Interpreting a Line From Q. Curtius Rufus

[Paralus]

You can have some of our English air if you like, Paralus - it's bloomin' freezing over here at the moment. What I wouldn't give for a spot of 40 degrees ...

Trust me: it's only wonderful for a short amount of time. Disgusting thing when your Guiness becomes warm too quickly. I'm happy to report it's half of that today - thanks for sending the air. Oh joy....

Just so we have the quote, but more suspicions; Memnon send 5,000 cavalry from Thrace yet Thrace had rebelled and was not under control, in fact I think Memnon had been killed. 5,000 is alot of cavalry to come from Thrace in any case, the whole levy of a major tribe such as the Odrysai. Harpalus' 7,000 foot don't ring true either since he was based in Asia Minor it would be adashed long walk! I'll check it on a map. The armour is associated with these soldiers so must be equally dubious.

The Memnon episode is one the more intractable sidebars to the main narrative of the period. There have been suggestions this fellow was related to the Memnon (one of those Greeks upon whom Diodorus settles his “outstanding general” motif that recurs throughout his history in contrast to dilatory effete Persians) and that he rose in alliance with Agis.

Whilst it is possible that the Agis revolt and Thracian revolts were related, not least for fact that Thrace provided the timing trigger for Agis, it seems rather odd to me that Alexander would appoint a relation to a Greek in the service of the enemy as general in Thrace – in his rear. He is unlikely to have been a relative.

It also seems more than inherently unlikely that, having come to a settlement of the matter, Antipater would re-appoint the traitor to his post so as to have him in his rear whilst marching upon Agis. Bosworth’s suggestion that Diodorus has confused his material in summary is more likely correct. For whatever reason this Memnon seems to have created unrest leading to a revolt of sorts; enforced recruiting for the east or harsh management of his protectorate might have something to do with it but it might be just as likely that the rather industrious Seuthes – intriguing with Athens – might also have stirred matters along. Alexander himself took a decent contingent from the region at the outset and, like the Triballians and Illyrians, their participation is often described as reducing those available at home for revolt as Frontinus (2.11.3) observes:

When Alexander had conquered and subdued Thrace and was setting out for Asia, fearing that after his departure the Thracians would take up arms, he took with him, as though by way of conferring honour, their kings and officials — all in fact who seemed to take to heart the loss of freedom. In charge of those left behind he placed common and ordinary persons, thus preventing the officials from wishing to make any change, as being bound to him by favours, and the common people from even being able to do so, since they had been deprived of their leaders.

Whatever with respect to the above, two things are reasonably clear: Memnon retained his appointment as strategos of Thrace and, unless Curtius has completely messed the entire notice up, he led the reinforcements east in person. Confirmation – of sorts – for this comes from the fact that his successor in the region, one Zopyrion, creates the dance floor for Seuthes’ secession ambitions by managing to have himself killed and his army defeated sometime around 325. Memnon was, therefore, succeeded prior to this, most likely at the time he led these forces east.

It all seems rather unlikely that Alexander – by this time dropping individuals for treasons perceived or otherwise like so many skittles – would have trusted this fellow to bring out his reinforcements. There remains the possibility that Alexander had him do so and then executed him for his crime. I find it all the more unlikely that Curtius would have omitted such a juicy detail.

I agree that the cavalry numbers – being from Thrace alone – seem large. Perhaps he has messed that up or perhaps they were not only from Thrace alone. Diodorus' notice of this would indicate that the troops (infantry and cavalry) were made up of "allied Greek and mercenary" contingents. It is possible that Thracians made up the bulk of the cavalry.If Seuthes was angling for opportunity – and there’s little doubt, given slightly later events, that he was – such a number, across Thrace or from the “stronger” areas, would help to limit that opportunity.

