The rival accounts of the siege of Halikarnassos

[Paralus]

Paralus wrote:

I must say that this is a riveting discussion. Dimensions of triremes, speeds, carrying capacities, wieghts and lengths of siege equipment and their constituent parts. A veritable theme park for supply chain enthusiasts, though I think most readers are not such.

Xenophon wrote:
agesilaos wrote:
A mule can carry up to 300 lbs, but its 'normal' load, certainly in 20th C armies is more like 150-200 lbs.


Would that be a Lybian mule or a European mule? I'm not certain that the African mule is migratory in any case....

Yes, very droll!...and to answer your question, a mule is a mule, is a mule.....
The importance of all that 'military trivia' is that it allows us to establish what is possible from what is not - and the probable from the improbable, not to mention that some people find the subject of interest itself, whilst finding pontificating about the motives of this or that character, for example, boring - because it is futile and unknowable....each to their own,

It was simply a little humour and, having read the technical treatises (and sources) I actually agree with you. As to the assault on Myndus, we hadn't got to it . Hence my note of 'later'.

[Xenophon]

Yes, the humour was both acknowledged and appreciated !

Chronologically, it seems reasonable to deal with the episode of the abortive Myndus attack, before describing/contrasting the initial attacks by Alexander on Halicarnassus itself, let alone discussing the breach or breaches...

This is all the more so considering that Arrian's account does not exactly cover Alexander in glory (he is defeated), while Diodorus' account passes over the event....a major discrepancy between the two sources.....

[Paralus]

Yes, the humour was both acknowledged and appreciated !

Chronologically, it seems reasonable to deal with the episode of the abortive Myndus attack, before describing/contrasting the initial attacks by Alexander on Halicarnassus itself, let alone discussing the breach or breaches...

This is all the more so considering that Arrian's account does not exactly cover Alexander in glory (he is defeated), while Diodorus' account passes over the event....a major discrepancy between the two sources.....

As always, matters are intwined. Myndus and subsequent matters are such. Arrian's account exculpates Alexander elswhere; leaving unmentioned matters recorded in Diodorus. It must be remembered that Arrian is 'writing' and Diodorus is summarising; the latter will leave out what does not seem of importance... to the Sicilian.

Difficult on a phone...

[Paralus]

Yet another difference in the accounts is Alexander's taking over of the cities of Caria. Arrian (via his sources) presents this as a clockwork military exercise wherein all the cities that lay between Miletus and Halicarnassus are captured at the first attempt. Diodorus, on the other hand, makes it plain that much of this was done via diplomacy and "kind treatment" with the Greek cities being exempt from taxation under the banner of the "freedom of the Greeks". While it is likely that there will have been holdouts, Diodorus' account seems to me to be the more logical given this was Alexander's propaganda throughout the Asia Minor littoral. Arrian's source prefers the undefeated military aspects over the diplomatic. Diodorus attributes Ada's influence as a strong influence in Caria coming over to the conqueror whilst she makes a later appearance in Arrian's narrative in surrendering her one and only city to him (on his entry into Caria) and being appointed satrap post Halicarnassus.

[Xenophon]

I don't think this is quite correct. Arrian does not say, or imply, that the advance through Caria was a "military exercise" nor that the cities are "captured at the first attempt".What he actually says is : "The towns which lay upon his route surrendered without resistance...." which is not quite the same as 'captured' which implies some resistance. [ Arrian I.23] Since Memnon was concentrating all his forces in Halicarnassus, the towns and smaller cities garrisons must have been withdrawn, and so they probably had not the means to resist, even if they wanted to. 'Holdouts' in such circumstances would seem unlikely, and neither of our sources mentions any.

Diodorus says:"... he himself with all his army [ Philotas and his small army had evidently rejoined] marched into Caria, winning over the cities that lay on his route by kind treatment..." going on to describe Ada's part in securing Caria.I agree with you that Arrian/his sources omit all mention of Ada's diplomatic aid - only Diodorus mentioning that, by his restoring the Royal family's rule in the form of Ada: " Thus he won the loyal support of the Carians by the favour he bestowed on this woman." [Diod XVII.24.3]

Evidently the high-placed officers behind Arrian's account did not wish to diminish Alexander's glory by mentioning that Caria was won with the aid of a local ruler, and a woman at that. Diodorus' added details have the ring of truth about them, and to our eyes an admirable example of Alexander's skill in diplomacy.

