THE STRENGTH OF THE PERSIAN ARMY AT ISSOS

[agesilaos]

a) The 8,000 are additional to the 64,000. They represent the largest number that could have crossed on the first day, during the second day those that had crossed (cavalry, Greeks, Kardaces, 8,000 lights and the Royal train) moved south to the Pinaros, although the original intent was to chase Alexander through the Pass of the Pillar of Jonah; as these troops advanced others would carry on crossing the Amanic Gates. 64,000 could have crossed but they still have to march to the Pinaros a distance of 75 km or 46 1/2 miles which represents a double-march or 15+ hours. I make the Macedonians only about 30,000 including the Greek Allies.

b) I would not count the kardakoi as fighting material either, their performance was poor to say the least.

The small body on the left are 6,000 archers Thracians and mercenary peltasts

battle_issus.jpg (223.64 KiB) Viewed 5389 times

[Paralus]

We need to be careful here because things are drifting inexorably towards the 'effete' and useless Persians of Greco-Macedonian machismo. Those wasted, carpet loving softies that Isokraktes railed against. Yet those same 'effete softies' conquered (and reconquered as rebellions attest) an empire not seen until Alexander. The rubbish that Persia was a wasted, soft culture by the fourth century is just that: rubbish. The fact that Persia utilised Greek mercenaries is trumpeted as an indicator of this 'serious' martial decline. This is claptrap. Persia utilised all forces available under its control and many of these mercenaries (in the fifth century) were "Greeks of Asia". Many (almost all in the fourth century) were on-hire from the mainland (Pammenes' 5,000 from Thebes for example) if employment was offered. The sources list mercenaries who were not Greek as well.

Persia, like many empires, had stronger or weaker kings (by comparison in hindsight). That does not mean the forces available to the king were effete. At the time of Alexander's invasion Darius III was in the process of settling his accession. His satraps had told him that Philip had sent some 10-11,000 men to "free the Greeks of Asia". The Great king's court had heard this all before: Agesilaos, with great pomp and bulls**t some fifty or so years before, had crossed to Asia to free the same Greeks and 'march up country'. Ho hum. Hence the satrapal gathering (sans the ridiculous 20,000 Greeks) that met Alexander at Granikos.

[Paralus]

Thanks. I'm going to tackle that thread as suggested.

As one should. Asklepiodotos is here. Aelian, apart from an old Google books link, is not online. Xenophon kindly passed on Devine's translation to me, the relevant parts of which are below...

Aelian, 11.5-6:
“Compacting” (pyknosis) is used whenever the general wishes to lead the phalanx against the enemy, “locking shields” (synaspismos) when the defenders, hedged about as it were, have to receive the enemy's attack. Therefore, since there are 1,024 file-leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx, it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits (6,144 ft.) in length, that is, 10 stades and 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits (3,072 ft.) in compact order (pyknosis), and two and a half stades and 24 cubits (1,536 ft.) in “locked shield” order.

Aelian, 33.1 & 3-4:
If we want to compact the phalanx on the right wing, we order the file on the extreme right wing to stand still and the rest to face spearward and close up to the right, then to face to the front to restore the line, and have the rearward ranks close up forward.
If we want to compact the phalanx on the left wing, we will give the opposite orders.
If we want to compact the phalanx in the centre, we order the diphalangia on the right to face shieldward and that on the left spearward. They must then close up towards the centre of the phalanx, then they must all face to the front to restore the line and have the rear ranks close up.

