About: 1000 deaths

[system1988]

It is known that during the Chaeronea battle almost 1000 Athenians died. Their ashes were transported by Alexander to Athens. During the funeral four epigrams were written for them, of which 3 must have been placed on the soldiers' final resting place. The only one saved in its original stone form (it is preserved in the epigraphic museum of Athens) is the following:

http://s1246.beta.photobucket.com/user/ ... 0%20deaths?

The translation goes like this:

"Time, god of mortals and all-seeing,
Become a messenger of our misfortunes to all,
for trying to save the holy country of Greece
and dying on the glorious grounds of Beotia"

The writer of this is unknown, however, his calling of Time as a god (in Greek literature) is unique to the best of my knowledge. Another mentioning of time was made at a passage written from Sofocles.

The Chaeronea battle and its outcome was made apparent to all Greeks as the total defeat of Greece against a ruthless and cruel ruler. The feelings were also mutual for all Greeks towards that ruler's son, Alexander during the reign of the last and after that.
It was the feeling of hatred and vengeance which were felt amongst all Greeks and not only Demosthenes. It becomes clear (from the 3rd line and so on) that the holy country of Hellas is lost, and with it the freedom of its peoples.

The translation is mine and not one of some prestigious academic, so feel free to make any corrections you might spot.

All in all, it is a beautiful epigram. The Athenians were not the best warriors but at least they understood literature, surely in a way neither Alexander nor Philip would comprehend.

[Nikas]

I think that would be a particularly Atheno-centric perspective. At the time leading up to, and including Chaeronea and it's aftermath, it would be safe to say that not all Greeks would have felt that way. Certainly Philip had his supporters in many of the polis, and some would have welcomed his intervention(s) in Greece, from the perspective of how much benefit they would receive towards their own interests.

I think Polybius summed it up quite well:

"From this point of view fault might be found with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in many respects, for having rashly and indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an alliance with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas: and many more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.1 For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese, and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries.2 In return for this they were bound not to make war on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning disaster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and regard for his own reputation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks to the policy of Demosthenes. Whereas, owing to the men I have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lacedaemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally, and many advantages accrued to their states separately."

Polybius, 18.14

[system1988]

Messinians were a unique and desperate case, being the only Greeks who actually lived ensalved by other Greeks. Their cause was noble: In order for them to claim their country back they would welcome anyone who would oppose the Spartans. They did exactly that with the Athenians, with Epameinondas as well as with Philip.

Nevertheless, remember who were against Philip altogether: Corinth and its colonies Corfu and Lefkas Islands, Ahaea, Megara, Acharnania, Euvoia, Athens, Thebes, not to mention Sparta. I also won't mention the cities of the Greek north, for they were taken one by one by Philip. Almost all of Grece opposed him and he defeated them all, not by diplomacy as much, as by war. They were all forced to sign treaties with him.

As for the epigram, the day after I posted this thread, I found a reference for this in Peter Green's book "Alexander the of Macedon". I have it in Greek and thus I don't know how its english translation goes. Anyway, in the Greek version the translation from the ancient Greek is literary-oriented, in order for the text to be more appealing. All who know ancient greek will know what I mean - compare the anicent greek text with the english translation.


Merry Christmas!

[Nikas]

To say the Messenians were desperate seems almost Demosthenic. Was Athens any less a "desperate" case than Messenia as they, after countless futile attempts to cajole, plead, or force Philip to their interests, being outwitted and out-worked at every turn, were now sending out emissaries all over the Greek world, even to recent foes, to "save" Greece's "liberty"? A liberty that they had no compulsion in the past trampling on, nor would pass up if the opportunity arose again? if Philips Letter is anything to go by, they did not hesitate to approach even the Great King and invite him directly back into Greek affairs, if that does not reek of desperation...
No, as Polybius rightly summarizes, the interests of Athens did not equate to the interests of Greece. I don't have the references at hand, but I want to say most of the Peloponnesians were pro-Philip or at least neutral, and Philip rewarded his allies, hollow Laconic ripostes aside, when he ravaged Lacaedomonia and advised the Spartans in no uncertain terms to turtle up. Even out of the Athenian allies you cite, Thebes was an 11th hour convert, no qualms in having Philip previously on the holy soil of Greece to clean up their mess and deal with the Phocian nuisance, and having no love-lost with Athens. I wouldn't put the Spartans in the enthusiastic supporter category either, petulantly sulking away in their corner of the Peloponnesus rueing those days they could trample their fellow Dorian and Greek's liberties, they did not even bother to send a used hoplon to Chaeronea.
No, I think Philip's diplomacy had laid its ground work impeccably, and when the moment to decide Hellenic affairs came, it was simply the coup-de-grace left to be done.