Here, our sources are still in accord as to what happened, but with different 'spin'.......

[Paralus]

I don't think this is quite correct. Arrian does not say, or imply, that the advance through Caria was a "military exercise" nor that the cities are "captured at the first attempt".What he actually says is : "The towns which lay upon his route surrendered without resistance...." which is not quite the same as 'captured' which implies some resistance. [ Arrian I.23] Since Memnon was concentrating all his forces in Halicarnassus, the towns and smaller cities garrisons must have been withdrawn, and so they probably had not the means to resist, even if they wanted to. 'Holdouts' in such circumstances would seem unlikely, and neither of our sources mentions any.

I disagree. Arrian says nothing like the above (de Selincourt?). What he says is that the poleis between Miletus and Halicarnassus were λαβὼν ("seized" or "grasped").The word does not imply diplomacy or that all of these poleis surrendered without some resistance.

[agesilaos]

Absolutely, and all without the aid of a siege train Myndos shows that it was really only those cities on the march that submitted, no doubt after a show of force (Myndos was not en route. Anyway am half way through a longer post will be right back.

[agesilaos]

Ok, just one last attempt on the naval disparity.

I think we all agree that Memnon was a good general and an able admiral. It would also seem that he had good intelligence, at 19 ix the Persians ‘had learned’ ‘πεπυσμένοι ἦσαν’, that Alexander’s sailors were away gathering firewood and provisions. The situation seems to be of the main Persian fleet sitting out to sea, challenging the Macedonians to come out and fight, while a small squadron watched the harbour entrance. Or, perhaps, the five ships were bait (against that is the Iassian ship being a poor sailer, one would want the bait to escape and draw the pursuit onto the main body). In any case we see the Persians using small squadrons for observation and having intelligence assets ashore.

If the whole fleet did retire to Halikarnassos then Xenophon is right that it would be unable to respond to any seaborne dash from Miletos; if Memnon is a good general he would not yield his naval advantage. He would only have left the seas of the bay to the Macedonians if he was certain that they no longer possessed any seabourne forces. It must be borne in mind that Memnon was the advocate of a supply based strategy before Graneikos , unfortunately for him the Persian generals took Paralus’ view of logistics rather than Xenophon’s or mine! (I do recognise that is an unfair statement of Para’s position and can only plead my twisted sense of humour in mitigation).

As to where the fleet could provision, the whole fleet had done so on Samos when denied the use of the Meander, smaller squadrons with a watching brief have a ring of islands and ports to choose from including Bargylia, Iassos and Myndos. The latter two probably remained in Persian hands until the fall of Halikarnassos (except Salamkis and the Island, which held out until just before Issos). Bargylia is on the ancient road from Mylasa to Halikarnassos, and so would have capitulated on Alexander’s approach; further indication that Memnon knew he did not face a naval threat, Bargylia is as defensible as Salamkis, only if a port did not significantly help his enemy would a good general abandon a defensible position, indeed it is almost a cardinal error to defend positions that do not hinder the opposition (the Duke of Wellington was famous for not favouring the garrisoning of outposts).

The next thing to consider is not the raid on Myndos, but the abortive attempt to drive Alexander away as he approached from Mylasa. The incident is only in Arrian, it would be too minor to attract the epitomiser’s attention if it did figure in his source. Nor does it demonstrate anything beyond Halikarnassos’ defiance.

It is necessary to say something further about logistics (England might not be able to play a dead bat but I have Boycott in my blood). Seriously, the Bodrum peninsular is rocky and not well watered, Alexander has daily requirements of 154 tons (Imperial) of grain and fodder and 91,700 gallons (328 tons) of fresh water. Since this cannot have been coming in by sea it must have been being supplied from the Carian heartland, and through the agency of Ada’s re-installation. The sources, of course, ignore the logistic angle and give us guff about putative Oedipal relations and such like.

Caria cannot have been heavily garrisoned by the Persians, if the whole provincial army was concentrated at Halikarnassos, there seem to have been only 2,000 Greek mercenaries, of whom a fleet of 300 could have supplied 1,500, and perhaps a further 1,000 Persians, Memnon’s alleged reluctance to commit them is strange if they were much more numerous.