[Hando]

a) The 8,000 are additional to the 64,000. They represent the largest number that could have crossed on the first day, during the second day those that had crossed (cavalry, Greeks, Kardaces, 8,000 lights and the Royal train) moved south to the Pinaros, although the original intent was to chase Alexander through the Pass of the Pillar of Jonah; as these troops advanced others would carry on crossing the Amanic Gates. 64,000 could have crossed but they still have to march to the Pinaros a distance of 75 km or 46 1/2 miles which represents a double-march or 15+ hours. I make the Macedonians only about 30,000 including the Greek Allies.

b) I would not count the kardakoi as fighting material either, their performance was poor to say the least.

battle_issus.jpg

Thanks for providing the map.
1)Ok, so you're saying the 8,000 Persian lights are not part of the 64,000 levies/armed servants but a different branch of troops.
I'm confused because earlier you said there were "6,000 cavalry,12,000 Greeks, 24,000 Kardaces, and 64,000 levies/armed servants; maximum with the first three contingents being the minimum to be counted as an army, i,e,42,000 to 106,000." So even if we discount the 64,000 levies/armed servants, that leaves us with only 42,000 deployed as the "minimum to be counted as an army" as you say. So, I don't understand where the 8,000 lights now come in to make up 50,000 deployed. Were there 50,000 deployed with only 42,000 "to be counted as an army" and another 8,000 lights deployed that cannot be considered "army" material?

2)On the map, I only see a total of 42,000 Persian troops deployed in battle lines. 44,000 if we count the 2,000? on the mountain behind Alexander's right that ended up not fighting. Where are the 8,000 lights? I thought you said 50,000 Persians were deployed in battle lines?

3)I assume the 64,000 armed levies (indicated by the arrow pointing south behind the Persian battle lines) means they were not deployed, since I don't see them deployed on the map? This is confusing since I thought you had said earlier that they were arranged behind the front lines, which would mean that they were deployed.

4)Are you saying that only 30,000 Macedonians/Greeks were deployed in battle lines and not 47,000?

5)And in fact, I only see 17,800 Macedonians/Greeks deployed on the map, not 30,000 or even 47,000. 18,600 if you count the 800 on the mountain behind Alexander facing off against the 2,000? Persians who did not fight anyway. Where are the rest of the deployed Macedonians/Greeks?
Thanks

[agesilaos]

1) Previously I had simply forgotten about the 8,000 lights which I had crossing previously; the whole is still an army but only the cavalry and Greeks constitute forces capable of standing up to the Macedonians
2) I did not draw the map but the 8,000 lights would be partially on the mountain and initially in front of the Persian line then in its rear behind the second rank of Greek mercs here.
3) The arrow means they were arriving onto the battle field, it is also important to remember the numbers are maxima, several variables would see fewer or more reaching the action (continuing to cross the pass all night, rests on the approach march, etc)
4) Yes, the higher figures assume more mercenaries, despite the fact that Alexander was not a good prospect until after Issos and that the figures for re-enforcements were additional to the original force rather than replacing losses.
5) You have not read the caption which adds 6,000 (inadequately shown as the small block by Parmenion and there are the 6,000 Allies missing too whose presence is not certain.
Don’t get too obsessed with the numbers on the Persian side they are only estimates based on the methodology explained in the very first post and supplemented by analysis of the baggage train captured at Damascus ( the thread is ‘On the Road to Damascus’)

Paralus, you slanderer, Agesilaos was a true hero! I am not saying that the Persians were ‘effete’, although Xenophon does characterise the decay of their enrolment system in the closing chapters of the ‘Cyropaideia’ with the nobility sending substitutes in their place. One needs to bear in mind that the Greek poleis were equally unable to face the Macedonian war machine.

[Hando]

3) The arrow means they were arriving onto the battle field, it is also important to remember the numbers are maxima, several variables would see fewer or more reaching the action (continuing to cross the pass all night, rests on the approach march, etc)
5)You have not read the caption which adds 6,000 (inadequately shown as the small block by Parmenion and there are the 6,000 Allies missing too whose presence is not certain.

A)With regards to your answer in 3). I take it that as these 64,000 levies/armed servants were arriving onto the battle field after the battle was engaged, they did not participate at all in the battle.
B)With regards to your answer in 5). If there is uncertainty regarding the presence of these 6,000 allies, isn't it possible that the Macedonian/Greek forces numbered even less than 30,000 deployed in battle lines? They may even have numbered 24,000 deployed only?
Thank you again.

