The rival accounts of the siege of Halikarnassos

[Paralus]

You have put your finger on the problem (logistics). Whilst Samos is a largeish island, its population then was of the order of 10-20,000. The influx of 300 ships and their 60,000 crew like a plague of locusts would soon exhaust both food and water supplies on an island – in fact the Persian fleet seems to have replenished there only once [Arrian I.19], or perhaps twice at most if they called in again on their way from Miletus to Halicarnassus.

I’d only observe that the Athenian fleet spent the Ionian War based on Samos.

[Xenophon]

You have put your finger on the problem (logistics). Whilst Samos is a largeish island, its population then was of the order of 10-20,000. The influx of 300 ships and their 60,000 crew like a plague of locusts would soon exhaust both food and water supplies on an island – in fact the Persian fleet seems to have replenished there only once [Arrian I.19], or perhaps twice at most if they called in again on their way from Miletus to Halicarnassus.

I’d only observe that the Athenian fleet spent the Ionian War based on Samos.

...whilst neglecting to mention that Samos was occupied as an 'advance post', that the Athenians were attacking Chios and Miletus, thus having a presence on the mainland, and that these actions were supported by portions of the fleet, and that the whole Athenian fleet numbered just 82 ships, which were in any case based at several places, forces of 20 or so being typical.... at any given time there were typically just twenty or so triremes based there [e.g.Thuc Viii.41 and 42 ]. Nor did the Athenian fleet spend the whole war there -just a couple of seasons. Samos was an ally at the time.

A very different situation to Memnon's 300 ships descending on the island for supplies. The point is that both tactically and logistically, Memnon could not carry on the war against Alexander from Samos, hence the withdrawal to Halicarnassus.

[Paralus]

...whilst neglecting to mention that Samos was occupied as an 'advance post', that the Athenians were attacking Chios and Miletus, thus having a presence on the mainland, and that these actions were supported by portions of the fleet, and that the whole Athenian fleet numbered just 82 ships, which were in any case based at several places, forces of 20 or so being typical.... at any given time there were typically just twenty or so triremes based there [e.g.Thuc Viii.41 and 42 ]. Nor did the Athenian fleet spend the whole war there -just a couple of seasons. Samos was an ally at the time.

It was only an observation; no 'neglect' intended. Athens - or the fleet - carried on the war from Samos essentially since the Samian 'revolt'. I'm not about to wander off on yet another tangent so I'm not going to check Xenophon's Hellenica, but I'd posit that Samos was the 'forward base' of the Athenian fleet operations for more than a couple of seasons post 412/11. Whilst rising to over 100 ships at times, I'd agree that such was not the same as 300.

[agesilaos]

Pity Memnon could not think of using portions of his fleet for observation, especially since Alexander is alleged to have only thirty or so ships to counter him.

[agesilaos]

The reason for the attack on Myndos must be linked to a terrestrial objective, Alexander can hardly have thought a port useful for the fleet he had disbanded; and since The Persians could obtain any succour Myndos might provide from a multitude of sources, the grand tactical reasoning must have been the threat to the rear of any position he established on the Western side of the city; and, given that the terrain only allowed three avenues of attack, Alexander would have definitely have wanted to threaten the walls in at least two places just to spread the garrison. Besides this, the west has several streams which could water a portion of his troops, another reason for dispersal.

If the Myndos Gate is actually the Tripylon, it would seem that the Hypaspists were dropped off at this position following the raid on Myndos. Why? Well, we know this was a secondary position; the moat was not filled in: so why would the crack troops be placed there?

It would seem from Curtius that the Hypaspists had a recognisable uniform, and according to Polyainos Memnon attempted to fool the Kyzekenoi by dressing his men as Macedonians; if we are willing to accept these notices it follows that Memnon would recognise the Hypaspists, and know they were the elite. He could not therefore ignore that sector, sieges are psychological warfare as much as physical. However, it would seem from Addaios’ rank, that Alexander actually posted his crack troops here, and I would suggest that this is explained by the value he placed on Myndos; if his concern was the defensibility of his position to an attack from that quarter then placing his crack troops at the vulnerable position makes dual sense; his lines are secured and Memnon’s are stretched.

I have to confess, cider led my maths astray; 300 triereis could carry 15,000 marines, Kimon had placed 50 hoplites on his for the battle of Eurymedon but this seems excessive for the Persians here; he was planning to fight a land battle in a river estuary close to his land base, they seem to have arrived from a campaign in Egypt.

Which brings us to the question of the size of Memnon’s forces. This is the same fleet that gave up its marines to supply Dareios with part of his Greek contingent at Issos, these were probably considerably fewer than the 30,000 claimed, 30 per ship was standard (Hdt. VII 184 ii) which yields 9,000 men; there must have been something approaching this number to make Dareios think it worthwhile to deprive the fleet of its marines.
Arrian does not specify the size of any of the sallying forces, but they are driven back by relatively small Macedonian forces, those with Ptolemaios the Bodyguard probably numbering 3,000 or so; he does report losses of 170 and 1,000, the latter when many troops fell into the moat when their temporary bridge collapsed and others were shut out of the city.

Diodoros, 26 iii mentions 2,000 picked troops sallying from all the gates and Memnon subsequently reinforcing them with his Persian troops. Since the forces at his disposal included not just the mercenaries with the fleet but also the garrisons of Karia, this is a surprisingly small force with which to attack an army of 32,000, even though they would be spread around the walls there would only be three points of attack leaving the sallying force automatically outnumbered. This is odd if there were over 10,000 troops available. Seems unlikely the whole of the fleet was at Halikarnnassos , then.

In Arrian’s version Alexander begins filling the moat after the attempt on Myndos, so unlike Diodoros’ futile assaults, Arrian’s version precludes the wanton waste of his forces; they can hardly assault the walls across an unfilled moat. Arrian’s version rings true since Alexander would be unlikely to commence operations until he had reconnoitred the whole perimeter which was what he was doing just before his attempted coup-de-main.