On the topography I prefer the written account of the 1862 excavator to the photo-montage of google earth. The German map does not show a demi-lune just the line of the walls

hal.jpg (163.09 KiB) Viewed 4577 times

Here,hopefully the green lines show where the ground would preclude both entrenchment and attack from wheeled engines, without a ramp; which is never mentioned, the red where such are possible and the blue where the breach has been erroneously supposed.

[Paralus]

Myndos shows that it was really only those cities on the march that submitted, no doubt after a show of force (Myndos was not en route. Anyway am half way through a longer post will be right back.

And those of the coast as well. As I say, the expressed intention was to deny the Persians any anchorage on the Asia Minor littoral.

Absolutely, and all without the aid of a siege train

Which only shows that Diodorus' account here is internally consistent. The Sicilian represents the 'submission' of these poleis as the result of diplomacy, preferential treatment (in the case of those Greek towns) and due to Ada's influence. As the siege equipment is off on an Aegean cruise, Alexander (and likely Philotas' column) employ both diplomacy and the liberation of the Greeks propaganda to effect (as he'd done earlier).

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote:

I disagree. Arrian says nothing like the above (de Selincourt?). What he says is that the poleis between Miletus and Halicarnassus were λαβὼν ("seized" or "grasped").The word does not imply diplomacy or that all of these poleis surrendered without some resistance.

Yes, De Selincourt's liberal translation. Chinnock's more literal version is : "Having taken all the cities between Miletus and Halicarnassus as soon as he approached them, he encamped near the latter city, at a distance from it of about five stades, as if he expected a long siege".
By 'diplomacy', I mean Diodorus' "..winning over the cities that lay on his route by kind treatment. He was particularly generous to the Greek cities, granting them independence and exemption from taxation...."
Note Arrian's "as soon as he approached them" - indicating that no fighting took place. This is hardly surprising.
The sequence of events is :
1. Memnon withdraws to Halicarnassus, the largest and most defensible city in the area thanks to its new and massive walls built by King Mausolus, concentrating both his troops and the fleet there.In fact it was the only place where both fleet and army could concentrate together.

2.On learning this, Alexander advances through a now abandoned ( by the Persians) Caria, and each city, as he comes near, capitulates. They have no option, even without Alexander's charm offensive and the urgings of Ada - there are no troops, and many of them may not even have had substantial walls in good repair. Resistance by these towns was futile, and I have no doubt they submitted in good time "as soon as he approached". ( The slightest resistance would have meant sacking and slavery)

Agesilaos wrote:

Absolutely, and all without the aid of a siege train Myndos shows that it was really only those cities on the march that submitted, no doubt after a show of force (Myndos was not en route.

Both accounts agree that there was no fighting, and that any town/poleis he approached submitted at once. What did Alexander need a siege train for, since he was well aware of the situation, with Memnon in Halicarnassus ?
Moreover, the siege train does not arrive until after the abortive attack on Myndus, even though it is less than a day's voyage away.

I would surmise that Alexander hedged his bets, until he knew whether all Caria would fall into his hands. By leaving the siege train in Miletus, if some place en route proved to be a 'hiccup' and resisted, he could send for the siege train to reduce it. As it was he arrived at Halicarnassus unopposed, and so sent for the siege train at this point in time, when he knew he would need it.

Even Myndos, to the west of Halicarnassos, was prepared to surrender but prevented from doing so by the arrival of troops aboard the fleet.

[Xenophon]

Before leaving Ada, Strabo records what happened in Halicarnassus after Alexander left, leaving her ruler of Caria.

Strabo [XIV.2.17]
"But Ada, the daughter of Hecatomnos, whom Pixodarus had banished, entreated Alexander and persuaded him to restore her to the kingdom of which she had been deprived, having promised to cooperate with him against the parts of the country which were in revolt, for those who held these parts, she said, were her own relations; and she also gave over to him Alinda, where she herself was residing. He assented and appointed her queen; and when the city, except the acropolis (it was a double acropolis), had been captured, he assigned to her the siege of the acropolis. This too was captured a little later, the siege having now become a matter of anger and personal enmity."

Note also that Strabo confirms Arrian, that she held only Alinda, but that through her relations, she had much influence throughout Caria. Our sources are again in accord.

Ada's tomb still exists and has been excavated: These photos, courtesy of the Livius.org site, are from Bodrum museum, and show her 'crown' in wreath form, very Macedonian in style, and her skeletal remains in her sarcophagus :-

[Paralus]

Yes, De Selincourt's liberal translation. Chinnock's more literal version is : "Having taken all the cities between Miletus and Halicarnassus as soon as he approached them, he encamped near the latter city, at a distance from it of about five stades, as if he expected a long siege".