[Paralus]

No, as Polybius rightly summarizes, the interests of Athens did not equate to the interests of Greece. I don't have the references at hand, but I want to say most of the Peloponnesians were pro-Philip or at least neutral, and Philip rewarded his allies, hollow Laconic ripostes aside, when he ravaged Lacaedomonia and advised the Spartans in no uncertain terms to turtle up.

Well, that's an interesting view. It might be said that the Megalopolitan view was not in the interests of Greece - or Athens more likely (below). A significant number of Greeks seemingly thought that Philip's interests were not theirs and a significant number of them died making the point. System1988 points out the Athenian dead but others (aside from famous Thebans) also died. The Achaeans obviously suffered severely in the defeat because, as Pausanias (7.6.5) writes:

...the Achaeans took part in the battle of Chaeroneia against the Macedonians under Philip, but they say that they did not march out into Thessaly to what is called the Lamian war, for they had not yet recovered from the reverse in Boeotia.

As System1988 points out, the northern Greeks were already under Philip's sway. Thessaly was, essentially, an annexed province reorganised to Philip's military and economic needs (as with the Greek poleis of the Macedonian coast) and with the Macedonian king as archon for life. I'm actually quite an admirer of Philip but as well as his diplomacy there was his money. Philip supported those (almost always oligarchs) who would support him. His divide and rule (so aptly demonstrated in Thessaly) was first choice, his money and diplomacy had already found its way into the Peloponnese and vested interest ruled. For those who might wish to come to his aid, there was always the difficulty of the allies holding the Isthmus. The real dividend was in the aftermath when those vested interests virtually bayed for him to come and "settle" the Peloponnese. And settle he did - in his favour. Even so, it is an interesting roll call of Peloponnesian states that threw in their lot with a Sparta dreaming of another Peloponnesian League in 331. By 323 Athens' interests seem to very much coincide with many Greeks - including the Thessalians, the Argives, the Sicyonians, the Eleans and the Messenians. So much so that the Greeks called it the "Hellenic War".

You quote Polybius in this matter as if he is a bastion of non-prejudiced truth. This is not the case. The severe Achaean losses (yet to recover by the time of the great "Hellenic" war) might give one pause here. The Megalopolitan had no liking for Athens in the slightest and Demosthenes talking the Achaeans into this venture would not help. Memories of those more recent "demagogues" who talked the (his) Achaean League (and others) into its suicide against Rome - people such as Critolaus and Diaeus - are highly likely in his mind given how fresh they will have been. Polybius 38.12.5-9 (though most of 38.9-18 would do):

For never had there been collected such a pack of artizans and common men. All the towns, indeed, were in a drivelling state, but the malady was universal and most fierce at Corinth. There were a few, however, who were exceedingly gratified by the language of the legates. But Critolaus, thinking he had got hold of the very handle he had been praying for and of an audience ready to share his fervour and run mad, attacked the authorities and inveighed against his political opponents, and used the utmost freedom of language regarding the Roman legates, saying that he wished to be friends with Rome, but he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots. The general tenour of his advice was that if they behaved like men they would be in no want of allies, but if they behaved no better than women they would have plenty of lords and masters.

It seemingly escapes Polybius that these "demagogues" were likely fired by that same eleutheria that so motivated the Greeks of the Persian wars and the Greeks who took the field in the wars against Macedon, only the foreigner here to be resisted was Rome. As well, his hero (Aratus) found himself severely embarrassed by the city of philosophers more than once (Plut. Arrat. 33). Polybius also fails to mention the gain of cities such as Argos who, until Cleomenes took it over a century later, endured (happily or otherwise depending on point of view) the rule of a close oligarchy and tyranny. Indeed, it transpired that after Philip, Macedonia sponsored many such a regime in the Peloponnese. Macedonian support for Megalopolis would not go astray in Polybius' world either. Demosthenes - no selfless angel to be certain - was most unlikely ever to be in Polybius "good books" advocating resistance to the man who would ensure the continued emasculation of Sparta to the benefit of the other Peloponnesian cities including, not incidentally, Megalopolis.

