Agesilaos wrote:
And here lies the methodological failing of this position; how do you evaluate the information in these separate references; your position is to refer them to an orthodoxy imposed by pre-conceived ideas, how else can you say definitively that there cannot be plural ‘agemata’ unless you have already decided there was only one? This method then furthers its interpretation by approaching the next reference in the light of its first mis-interpretation and finally invents an expanded Hypaspist corps, for which there is no evidence to further explain away the inconvenience of a clear division of the body into three. ‘It’s historical method, Jim, but not as we know it!’
LOL! Nice riposte with the Star Trek reference!
My methodology does not refer to any supposed ‘othodoxy’, nor pre-conceived ideas. By definition, there can only be one ‘leading unit’ of a given formation, and as I demonstrated previously, the word ‘Agema’ continued to be used in this context. It is Alexander who creates both a cavalry agema as well as an infantry one, and after him this usage continues among the successors. At no time in any source are there any references to more than one infantry Agema ( except just about possibly this sole example in your hypothesis), or for that matter more than one cavalry agema. Even where Hellenistic monarchs have more than one mounted Guard unit, there is only ever one Agema.
The expanded Hypaspist corps has plenty of evidence for it, e.g. the ‘Silver-shields/Argyraspides’ number three chiliarchies - Diodorus is clear that the argyraspides numbered 3,000 (18 59.3, 19 30.6) as he states at 19.28.1, not including the Agema; Ptolemy is given 3 chiliarchies of hypaspists at Sangala, obviously excluding the Agema which always served with Alexander[ Arrian V.23.7]; At V.13.3 Alexander crosses the Hydaspes with "half the Hypaspists", obviously the Agema and one other chiliarchy, leaving the other two behind; Ptolemy is given inter alia "one third of the Hypaspists Basilikoi" i.e. one chiliarchy[IV.24.10} ( not including the Agema), and so on.
Xenophon wrote
Unfortunately for this premise, the manuals do in fact refer to such a formation/manouevre e.g. Arrian ‘Tactica’ 29:
“Again, the phalanx is called ‘two edged’ when it has each half of the men in its files facing away from each other so as to be back to back.”
However, even if we did not have specific evidence for this formation/manoeuvre it would be surprising if such a formation did not exist. “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” as the saying puts it. Moreover, even if there were no such drill, there is no reason such a manoeuvre couldn’t be carried out ‘ex tempore’, or even on the men’s individual initiative.
Sir Francis Bacon’s dictum also seems to apply, for while you put forward the posit that turning around to deal with the chariots was ‘impossible’ for want of a drill, you happily accept that the ranks opened up to let the chariots through, even though the manuals don’t mention anything at all about a drill for this !!
In the immortal words of Mr Spock; “Illogical, Captain!”
Unfortunately, this is not what is supposed, in your view to have happened at Gaugamela, this is a parade ground manoeuvre or even just a way of lining up rather than an actual evolution. Alexander did not set up with a ‘two-edged phalanx’ but with a ‘doubled phalanx’ with two lines both facing the same way. Indeed I cannot recall a single instance of a phalanx adopting this theoretical posture, nor any commander being fool enough to order it; should either face have to fall back the whole formation is immediately in chaos.
A ‘parade ground manouevre’ ? ‘theoretical posture’? Not an ‘actual evolution’ ? On what evidence are these assertions based ? I have remarked previously that even if we didn’t have the manuals, “about turning” is simple and basic drill whether by a whole unit or part of it, and to be expected, just as much as turning left or right, wheeling etc. This has been so throughout military history. Far from falling into chaos (why should this be so any more than falling back by a unit as a whole? ), such a manoeuvre is necessary to prevent ‘chaos’ from men attacked in the back.
This is all special pleading. To face about against an enemy who is in your rear is to be expected as a natural reaction, drill or not, and if the manuals say that Hellenistic phalanxes practised this formation, it likely harks back to this very instance.
We can now turn to your posited ‘ex tempore’ desertion of their ranks; I think you cannot really be serious here, how do their comrades know what is happening? Who decides when there are sufficient forces to deal with the situation? And what are they going to do with their sarissa?
Soldiers are not, and never have been ‘automatons’. Unforeseen situations arise all the time .Soldiers, and especially junior officers are expected to show initiative in such situations. A famous example is the Roman Tribune at Cynoscephalae who, on his own initiative, diverted 20 maniples of the Roman right wing to attack the rear of Philip V’s phalanx which was succeeding against the Roman left.
I choose to believe that the ranks opened because we are told they did in a narrative historian and that it had been specifically ordered by Alexander (and presumably practised). It is also a manoeuvre mentioned by Xenophon (the Laconophile Athenian, not the forum member!), as a rule I place more faith in what is said to have been done on the battlefield rather than in the musings of theoreticians more concerned with the beauty of numbers than battlefield reality; thus when an improbable evolution does not make it into their books it is quite logical, therefore, to doubt it especially when it is not mentioned in the sources either.
The exact ‘openings’ in ranks probably could not be rehearsed, because there was no way of knowing in advance exactly where a particular chariot was going to collide with the line – though possibly if fixed lanes were open the horses might take the line of least resistance ( like the elephants at Zama), but what if they didn’t? Disaster ! Surely it is more likely that the openings ( 10 men wide, be it recalled) were extemporised and occurred while the infantry were in ‘normal/open’ order, though I concede either is possible. ( Generally, they only ‘closed up’ immediately before the clash of battle lines). However, the use of the phrase "break formation" rather than, say, "opened lanes" might seem to imply simply getting out of the way rather than a formal manouevre to open up lanes.
The idea that the manuals were somehow the work of philosophers interested in theoretical numbers was postulated by the Loeb translator, but most modern scholars who have studied them accept that they ultimately go back, via Poseidonius, to Polybius – who was hardly a ‘theoretician’. As I pointed out, ‘about turning’ is referred to – twice - in the
narrative of this battle.