That is far better. As I say, the operative word is 'grasped' or 'seized' (λαβὼν). Added to that is ἐξ ἐφόδου. The Landmark probably comes closes with "After capturing, on the first attempt..." as this could be rendered 'on the first attack/approach/onslaught'. Attempt covers both methods: shock and awe and diplomacy / charm offensive

Both accounts agree the poleis were taken without much fuss and I'd largely agree with the reasoning that the Persians had fallen back on Halicarnassus to make a stand. The point of difference between the two accounts is that Diodorus provides the full reasons for this (as we've both noted) and claims that it was a diplomatic triumph rather than a military one (hence no need for the nautically occupied siege train). Arrian's source prefers to have these cities seized on the first approach/attack and makes absolutely no mention of the diplomatic / propaganda "offensive" involved. A rather different colour entirely.

Agesilaos seems to have a thing for the demi-lune. Perhaps we should get onto this as Myndus is a part of the solution for it is the part of the wall facing that town where the breach is made.

[agesilaos]

And those of the coast as well. As I say, the expressed intention was to deny the Persians any anchorage on the Asia Minor littoral.

The denial of the coast to the Persian navy was the grand strategic plan but the events around Halikarnassos, which are perhaps thirty days at most, we are really in the realm of tactics. What Alexander needed to achieve was the reduction of the base at Halikarnassos, and the furtherance of his grand strategy could wait, that Myndos was not taken into the approach march is a sign of Alexander’s priorities.

The question then arises why did he undertake this nocturnal attack, with nigh on half the army? The sheer opportunism of the Myndian offer of betrayl would not have been enough to drag half the besieging force away unless Myndos represented a sizeable prize.

Both accounts agree that there was no fighting, and that any town/poleis he approached submitted at once. What did Alexander need a siege train for, since he was well aware of the situation, with Memnon in Halicarnassus ?
Moreover, the siege train does not arrive until after the abortive attack on Myndus, even though it is less than a day's voyage away.

Two errors here, Alexander could not be certain that the towns would simply surrender, the initial sally from Halikarnassos indicate his lack of intelligence regarding Carian intentions and Arrian is quite clear that he left the siege engines behind, so they had definitely arrived and been assembled before his move against Myndos. Alexander did not wish to risk any part of his forces therefore he kept them together.

Back to the reason Myndos was important; it is a tactical reason, as the response to his attack shows troops could move freely from Halikarnassos to Myndos and thus threaten the rear of any troops in works on the west of Halikarnassos, also the position threatened his lines of communication and would be handy to eradicate.

I am not obsessed with the demi-lune, but that is where the main attack occurred so establishing its location is of some import. Paralus suggests the Myndos Gate as its true location but this is where there is a distinctive group of three towers, all of which are still standing and were thus not undermined as was the case at the actual breach. Now, I am aware that ‘Tripylon’ ought to mean either a gate with three arches as at Jerusalem, or one with two inner courtyards and three gates as in the alleged Solomonic gates of Meggido, but the ‘Tripylon’ at Persepolis is a collection of three entrances arranged around a space, not unlike the three towers one set in advance described in 1862. The Tripylon was not the site of the real assault since the moat there had not been filled, nor does Alexander’s recce have led to him making the Myndos wall his main object. The most obvious place toassault is surely the longest stretch of wall with a level approach, which is to the east just where the Macedonians seem to have encamped.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

Ok, just one last attempt on the naval disparity.

I think we all agree that Memnon was a good general and an able admiral. It would also seem that he had good intelligence, at 19 ix the Persians ‘had learned’ ‘πεπυσμένοι ἦσαν’, that Alexander’s sailors were away gathering firewood and provisions. The situation seems to be of the main Persian fleet sitting out to sea, challenging the Macedonians to come out and fight, while a small squadron watched the harbour entrance. Or, perhaps, the five ships were bait (against that is the Iassian ship being a poor sailer, one would want the bait to escape and draw the pursuit onto the main body). In any case we see the Persians using small squadrons for observation and having intelligence assets ashore.

I think you overate the Persian “intelligence assets”. Fleets routinely observed one another with scouts, and could watch the comings and goings of crews – it was a common tactic to attack while crews were away provisioning – c.f. Battle of Aegospotami. Reports from ashore were simply un-necessary.