To say the Messenians were desperate seems almost Demosthenic. Was Athens any less a "desperate" case than Messenia as they, after countless futile attempts to cajole, plead, or force Philip to their interests, being outwitted and out-worked at every turn, were now sending out emissaries all over the Greek world, even to recent foes, to "save" Greece's "liberty"? A liberty that they had no compulsion in the past trampling on, nor would pass up if the opportunity arose again? if Philips Letter is anything to go by, they did not hesitate to approach even the Great King and invite him directly back into Greek affairs, if that does not reek of desperation ...

Ah yes, the Great King. Athens is not the first to seek his help though: Sparta ruled an empire with Persian support bought with the freedom of the Greeks of Asia and Thebes looked to do the same. Athens had, to her credit, gone without until now. The rude fact is that without a major alliance of a large number of Greek poleis - including Peloponnesian - no city state could stand against the resources the king of Macedonia could put into the field. That would change after the depredations of Alexander's campaigns (Antipater's embarrassment in the Lamian War) and the Diodochoi. In 338 Macedonia was the most powerful state in "Europe" and would show that at Chaeronea. No one, including myself, is portraying Athens as any pure-hearted knight in shining armour. She well knew that rule of the strongest meant what it always had: that despite symmachia, despite any synhedrion and who sat in it, the hegemon decided the meaning of eleutheria. Always. She herself was the proof as Sparta after her and Thebes after Sparta. No one in their right minds - at the time - could have expected anything different.

[Nikas]

Well, that's an interesting view. It might be said that the Megalopolitan view was not in the interests of Greece - or Athens more likely (below). A significant number of Greeks seemingly thought that Philip's interests were not theirs and a significant number of them died making the point. System1988 points out the Athenian dead but others (aside from famous Thebans) also died. The Achaeans obviously suffered severely in the defeat because, as Pausanias (7.6.5) writes:

...the Achaeans took part in the battle of Chaeroneia against the Macedonians under Philip, but they say that they did not march out into Thessaly to what is called the Lamian war, for they had not yet recovered from the reverse in Boeotia.

The Megalopolitan view was in the interests of Megalopolis and truly that is all that mattered, not whether Athens felt that this wasn't in Greece's (really their own) best interests. It is always fascinating reading in Thucydides to see the Athenian strain sinew and row to beat down the other Greeks in their Delian League and elsewhere all in the name of "freedom" from the Persian, or is that freedom from the liberty of not being forced to support the hegemonal ambitions of their Periclean dreams of glory? The poor Melians would surely be forgiven if they didn't shed a tear for Athens chastisement at the hands of the Macedonians. Significant amount of Greeks certainly thought Philip's interests weren't their own, a significant many thought his interests were indeed their own, and therein is the point, Athens was not, and should not, speak for all of Greece.

As System1988 points out, the northern Greeks were already under Philip's sway. Thessaly was, essentially, an annexed province reorganised to Philip's military and economic needs (as with the Greek poleis of the Macedonian coast) and with the Macedonian king as archon for life. I'm actually quite an admirer of Philip but as well as his diplomacy there was his money. Philip supported those (almost always oligarchs) who would support him. His divide and rule (so aptly demonstrated in Thessaly) was first choice, his money and diplomacy had already found its way into the Peloponnese and vested interest ruled. For those who might wish to come to his aid, there was always the difficulty of the allies holding the Isthmus. The real dividend was in the aftermath when those vested interests virtually bayed for him to come and "settle" the Peloponnese. And settle he did - in his favour. Even so, it is an interesting roll call of Peloponnesian states that threw in their lot with a Sparta dreaming of another Peloponnesian League in 331. By 323 Athens' interests seem to very much coincide with many Greeks - including the Thessalians, the Argives, the Sicyonians, the Eleans and the Messenians. So much so that the Greeks called it the "Hellenic War".

The northern Greeks, to their unfortunate error, did not come to grips with the rising power that was Philip's Macedon until Philip's inscribed arrowheads were literally raining down on them. Was in not the Thessalians themselves who invited Philip into Thessaly first, in fact having invited in Perdiccas even before that? Philip would have been, frankly, idiotic to not have settled his southern border to Macedon's benefit. As for the Olynthians, they thought the old card of a pretender to the Macedonian throne was a smart bet to lay down, an ace up the sleeve and an explicit threat to Philip and Macedon, too bad that was a bluff that was called to their extreme detriment and even the resounding alarm bells of the Olynthiancs did not motivate the wider Greek world to rush to the defence of the Olynthian League, but it should not be surprising as it was also an interesting roll call of states that threw in against Sparta at Coronea, or the Athenians as Thucydides reminds us:

1.124. [3] We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.’