[Paralus]

Paralus, you slanderer, Agesilaos was a true hero!

An empire builder, Theban hater and immovable force who would break through or break. Sparta broke.

[Hando]

And at Issos, how many Persian troops fought in the center according to Diodorus? I read Diodorus' work on Issos online and I have not managed to locate this information.

[agesilaos]

31 1 He wasted no time in summoning his forces from all directions and ordered them to muster in Babylon. He canvassed his Friends and Relatives and selected those who were suitable, giving to some commands suited to their abilities and ordering others to fight at his side as his personal staff. 2 When the time set for the march had come, they had all arrived in Babylon. The number of the soldiers was over four hundred thousand49 infantry and not less than one hundred thousand cavalry.

This was the force with which Dareius marched out of Babylon in the direction of Cilicia; he had with him his wife and children — a son and two daughters — and his mother.

Diodoros XVII

A) they would arrive fifteen hours after crossing the Amanic Gate so if they crossed at midnight they would start arriving at three pm, the battle started about five thirty pm; about 8,000 would come in each hour. Any that arrived did not resist but fl the Greeks and Kardakoi broke.
B) Yes, it is possible, which wouldbring the odds to 2:1

I find nothing innaccurate in your assessment, Paralus, still a hero of mine though, along with the two Kleomeneses I and III, and the Emperor Domitian too!

[Hando]

Thanks. I'm going to tackle that thread as suggested.

As one should. Asklepiodotos is here. Aelian, apart from an old Google books link, is not online. Xenophon kindly passed on Devine's translation to me, the relevant parts of which are below...

Aelian, 11.5-6:
“Compacting” (pyknosis) is used whenever the general wishes to lead the phalanx against the enemy, “locking shields” (synaspismos) when the defenders, hedged about as it were, have to receive the enemy's attack. Therefore, since there are 1,024 file-leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx, it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits (6,144 ft.) in length, that is, 10 stades and 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits (3,072 ft.) in compact order (pyknosis), and two and a half stades and 24 cubits (1,536 ft.) in “locked shield” order.

Aelian, 33.1 & 3-4:
If we want to compact the phalanx on the right wing, we order the file on the extreme right wing to stand still and the rest to face spearward and close up to the right, then to face to the front to restore the line, and have the rearward ranks close up forward.
If we want to compact the phalanx on the left wing, we will give the opposite orders.
If we want to compact the phalanx in the centre, we order the diphalangia on the right to face shieldward and that on the left spearward. They must then close up towards the centre of the phalanx, then they must all face to the front to restore the line and have the rear ranks close up.

Thank you for sharing this Paralus. There seems to be a lot of little details I need to know of in order to get a better sense of how these battles were fought. Seems there was a lot of systematic and sophisticated planning involved. Something only professional soldiers with practiced discipline could have managed to pull off.

[Hando]

A) they would arrive fifteen hours after crossing the Amanic Gate so if they crossed at midnight they would start arriving at three pm, the battle started about five thirty pm; about 8,000 would come in each hour. Any that arrived did not resist but fl the Greeks and Kardakoi broke.

Thanks Agesilaos, but I didn't quite catch your last sentence above. "Any that arrived did not resist but fl the Greeks and Kardakoi broke."
By "fl the Greeks" you mean "fled the Greeks?
So you mean any of the levies/armed servants that did arrive at the battle field did not fight at all, but instead fled and that as a direct result of this the Kardakoi broke their ranks and fled too?

And I assume the levies/armed servants were positioned behind the Kardakoi and the rest of the fighting Persians since they arrived last. If this is the case, then I'm not sure how the levies/armed servants running away could have influenced the Kardakoi to run away as well. After all, since the levies/armed servants were behind the Kardakoi, wouldn't it have been difficult for the Kardakoi to notice what was happening behind them? On top of this since the Macedonians were screened off from the levies by the Kardakoi in the front ranks why would the levies run? They weren't in any direct threat from the Macedonians, since they were shielded by the Kardakoi in front of them.