If the whole fleet did retire to Halikarnassos then Xenophon is right that it would be unable to respond to any seaborne dash from Miletos; if Memnon is a good general he would not yield his naval advantage. He would only have left the seas of the bay to the Macedonians if he was certain that they no longer possessed any seabourne forces. It must be borne in mind that Memnon was the advocate of a supply based strategy before Graneikos , unfortunately for him the Persian generals took Paralus’ view of logistics rather than Xenophon’s or mine! (I do recognise that is an unfair statement of Para’s position and can only plead my twisted sense of humour in mitigation). As to where the fleet could provision, the whole fleet had done so on Samos when denied the use of the Meander, smaller squadrons with a watching brief have a ring of islands and ports to choose from including Bargylia, Iassos and Myndos.

You have put your finger on the problem (logistics). Whilst Samos is a largeish island, its population then was of the order of 10-20,000. The influx of 300 ships and their 60,000 crew like a plague of locusts would soon exhaust both food and water supplies on an island – in fact the Persian fleet seems to have replenished there only once [Arrian I.19], or perhaps twice at most if they called in again on their way from Miletus to Halicarnassus. Scattering the fleet, or even squadrons around the bay was not an option, inviting piecemeal defeat. Moreover, such a strategy presented insurmountable command and control problems ( no radios then! How does Memnon tell his fleet when to sail ? Or where to go ? ). Moreover we know that Ionian ships and crews formed part of the Persian fleet. Once Alexander overran their homes at Miletus and other places, it is a fair surmise that many of these would want to ‘go home’. Splitting up the fleet would simply make desertion easier. Indeed, one wonders whether that Iassian ship really was such a “poor sailer”, or whether they simply slackened their sails so as to go over to Alexander – impossible to know, of course.

Worse still, there is no indication of 'splitting up' the fleet in our sources - even were your surmised sub-divisions of the fleet practical, there is nothing to suggest this was done in our sources. We are told the fleet went to Halicarnassus. Why did Memnon choose Halicarnassus to make his stand?

[*]It was the largest city in the region, and with its harbour the only place that could accommodate both army and fleet.
[*]It had 'new' walls, built by Mausolus, at least 6 ft thick. Being new it was designed with (non-torsion) artillery in mind and had roofed towers able to accommodate artillery.
[*]The city was well equipped with non-torsion artillery in its arsenal.
[*]The city had ample provisions, water etc to support the fleet and army.

In short, it offered excellent prospects for a successful defence, and also an excellent springboard and base for offence by both navy and army. Alexander could not afford to bypass it, and thanks to the Persian fleet, could not blockade the place either, nor starve it out. An extremely tough problem for Alexander.

The latter two probably remained in Persian hands until the fall of Halikarnassos (except Salamkis and the Island, which held out until just before Issos). Bargylia is on the ancient road from Mylasa to Halikarnassos, and so would have capitulated on Alexander’s approach; further indication that Memnon knew he did not face a naval threat, Bargylia is as defensible as Salamkis, only if a port did not significantly help his enemy would a good general abandon a defensible position, indeed it is almost a cardinal error to defend positions that do not hinder the opposition (the Duke of Wellington was famous for not favouring the garrisoning of outposts).

Why do you say that Bargylia/Bargylus was as defensible as the acropolis of Halicarnassus? I can’t find any evidence for this. Following the Duke of Wellington’s precept, Memnon would have been foolish to garrison Bargylia/Bargylus, even if it did have defensible walls, thus diluting his forces for no good reason. ( Bargylia/Bargylus could have been ‘masked/blockaded’ and the siege of Halicarnassus proceeded with, whilst any troops there were effectively ‘out of it’ )

The next thing to consider is not the raid on Myndos, but the abortive attempt to drive Alexander away as he approached from Mylasa. The incident is only in Arrian, it would be too minor to attract the epitomiser’s attention if it did figure in his source. Nor does it demonstrate anything beyond Halikarnassos’ defiance.

It also demonstrates the strength of Memnon’s forces, for this would be but the first of many ‘sallies’ by the defenders – only possible to a strong force.