That the other Greek states lined up to liberate themselves from Macedon in the opportunistic aftermath of Alexander's death should not raise any eyebrows in the larger tapestry of the Hellenic hegemonies. The "Hellenic War" indeed was a war amongst all the Hellenes, a crack at the chance at the "eleutheria" to pursue their own petty interests for the smaller polis and another kick at the can for the major players to re-assert their yearning desires to re-assert their own ascendency, and perhaps that the major battles were fought at Lamia in the region of Phthia, the original home of the ethnonym of "Hellas" and the "Hellenes" played no small role in the tagline of this struggle.

you quote Polybius in this matter as if he is a bastion of non-prejudiced truth. This is not the case. The severe Achaean losses (yet to recover by the time of the great "Hellenic" war) might give one pause here. The Megalopolitan had no liking for Athens in the slightest and Demosthenes talking the Achaeans into this venture would not help. Memories of those more recent "demagogues" who talked the (his) Achaean League (and others) into its suicide against Rome - people such as Critolaus and Diaeus - are highly likely in his mind given how fresh they will have been. Polybius 38.12.5-9 (though most of 38.9-18 would do):

For never had there been collected such a pack of artizans and common men. All the towns, indeed, were in a drivelling state, but the malady was universal and most fierce at Corinth. There were a few, however, who were exceedingly gratified by the language of the legates. But Critolaus, thinking he had got hold of the very handle he had been praying for and of an audience ready to share his fervour and run mad, attacked the authorities and inveighed against his political opponents, and used the utmost freedom of language regarding the Roman legates, saying that he wished to be friends with Rome, but he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots. The general tenour of his advice was that if they behaved like men they would be in no want of allies, but if they behaved no better than women they would have plenty of lords and masters.

It seemingly escapes Polybius that these "demagogues" were likely fired by that same eleutheria that so motivated the Greeks of the Persian wars and the Greeks who took the field in the wars against Macedon, only the foreigner here to be resisted was Rome. As well, his hero (Aratus) found himself severely embarrassed by the city of philosophers more than once (Plut. Arrat. 33). Polybius also fails to mention the gain of cities such as Argos who, until Cleomenes took it over a century later, endured (happily or otherwise depending on point of view) the rule of a close oligarchy and tyranny. Indeed, it transpired that after Philip, Macedonia sponsored many such a regime in the Peloponnese. Macedonian support for Megalopolis would not go astray in Polybius' world either. Demosthenes - no selfless angel to be certain - was most unlikely ever to be in Polybius "good books" advocating resistance to the man who would ensure the continued emasculation of Sparta to the benefit of the other Peloponnesian cities including, not incidentally, Megalopolis.

I quote Polybius as an example of a non-Athenian source with a different perspective than the self-serving Attican laments. I fear you may be letting Athenian-enduced rhetorical flourish cloud your perspective, keep in mind Diodorus tells us:

"In this year, Philip the king, having won most of the Greeks over to friendship with him, was ambitious to gain the the uncontested leadership of Greece by terrifying the Athenians into submission."

"επι δε τουτων Φιλλιπος ο Βασιλευς τους πλειστους των Ελληνων εις φιλιαν…"

XVI.84

Many if not most of the Greeks were on-side with Philip's hegemony, don't be deceived by malicious character assassinations of the great king by his ancient enemies, he was not universally as disrespected as one would think reading the Athenian orators:

"Furthermore, with respect to the way in which a deed is accomplished, a historian's narrative is open to the charge of malice if it asserts that the success was won not by valour but by money (as some say of Philip), or easily and without any trouble (as they say of Alexander)…"

Plutarch

It is difficult to escape the long shadow of Athens, the proud and historic defender of the democratic spirit against the one-eyed "barbarian" hell-bent on pillaging and enslaving all that crossed his path, but Athens was not the only Greek polis, and not the proprietary owner of the Greek opinion.

[Paralus]

The Megalopolitan view was in the interests of Megalopolis and truly that is all that mattered, not whether Athens felt that this wasn't in Greece's (really their own) best interests.

You misread: the reference to Athens viz Megalopolis was in respect to the latter third century and Achaea's attempts to "incorporate" her into the Achaean League.