Now we come to the classic wedding of a ‘strawman argument’ and a false accuracy; I have consistently said that the reaction force would be armed with javelins or longchai if one prefers, so why would they adopt a formation suitable for sarissai?
Because however they were armed – longche, dory or sarissa –close order heavy infantry formed up in the same way. Six feet per man in ‘normal/open’ order, closing up to three foot frontage by half files ‘close order/pyknosis’ for action. Nor does this just come from the Hellenistic manuals, it goes back to Xenophon too ( and before)– who was also hardly a ‘theoretician’!
There is absolutely not even a hint of evidence of a 'reaction force', especially not a mixed force of grooms, who were almost certainly mounted to perform their function, and single hypaspists posted every few meteres.
Is it strange that we all pooh-pooh the numbers given for the men in the Persian army and then blithely accept those given for the chariots; that aside the rest falls because the Hypaspistai Basilikoi were deployed in open order just like the Agrianes, and I would guess in the same strength ie, a pentekosiarchy (I reckon the ‘agema’ as a chiliarchy with two pentekosiarchai, one ‘of the Makedones’ and the other the ‘the Royal Hypaspists’) their role is to stiffen the grooms, in whom Alexander would not have placed too much confidence.
Numbers in crowds are notoriously difficult to estimate – witness modern estimates of crowds which vary from hundreds to thousands. You can’t count a sea of bodies extending thousands of metres, but it is easy enough to count 50 or 100 large objects, such as chariots or elephants, especially when they are drawn up in front of the sea of bodies. Not forgetting that Arrian [III.11] records that Darius’ written ‘Orbat’ ( Order of battle) came into Alexander’s hands. ( Darius' orbat wouldn't have known numbers either)
Of course one may decide that Alexander relied on ad hoc solutions conjured up by the rank and file, but I tend to give him the credit of being able to organise a battle himself. That the grooms needed a stiffening is apparent from Alexander placing them in this role rather than as a camp guard where he used the Thracians, who would have been well-suited to destroy the chariots, Alexander clearly judged that the camp could not be held by the grooms and their ilk and did not want to distance his elite troops so far as to make them unable to join the battle (this is pure speculation, of course).
And I am sorry to suggest pretty unlikely speculation. Such an unusual tactic would surely have been mentioned in at least one source. Paralus has pointed out the impossibilities of ‘stiffening’ the grooms with individual hypaspists – apart from anything else, given the relative numbers it simply wouldn’t have worked. Nor, as you have pointed out, were the grooms the right solution to the problem of chariots breaking through – again as you pointed out, seasoned armed troops were available.
The light Infantry screen – Agrianes and Balacrus’ javelin-men – extended across in front of Alexander and the cavalry, then further across the front of the Hypaspistae. The chariot line was a minimum of 1,000m frontage, more likely 1,500m, roughly the same frontage as Alexander’s Companions and Hypaspists. We are not told where the grooms were, but almost certainly behind their masters in the cavalry – their role was to bring up remounts, replacement weapons and water. ( Alexander got through several horses during the battle. [ Curtius IV.15.31] )
As I said earlier, breakthroughs will have occurred randomly along the whole front, and “the Macedonians”(Arrian III.13 ) presumably both cavalry and infantry had orders “to break formation” and allow them through. Those few that got through the Agrianes and cavalry will have been “dealt with” by the grooms behind that sector of the line, and the odd few that got through Balacrus’ javelin-men and then the Hypaspists phalanx, by the simple expedient of some turning around and attacking them. The rear phalanx of the “box” was several hundred metres further back ( judging by the size and dispositions of the flank units ), and inside the “box” were several thousand pack-animals, handlers and army servants, again with water, weapons and other necessaries, guarded by Thracians. This all sounds far more probable than a vast army of grooms extending along the whole rear, or even in groups as you suggest, ‘stiffened’ by a single line of Hypaspist Basilikoi every 2-3m, using your posit that they were a lochos strong. ( I reckon a chiliarchy by this time - see e.g. V.13.1 below. At the Hydaspes, Alexander takes "half" the Hypaspists across, which can hardly be anything other than the Agema and one chiliarchy, leaving the other two chiliarchies behind)
Agesilaos wrote:
Xenophon wrote:
I don’t see a problem with this – like many Greek ( and English) words ‘taxis’ has a generic meaning -‘unit’ generally - and a specific meaning, such as “Coenus’ taxis”, depending on context. It is clear that our sources use ‘taxis’ in the specific sense of a ‘unit’ comprised of one sixth of the phalanx , probably 2,000 strong ( discussion deferred to dormant thread.) Paralus has already pointed out the unlikelihood of ‘taxis’ in this sense referring to small units able to fit on a triakonter !!
The problem is that ‘taxis’ has ONLY a generic meaning and the mock technical meaning has been imposed by modern scholars, though even Tarn recognised that Arrian (and thus probably Ptolemy use the word ‘as a handmaiden for all uses’)
Not only generic, but specifically to refer to a ‘unit’ consisting of one sixth ( originally) of the 12,000 strong sarissa phalanx – the term occurs some 72 times in Arrian, the vast majority references to sarissa phalanx units and occasionally in other contexts such as ‘units’ of mounted javelinmen, archers etc thus in a generic sense also. As I remarked elsewhere, the term generally refers to the largest individual unit, usually but not always infantry ( it originated as a term for units of hoplites) and we can call that meaning either 'specific' or 'generic'.
Let’s agree to leave discussion of the Achaemenid army for another thread, though I am not going to start it!
Agreed !!
[amended in the wake of the thread being split to create a separate branch on Neoptolemus]