It is necessary to say something further about logistics (England might not be able to play a dead bat but I have Boycott in my blood). Seriously, the Bodrum peninsular is rocky and not well watered, Alexander has daily requirements of 154 tons (Imperial) of grain and fodder and 91,700 gallons (328 tons) of fresh water. Since this cannot have been coming in by sea it must have been being supplied from the Carian heartland, and through the agency of Ada’s re-installation. The sources, of course, ignore the logistic angle and give us guff about putative Oedipal relations and such like.

Though there are rivers in the area, it is highly likely they would have been dry at that time of year, so Alexander would indeed be reliant on the ‘friendly’ Carians. The adoption of Alexander by Ada was surely to ensure that her kingdom reverted to her ‘son and heir’, Alexander, rather than some branch relative.....

Caria cannot have been heavily garrisoned by the Persians, if the whole provincial army was concentrated at Halikarnassos, there seem to have been only 2,000 Greek mercenaries, of whom a fleet of 300 could have supplied 1,500, and perhaps a further 1,000 Persians, Memnon’s alleged reluctance to commit them is strange if they were much more numerous.

The question of just how strong the garrison was is a good one – as we shall see, they put up impressive resistance, but Alexander’s “ace in the hole” was his ‘new’ torsion catapults.....

Not sure where your calculations for the garrison come from. At this time, for example, triremes typically carried up to 40 ‘epibatai’/hoplite marines – so the fleet could theoretically supply up to 12,000 heavy infantry and archers. Add to that your estimate of 2,000 Gk mercenaries, and 1,000 Persians and the total garrison is potentially 15,000.....though probably rather less in reality. Diodorus says Memnon had “large numbers of men in the city”[XVII.24.5] and Arrian [I.20] says that along with the whole fleet Memnon was given “a powerful force of of Persian troops and mercenaries.” Ephialtes later leads a sally of 2,000 men at one point [XVII.26.3], which is probably all the Greek mercenaries, but perhaps less. Arrian refers to a double sally, one part of which loses 1,000 men at the Tripolion gate.[I.22]. The walls too were over 5.5 km in circumference, and to properly man the walls would require many thousands of men. On the other hand, Alexander’s army numbered around 18,000 Macedonians or so plus at least 10,000 Greek allies and Greek and Balkan mercenaries. If we say Memnon had around 10,000 defenders plus or minus, we shan’t be far off the mark in all likelihood.

On the topography I prefer the written account of the 1862 excavator to the photo-montage of google earth. The German map does not show a demi-lune just the line of the walls.

The account of the excavator is necessarily subjective, and while valuable hardly gives us a complete picture of the terrain. It does not mention, for example, that the city rises like a tiered Greek theatre from the ‘stage’ of the harbour. Nor is the German 1914 sketch map of much use. It is inaccurate and misleading, with its ‘hachured’ terrain, only ever meant to give an impression of it.(which is why it is called a 'sketch' map)

If you don’t like Google Earth ( Why not? It is demonstrably accurate.), here is a proper 3D map with correct contour lines......

On the subject of the breach/breaches, we are getting ahead of ourselves as to where these were, let us consider the Myndos episode first. Myndos lay to the west of Halicarnassus, further down the peninsula at its end. It was relatively small, but had a small harbour. Possession of it would allow Alexander to ship supplies through it, and provide a harbour facility for his reduced flotilla in addition to Bargylus. Certain factions within Myndos offerred to open the gates if Alexander would come after dark. Alexander took half his Macedonian troops to reconnoitre the Myndus gate side of the city. (see maps) After dark he marched the 20 or so kilometres and arrived about midnight. The gates stayed barred, the plot obviously betrayed. Without even scaling ladders, Alexander ordered the troops to try undermining, and a fort duly came down - which tells us that the defenders were too few to keep the Macedonians away from the walls.. The situation was saved when the fleet brought re-inforcements from Halicarnassus. Frustrated, Alexander had no choice but to return empty handed.....

Given that all other towns approached by Alexander promptly surrendered, he had every reason to expect the same here, except that there must have been a 'pro-Persian', probably oligarchical faction, in the town - unsurprising when one considers its proximity to the Satrapal capital. It could be safely ignored for once Halicarnassus fell, stuck down the peninsula, it would have to yield.....

P.S : The excavator, commenting on the spontaneous assault by Perdiccas' men, translated that it was the two Macedonians who had the advantage of high ground, whereas every other translation says it was the Halicarnassians who had the height advantage, which is what we would expect if this breach was in the eastern wall of the 'akra'/fortress facing Mylasa, as Arrian tells us. Also, De Selincourt has "

to attack the wall on the high ground facing Mylasa.

