsuccessful (though he obtained the ear and, later, the support of Tiribazos). He obtained no alliance or support for Sparta and Persian Darics continued to support Athens.
Xenophon wrote:My aim here, as I think was obvious, was to compare two examples of 'peace embassies', one Spartan, one Theban as described by Xenophon, and that there was no significant 'bias' in Xenophon's accounts.
Which was not ever the point of my comparison. Which comparison was Xenophon's treatment of Thebes' attempt to arrange a King's Peace with itself in Sparta's former position of prostatai and that of his treatment of Sparta's successful attempt of 386. Your response was to compare Thebes' Attempt with Sparta's desperate attempt to sway Persia from support of Athens (at worst) to alliance and support of herself (at best). Apples and oranges. As I've noted, while we get the full 'Diodoran' summary of the arguments of the Thebans conniving at rule over Greece, we hear absolutely nothing of Antalkidas' words on behalf of an altruistic Sparta, only the rescript read out. That Xenophon heard nothing of it really doesn't cut it. He didn't bother to report it.
Xenophon wrote:Perhaps he does not, but he is quick to criticise Sparta's actions with her new found hegemony - e.g. the forcing of Mantinea in Arcadia, to disband into its four constituent villages, referred to previously. The largest intervention was a campaign in 382 BC to break up the Chalcidian League in northeastern Greece, as violating the autonomy principle of the Great King's decree.
On the way there, in 383 BC the Spartan commander Phoebidas, invited by a pro-Spartan faction, seized the Theban Kadmeia (the Theban acropolis) and left a Laconophile oligarchy supported by a Spartan garrison; even the pro-Spartan Xenophon could only attribute the act to 'hubris' . [ see e.g. V.4.1 or VI.3.4.ff for example].
And of these Xenophon only ever explicitly criticises the seizure of the Kadmeia which, by itself, brings the ire of "the divinity" resulting in defeat at Leuktra and invasion of the Peloponnese. Of Mantinea he says nothing other than it was a good thing and the 'rich' were pleased (5.2.7). In fact, the Kadmeia episode aside, Xenophon contends that all Sparta's actions post the King's Peace to 379 were rewarded presenting Sparta with a "rule" that was "strong and secure". No condemnation there.

It likely does belong elsewhere.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote:
You might well be more familiar with the Helleika than myself but you are hardly as familiar with what I've written. Antalkidas' mission was indeed desperate. Spartan naval power in the Aegean had been crushed so fully that a Persian fleet sailed the Aegean uncontested. Athens' walls were rebuilt. His mission was also unsuccessful (though he obtained the ear and, later, the support of Tiribazos). He obtained no alliance or support for Sparta and Persian Darics continued to support Athens.
Shome confusion here shurely ??......and alas its on my part!! Mea Culpa! :?

Antalcidas embarked on at least 3 embassies: -
*The one of 392, which I quoted Xenophon's report of in my comparison, and was unsuccessful as I quoted.

* The one of 387 BC which resulted in 'The King's Peace' also called 'Peace of Antalcidas' which brought about a general peace on the basis that:
1.The whole of Asia Minor, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, was recognized by all as subject to The Great King (Artaxerxes)
2.The other Greek cities—that were not under Persian rule—were to be independent, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to belong, as previously, to Athens.
3.If any of the parties refused the terms, the Great King and the other cities would make war on them [XH V.1.31]
This peace was renewed in 375 BC.

*The one of (probably) 367 BC, which I also quoted Xenophon's account of, in which Pelopidas was at first successful, but the Greek cities subsequently refused to ratify. Antalcidas, the Great King's son-in-law was mortified at his loss of influence with his father-in-law, and it was said he committed suicide by starving himself to death.

For some reason I thought it was the embassy of 387 that you were saying was 'desperate', probably because that was the embassy you had been talking about previously. In fact it was the embassy of 392, which I should have realised because you put "392" immediately after your reference !!

Certainly, the scales were tipped in Athens favour in 391 by the matters you mention, and Spartan military efforts were concentrated on keeping their foes out of the Peloponnese - a far cry from Agesilaos' earlier campaigns in Asia, but I think I would reserve 'desperate' for Sparta fighting for its very survival against the Thebans 369 to 362 BC, when her enemies invaded Laconia 3 times. I'ts a bit of an exaggeration to describe the situation of 392 as 'desperate'.