[agesilaos]

That should be 'fled once the Greeks and Kardakoi broke'; I seem to bve suffering from text drop out. Any that arrived in time wouild have assisted in the barricading of the river bank and beefed up the initial skirmish line or possibly shot from the rear of the Greeks and Kardakoi - Arrian says that Alexander closed quickly to minimise any damage from missiles, but there does not seem to have been any clash until the Macedonians struck the Kardakoi and Greek mercenaries; rear support would explain why it was so ineffective too.

[Hando]

Thanks for your explanation and for your patience Agesilaos.

[agesilaos]

Hans Delbruck suggested quite emphatically that the Persian army at Issos could not have ‘been larger than some 25,000 men’, even a cursory reading of his treatment of this battle reveals a haze of mis-conception and confused reasoning.

The factors which bring him to the conclusion about Persian numbers are various
1) That since the Persian army made a march of a parallel distance in a similar time to that of Alexander's which he puts at 30,000.
2) That since the Persians had the option of fighting on the Deli Tschay which has an ample plain but they chose, instead to stand on the defensive on a more constricted front, they must have been the weaker force.
3) The casualty figures for the Macedonian imply that there were not many Persians.
Each of these is open to question; it seems highly likely that Dareios had an extra day to make his march, which necessarily allows more men to cross the Amanus range, he also forgets that Alexander has to cross two passes (going to Myriandos and coming back) whereas Dareios only crosses one.

The second point falls on the question of Persian intelligence; we are told that Dareios was advancing against what he thought was a flying foe and was only apprised of the fact that Alexander was advancing against him once he reached the Pinaros; the choice of field was thus forced upon him.

It would be totally unsafe to draw any conclusion from propagandist casualty figures (even Delbruck admits that they are untrustworthy!).

Because of these ‘positive factors that exclude the possibility’ of a larger Persian army he dismisses Kromayer’s note that the Seleukids had raised armies of 50-60,000 in the area with a note that the Hellenistic kingdoms had ‘a different concept of war to the Empire of the Achaemenidae’. So it would seem that Dareios, whose tradition was founded on raising large armies to awe the enemy into submission, failed to raise even as many troops as the later, more quality oriented Seleukids. Nor has he considered the size of the baggage captured at Damascus, which accords with a force of 100,000 souls.

Again, he would have Dareios move from the plains on a whim, rather than the necessity of supply problems.

Further oddities include making the Macedonian phalanx a spear armed hoplite one, having Alexander take two phalanx taxeis from the centre in his flanking movement (they are explicitly two ilai of the Companion cavalry) and having the Macedonians fight thirty-two deep! This last because having rejected Polybios’ figures he then works from them, failing to note that Alexander deployed in two lines and including the lights who were ahead of the wings in the calculation of the battle line.

His conclusions are thus deeply flawed.

[Hando]

Hans Delbruck suggested quite emphatically that the Persian army at Issos could not have ‘been larger than some 25,000 men’, even a cursory reading of his treatment of this battle reveals a haze of mis-conception and confused reasoning.
The factors which bring him to the conclusion about Persian numbers are various
1) That since the Persian army made a march of a parallel distance in a similar time to that of Alexander's which he puts at 30,000.
His conclusions are thus deeply flawed.

Thanks for sharing this. I find it very useful.

Another issue with his point in 1) is that if both Persians and Macedonians had to march parallel distance in similar time, then according to his calculations the number of troops deployed by both should be similar as well, but Delbruck concludes that the Macedonians had 5,000 more troops than the Persians. His reasoning here seems flawed for this particular point as well.

Now if only we could get someone who speaks Dutch to read Lendering's "Alexander the Great" and see why he says the Persians were outnumbered at Issos and why they ran away without a fight at Gaugamela.