The 7,000 from Harpalus does not inherently seem unlikely. The man, foibles and all, was in charge of massive amounts of money and, like Craterus, Eumenes and Antigonus after him, had access to the funds to raise such forces. Eumenes had little trouble raising some 10,000 in Cilicia to take east in 318/17. Antigonus too seemingly had little trouble recruiting for the defence of Alexander’s supply lines and his ambitions after the latter’s death. Harparlus was recruiting from Mesopotamia and it might be a fair guess that Alexander had instructed him to do so in the vacuum of troops coming from Macedonia after 331 (he'd asked Antipater for some in around 328/7[?] and received none). The march across to India, having assembled in Mesopotamia, is not terribly incredulous. Great numbers had marched from Europe to Sittacene and to Bactria if our sources are correct.

As always it is the neat round figures that irritate. Oh for a Thucydides (“6,750 mercenaries raised from the districts about Caria, Lycia and Panphylia; 4, 820 Thracian cavalry from all areas; the bulk of which were recruited from districts where unrest was being fomented ….”)

[agesilaos]

During these events in Italy, Zopyrion, who bad been left governor of Pontus by Alexander the Great, thinking that, if he did not attempt something, he should be stigmatized as indolent, collected a force of thirty thousand men, and made war upon the Scythians. But being cut off, with his whole army, he paid the penalty for a rash attack upon an innocent people.

Thus Justin puts Zopyrion's debacle contemporary to the death of Alexander of Epeiros viz c331 I would posit Zopyrion's expedietion denuded the Thracian region of troops and that Memnon or Menon was a Thracian prince who took advantage thereof to improve his lot, Antipater's revenge was stalled by Agis' War and he confirms memnon's position as chieftan, just as Lysimachos would later maintain Seuthes as King despite his serial revolts. It is hard to see a Macedonian being forgiven High Treason. The name Memnon is quite common even a Persian king bearing it and a pharaoh there is no question of a relationship with Memnon of Rhodes.

I suspect the later dating of Zopyrion stems from these reinforcements of Curtius. Harpalus must have been a year away, in his base at Ecbatana, Thrace a year beyond that so there cannot be much chance of them reacting to events in India. Of course, they may have had standing orders to send men East. Could be something to look into a bit closer... come back Sysiphus all is forgiven.

[Paralus]

Indeed Justin does. One might caution, though, that if Diodorus occasionally confuses his dating, Justin is liable to confuse much more (including names and places - the Lamian war in Heracleaia for example). This might sound odd but Curtius might well be the more reliable chronicler here (X.1.43-45):

At about this same time [that is, 325 during the "satrapal purge" which Curtius was discussing], Alexander received a letter from Coenus concerning events in Europe and Asia while he was himself engaged in the conquest of India. Zopyrion, who governed Thrace, had been lost with his entire army with the sudden onset of stormy weather and squalls while he was on an expedition against the Getae. On learning of this set-back, Seuthes had driven his subjects, the Odrysians, to rebellion. Thrace had almost been lost and not even Greece …

As always: sources, sources, sources: whom to believe?? At least Curtius is consistent: he has Memnon bringing troops from Thrace and one Zopyrion - evidently his successor - dying afterwards.

[agesilaos]

There may not be any chronological clash here. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Curtius is reporting the receipt of a letter bringing Alexander up to date with affairs in Europe whilst he was subjugating India; just before the the lacuna, however we have 'Thrace had almost been lost and even Greece...' ;I put it to you that the only time when it might have been said that Greece had almost been lost was during Agis' War. Curtius is recapping all the way back to the last news Alexander is alleged to have received from the West, to whit the suppression of these risings, the lacuna would have brought matters up to date from that chronological base.

[Paralus]

... just before the the lacuna, however we have 'Thrace had almost been lost and even Greece...' ;I put it to you that the only time when it might have been said that Greece had almost been lost was during Agis' War.

That is entirely possible; problem is that we don't know what follows. The sentence was obviously not complete with “Greece”. I think it needs to be read in conjunction with the preceding sentences:

…Zopyrion, who governed Thrace, had been lost with his entire army with the sudden onset of stormy weather and squalls while he was on an expedition against the Getae. On learning of this set-back, Seuthes had driven his subjects, the Odrysians, to rebellion. Thrace had almost been lost and not even Greece …

Curtius is indicating here that Thrace almost fell to Seuthes – not Memnon. That Thrace was “almost lost” might be a description better suited to a failed uprising after Zopyrion’s death in 325. Thus Seuthes, whilst not “winning” all Thrace, has established his position and power; a position that will have improved by the time that Lysimachus arrives in 323.