And I'd agree with you that in general Xenophon thought Spartan hegemony a good thing [V.3.27]
"Things had certainly gone well for Sparta. The Thebans and the rest of the Boeotians were entirely under control,[ due to the seizure of the Cadmeia and Spartan alliance with Thebes Boeotian rivals Thespiae and Orchomenus] the Corinthians had become perfectly reliable, the Argives finding that the pretext of the sacred months was no longer any help to them,had their pride humbled, [ The Argives had forcibly "united" with Corinth from 392, and by 390 had occupied it], and while the Athenians were left isolated, all allies of Sparta who had shown hostility had been brought to heel. Thus it appeard that now at last Spartan supremacy had been established".
But then he immediately goes on to criticise Spartan actions, especially the seizure of the Theban Cadmeia, as 'hubris' - there seems to have been a dichotomy in Xenophon's attitude to Sparta.....
As I've noted, while we get the full 'Diodoran' summary of the arguments of the Thebans conniving at rule over Greece, we hear absolutely nothing of Antalkidas' words on behalf of an altruistic Sparta, only the rescript read out. That Xenophon heard nothing of it really doesn't cut it. He didn't bother to report it.
Like I said, the most likely and obvious reason for this is that back on his estate, Xenophon heard no details - no doubt what passed between Artaxerxes and his son-in-law Antalcidas did not become public knowledge. Moreover, Xenophon was an adherent and friend of King Agesilaos, while Antalcidas was an opponent of the King, so it is most unlikely that information from this direction would come Xenophon's way. Xenophon can't report what he didn't know. He certainly had no reason to suppress the details of this Spartan diplomatic triumph, and would surely have reported same, if he was aware of them.
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Re: Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

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Xenophon wrote: Certainly, the scales were tipped in Athens favour in 391 by the matters you mention, and Spartan military efforts were concentrated on keeping their foes out of the Peloponnese - a far cry from Agesilaos' earlier campaigns in Asia, but I think I would reserve 'desperate' for Sparta fighting for its very survival against the Thebans 369 to 362 BC, when her enemies invaded Laconia 3 times. I'ts a bit of an exaggeration to describe the situation of 392 as 'desperate'.
No, I don't see 'desperate' as going too far. In the shadows of the Peloponnesian War, victorious Sparta (somewhat) covertly supported the rebellion of Kyros. In the aftermath of that failure Sparta, very publicly as 'liberator of the Greeks', overtly went to war in western Asia Minor for the freedom of the Greeks of Asia. In 396 she sent Agesilaos, even more publicly, to campaign to that end and in 395, her demands for said freedom rebuffed, the ehpors gave that king command of both army and fleet to help him destroy "the empire that had attacked Greece in the past" (Xen. Ages. 1.37). With the Korinthian war needing serious attention in Greece Agesilaos is recalled home and, in 394, Sparta's fleet is destroyed by Persia at Knidos. Beset on the home front and with Konon and the Persian fleet doing as it pleased in Athens and the Aegean, Sparta rolled over and offered the King that which he'd demanded under the alliance of 411and which Sparta, in her post-war hubris, had continually and publicly refused.

Political back-flips are never pretty and this is one 'mother' of a back-flip. They are, almost without exception, born of desperation.
Xenophon wrote:And I'd agree with you that in general Xenophon thought Spartan hegemony a good thing [V.3.27]
"Things had certainly gone well for Sparta. The Thebans and the rest of the Boeotians were entirely under control,[ due to the seizure of the Cadmeia and Spartan alliance with Thebes Boeotian rivals Thespiae and Orchomenus] the Corinthians had become perfectly reliable, the Argives finding that the pretext of the sacred months was no longer any help to them [ Argos and Corinth had united partly on this basis around 390], had their pride humbled, and while the Athenians were left isolated, all allies of Sparta who had shown hostility had been brought to heel. Thus it appeard that now at last Spartan supremacy had been established".
But then he immediately goes on to criticise Spartan actions, especially the seizure of the Theban Cadmeia, as 'hubris' - there seems to have been a dichotomy in Xenophon's attitude to Sparta.....
Good you threw in the reference. I'd left that out. It's not only "the hegemony" but the actions which so underpinned it. And, yes, he does criticise the seizing of the Kadmeia. As I said, it is the one clear thing he took exception to because, as Xenophon makes clear, it was this which brought the wrath of "the divinity" - not what went before - and laid Sparta low. Interestingly, he does not moralise on its continued occupation. That is rationalised as being to Sparta's benefit by Agesilaos and so is fine. What we learn from Plutarch (Ages. 23.11) is that Agesilaos argued the case for Sparta to continue to hold it.
Xenophon wrote:Like I said, the most likely and obvious reason for this is that back on his estate, Xenophon heard no details - no doubt what passed between Artaxerxes and his son-in-law Antalcidas did not become public knowledge. Moreover, Xenophon was an adherent and friend of King Agesilaos, while Antalcidas was an opponent of the King, so it is most unlikely that information from this direction would come Xenophon's way. Xenophon can't report what he didn't know. He certainly had no reason to suppress the details of this Spartan diplomatic triumph, and would surely have reported same, if he was aware of them.
Which is why he also doesn't tell us that the King's representative read out the terms of the peace in Sparta. You are correct that Xenophon "was an adherent" of Agesilaos. As a friend of the Spartan king it is far more likely than not that he was only too well aware of what Antalkidas' "party" had proposed and said as he demonstrates when he has the King's half brother (Teleutias) rail against exactly that as Antalkidas is off to the King (Hell. 5.1.14-17). One simply cannot explain Xenophon's many silences with "Xenophon can't report what he didn't know" as you've done both for this, Leuktra and the Theban statesmen.
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Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.

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