That said, the ancient Greek proclivity for dissension, bellicosity and war is well known. Whilst the barbaroi were over "there", the bastards, with whom it really mattered to settle with, were always next door. One could count on a fingerless hand the number of ancient Greek "states" which put the greater good of "Hellas" ahead of its own interests. All tilted at ultimate power depending upon means. For Athens that meant emasculation by finacial commitment (to replace supply of manned ships). For Sparta, in her turn, it meant 'realpolitik': the sale of the Asian Greek polies for Persian silver and ships. Thebes sought similar support for her attempted hegemonic "peace". You perceive me as carrying a candle for Athens? This is not so; my view is far more realistic just as was Philip's of the Greeks he dealt with.

It is always fascinating reading in Thucydides to see the Athenian strain sinew and row to beat down the other Greeks in their Delian League and elsewhere all in the name of "freedom" from the Persian, or is that freedom from the liberty of not being forced to support the hegemonal ambitions of their Periclean dreams of glory? The poor Melians would surely be forgiven if they didn't shed a tear for Athens chastisement at the hands of the Macedonians.

Rather an emotive passage that. One could pen a passage couched in similar emotive terms about Sparta, Thebes and Philip - not to mention Alexander III and his Successors. Perhaps the descendants of those Plataeans who survived Sparta's "settlement" of the town during the Peloponnesian War would surely be forgiven if they didn't shed a tear for Sparta's chastisement at the hands of the Macedonians in 331?

Philip would have been, frankly, idiotic to not have settled his southern border to Macedon's benefit.

I was referring to Philip's settlement of the Peloponnese, not Thessaly. The point being that of all those poleis, so insistent on his coming into the Peloponnese to settle differences, many took up arms against Macedon alongside Sparta in 331. Ancient Greeks will do as ancient Greeks do: self interest first; local disputes second and "Hellas" a distant third. The petty, belligerent "inviting" of Rome is a stellar example complicated, only slightly, by the plays of Hellenistic monarchs who utilised these Greek traits without remorse.

I quote Polybius as an example of a non-Athenian source with a different perspective than the self-serving Attican laments.

And, as I've attempted to point out, Polybius' remarks are just as informed by self-serving motivation. Indeed, I'd describe his telling of the fall of Achaea as a hostile lament.

I fear you may be letting Athenian-enduced rhetorical flourish cloud your perspective, keep in mind Diodorus tells us:

"In this year, Philip the king, having won most of the Greeks over to friendship with him, was ambitious to gain the the uncontested leadership of Greece by terrifying the Athenians into submission."

"επι δε τουτων Φιλλιπος ο Βασιλευς τους πλειστους των Ελληνων εις φιλιαν…"

Ah yes, the passage in which we find the absolute howler that Athens was caught unawares relying on a peace treaty (after Perinthus) that never existed. I fear you take Diodorus here far too literally. Just what "most of the Greeks" thought as philia is a moot point. I doubt most of the "most" had too much of a choice. Those who weren't bought were bashed. Others, divided amongst themselves, were played off and "befriended". Those Peloponnesian poleis who agitated for Philip's intervention - led by Philip's "supporters" - also provided not a few of those who stood alongside Sparta in 331. Philia might be in the eye of the philanderer??

As I've said: I quite like Philip. He was most certainly a man for his time. He bullied, battled, bribed and bought the Greeks. Before they knew what he was doing it was, mostly, done. Athens, like many a salesman sold to easily by other salesmen, was played as a lyre.

[Nikas]

Rather an emotive passage that. One could pen a passage couched in similar emotive terms about Sparta, Thebes and Philip - not to mention Alexander III and his Successors. Perhaps the descendants of those Plataeans who survived Sparta's "settlement" of the town during the Peloponnesian War would surely be forgiven if they didn't shed a tear for Sparta's chastisement at the hands of the Macedonians in 331?

Exactly why I am not particularly moved by the Athenian's hollow cries of the loss of Hellenic "freedom".

, as I've attempted to point out, Polybius' remarks are just as informed by self-serving motivation. Indeed, I'd describe his telling of the fall of Achaea as a hostile lament.