"....Chinnock has "

assault the wall facing the citadel, which for the most part was turned towards Mylasa."

and Diodorus has

"attack on the walls of the citadel."

Could someone check the Greek, please on these two points ? ( height advantage; description of where attack/breach was), which I suspect may be ambiguous. I also strongly suspect this breach is in the east facing wall rather than the west facing 'demi-lune'...... though it now becomes apparent why someone decided this major breach was in the vicinity of the 'demi-lune'. This is the only wall which faces both west ( toward the citadel ) and north ( toward Mylasa). Add to that the archaeologically attested 'demi-lune' being mistaken for the Halicarnassian 'secondary back-up wall', whereas it is far more likely just a curve in the main wall, and one can see how someone might position this breach here.......

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

Both accounts agree that there was no fighting, and that any town/poleis he approached submitted at once. What did Alexander need a siege train for, since he was well aware of the situation, with Memnon in Halicarnassus ?
Moreover, the siege train does not arrive until after the abortive attack on Myndus, even though it is less than a day's voyage away.

Two errors here, Alexander could not be certain that the towns would simply surrender, the initial sally from Halikarnassos indicate his lack of intelligence regarding Carian intentions and Arrian is quite clear that he left the siege engines behind, so they had definitely arrived and been assembled before his move against Myndos. Alexander did not wish to risk any part of his forces therefore he kept them together.

As I remarked earlier Alexander seems to have 'hedged his bets' by leaving his siege train in Miletus, to be ordered to any 'hiccup' such as a town defying him. Only once he has secured the towns does he order the siege train to (probably) Bargylius, for the short overland trip to Halicarnassus. It would help if everyone would quote section numbers, especially when paraphrasing. I don't think Arrian is "quite clear" as to when the siege train arrived at all.
At[I.20] he simply says ( re Myndos) :

"...and though he had with him no military engines or ladders, inasmuch as he had not set out to besiege the town, but to receive it on surrender, he nevertheless led the Macedonian phalanx near and ordered them to undermine the wall".

He goes on to say that after returning from Myndos :

In the first place he filled up with earth the ditch
which the enemy had dug in front of the city, about thirty cubits wide and fifteen deep so that it might be easy to bring forward the towers, from which he intended to discharge missiles against the defenders of the wall ; and. that he might bring up the other engines with which he was planning to batter the wall down.

Arrian doesn't say that the equipment had arrived and was assembled, merely that Alexander had no equipment at Myndos, and after his return he filled the trench in order that the machines could be brought up. The implication being that the siege train arrived some time around Alexander's return from Myndos, perhaps a day or two before.

Diodorus[XVII.24.4] says :

Alexander encamped near the city and set in motion an active and formidable siege. At first he made continued assaults on the walls with relays of attackers and spent whole days in active fighting. Later he brought up all sorts of engines of war, filled in the trenches in front of the city with the aid of sheds to protect the workers, and rocked the towers and the curtains between them with his battering rams. Whenever he overthrew a portion of the wall, he attempted by hand-to-hand fighting to force an entry into the city over the rubble.
[5] But Memnon at first easily beat off the Macedonians assaulting the walls, for he had large numbers of men in the city. Where the siege engines were attacking, he issued from the city at night with numbers of soldiers and applied fire to the machines.
[6] Fierce fights occurred in front of the city, in which the Macedonians showed far superior prowess, but the Persians had the advantage of numbers and of fire power. For they had the support of men who fought from the walls using engines to shoot darts, with which they killed some of the enemy and disabled others.

It is evident from both accounts [c.f. Arrian I.20 ] that Alexander's initial attacks were made without siege train support, and consisted of 'coup de main' type attacks, perhaps with locally made ladders only, and that thanks to numbers and aggression the defenders sortied forth and defeated these attacks, doubtless retiring at nightfall back into the town, hence Arrian saying

they were driven back within the walls

. and that this went on for several days at least prior to the Myndos expedition.

Agesilaos wrote:

The most obvious place to assault is surely the longest stretch of wall with a level approach, which is to the east just where the Macedonians seem to have encamped.

I would certainly agree that from the anecdote of the spontaneous assault by Perdiccas' men, it is apparent that a major breach existed in the eastern wall, probably toward its northern end, if the references to 'citadel' and so on are correct.....it all depends on the passages I referred to above, and their correct interpretation!