All ancient historians are certainly not free of the taint of bias, however Polybius is a refreshing perspective of a non-Athenian centric perspective. When writing about Philip II and Demosthenes, he is looking back to affairs long before his time and making the refreshing point that Athens was not Hellas, nor Hellas was Athens, which are a very strong reminder of the danger of being sucked in by the prophecies of doom, pillage, rape and plunder foretold by the firebrand of the Philippics.

yes, the passage in which we find the absolute howler that Athens was caught unawares relying on a peace treaty (after Perinthus) that never existed. I fear you take Diodorus here far too literally. Just what "most of the Greeks" thought as philia is a moot point. I doubt most of the "most" had too much of a choice. Those who weren't bought were bashed. Others, divided amongst themselves, were played off and "befriended". Those Peloponnesian poleis who agitated for Philip's intervention - led by Philip's "supporters" - also provided not a few of those who stood alongside Sparta in 331. Philia might be in the eye of the philanderer??

"Philia" to my enemy's enemy or my friend's friend was par for the course. Each Hellenic polis had it's own interests at heart and Athens was not every Hellenic polis. I believe Diodorus captures it succinctly enough, most of the Greeks, at least perhaps only the ones that mattered, felt that either befriending Philip, or at the least not opposing him, was in their interest, and this interest did not have to be Athens interest which extended no further than how they could re-take their long lost northern possession and yearnings of leading (dominating) the other Greeks Panegyricus style.

I've said: I quite like Philip. He was most certainly a man for his time. He bullied, battled, bribed and bought the Greeks. Before they knew what he was doing it was, mostly, done. Athens, like many a salesman sold to easily by other salesmen, was played as a lyre.

Yes, I quite admire Philip as well, more-so than his son in fact. As Diodorus has Demades say, the new "Agamemnon" was the great king who beat everyone else to the punch.

[Xenophon]

For a simple analogy of Philip's achievements :

It is often a more prestigious accomplishment, when asked to build a house in a swamp ( here the swamp of Greek politics and rivalries), to build a solid foundation. One this is done, albeit with great difficulty, completing impressive walls, lofty columns, a splendid roof , and impressive decoration is a relatively easy task, quickly completed. But without the harder task of establishing a solid foundation in the swamp, all would be in vain and as nothing, impossible to build.......

No one can deny Philip built the firm foundation in the swamp.

One further consideration. Philip, that master of diplomacy as well as battle, might not - unlike Alexander - 'bitten off more than he could chew'. After all, Alexander's 'conquests' in the far east were largely illusory, and his ramshackle empire there lasted about 5 minutes after he was gone from a particular area. Perhaps, had Philip lived, with more caution and less 'glory' he'd have established a smaller empire that might have lasted.....

[Paralus]

"Philia" to my enemy's enemy or my friend's friend was par for the course. Each Hellenic polis had it's own interests at heart and Athens was not every Hellenic polis. I believe Diodorus captures it succinctly enough, most of the Greeks, at least perhaps only the ones that mattered, felt that either befriending Philip, or at the least not opposing him, was in their interest, and this interest did not have to be Athens interest which extended no further than how they could re-take their long lost northern possession and yearnings of leading (dominating) the other Greeks Panegyricus style.

I do not know why you seem to ascribe to me an Atheno-centric or (defence of same) view. Athens spent the better part of the fourth century in wasted idyll eying off recapture of empire past. Her near psychotic fixation upon Amphipolis betrays such and it was this idyll that Philip so skilfully manipulated throughout his dealings with her. Philip clearly saw a benefit to an extant Athens and one allied to his interests.

Polybius makes much of the Macedonian king's actions post Chaeroneia - going so far as to say that Philip's actions allowed those Peloponnesian states the "breathe again". This is, of course, the immediate result. He conveniently neglects the intervening 150 odd years during which Macedonian suzerainty was enforced via tight oligarchical regimes and tyrants (this later being the single most abhorrent title in Polybius' world view and the title which he gave Cleomenes III after the trouble he caused Megalopolis and Acahaea). The changing view of Macedon, also neglected by Polybius, is reflected by the number of Peloponnesian allies that Sparta gathered to her cause in her abortive rebellion. One can only assume the breathing was no longer so free.

I've said: I quite like Philip. He was most certainly a man for his time. He bullied, battled, bribed and bought the Greeks. Before they knew what he was doing it was, mostly, done. Athens, like many a salesman sold to easily by other salesmen, was played as a lyre.

Yes, I quite admire Philip as well, more-so than his son in fact. As Diodorus has Demades say, the new "Agamemnon" was the great king who beat everyone else to the punch.

And that is no surprise. Personally I find the father and that cast of grasping, coercive political infighters who followed him far more interesting. Far too much worship - still today the propaganda works - attends the son.