Seuthes may also have been “intriguing” with the old “ally” of the area, Athens, during or after Agis’ revolt. His diplomatic activity, about the time of the Agis’ revolt or its aftermath, might have been aimed acquiring future Athenian support. Perhaps he intended to support Memnon in a coup against his superior Antipater. It is as clear as an ouzo and coke. It makes no sense to me that Antipater would confirm a rebellious Memnon unless he was that strapped for troops and reliable strategoi. That Curtius does not delight in telling us that Alexander had him trampled by an elephant or some such means that Alexander did not see him as a traitor – rehabilitated or not.

What is clear, at least to me, is that the letter (or report) is describing events that occurred during Alexander’s time in India. During this time Zopyrion lost his life and his forces. As well, Curtius is clear in naming Memnon as the strategos who brought the reinforcements to the Hydaspes – reinforcements containing significant numbers of Thracians. Alexander was well informed of the revolt of Agis and, one might well imagine, concomitant events in Thrace as large columns of troops ostensibly reached him in Sittakene and / or Bactria prior to moving into India.

Curtius gives his rendition of Agis’ revolt earlier (book six). The lamentable state of the book does not allow us to guess at what is missing from the beginning. It is interesting though that he states at the beginning of book five:

As for contemporaneous operations in Greece or in Illyria and Thrace under the supreme command of Alexander, if I intended to record these in accordance with strict chronology, I should be obliged to interrupt my Asian narrative.

He evidently intended to come back to such and consider them chronologically too - perhaps using the letter or report as you suggest. It might be assumed that a discussion of Memnon and Thrace preceded the closing stages of the “battle of mice”. As it stands, the only information remaining in Curtius about Thrace is Memnon bringing troops to the Hydaspes (326) and Zopyrion dying (in 325 as I’d argue). That might see Memnon leaving Thrace sometime near to 328.

Lastly we need to know how to end that infernal sentence “Thrace had almost been lost and not even Greece …”. I’d suggest it may have read “was without threat”

[rocktupac]

It does indeed seem a better fit and is, in my opinion, what is meant. It strikes me as odd that some suggest that hoplites – in their technical sense – are “lighter armed”. Whilst one concedes that clambering up mountain tracks (the Persian gates for example) or chasing about with the cavalry on skirmishing missions with a sarissa is out of the question, the argument that classic hoplites are much better at this is a furphy. I’d love to see a fully armed hoplite play hamippoi. I, for one, would soon tire of lumbering about in cuirass (be it quilted / layered linen or metal), greaves, dory and 6kg aspis. Not entirely certain that I’d carry such a panoply too bloody far up a mountain either – not to say a scaling ladder.

I agree. Currently, I am working on a paper for grad school that will attempt to prove just how the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx worked, how it was able to moved/its mobility, what it looked like, etc. After reading just about everything I could find on the sarissa-phalanx (ancient and modern) I have come to some striking conclusions that are greatly different than what most (albeit) modern authors say about the sarissa-phalanx. It is interesting what kind of information comes forward once all the ancient evidence is assembled and all preconceived modern notions of how the sarissa-phalanx worked and its presupposed limits are ignored.

[Paralus]

Currently, I am working on a paper for grad school that will attempt to prove just how the Macedonian sarissa-phalanx worked, how it was able to moved/its mobility, what it looked like, etc. After reading just about everything I could find on the sarissa-phalanx (ancient and modern) I have come to some striking conclusions that are greatly different than what most (albeit) modern authors say about the sarissa-phalanx.

I, for one, would be most interested.

There are actually few attestations in the extant literary sources that describe such. This is not to dismiss the "Tacticians"; rather to point up the dearth of descriptions of the phalanx in actual battle. The most celebrated is, of course, Polybios’ explanation of the phalanx’s defeat by Roman manipular armies of the second century. Others include Plutarch’s account of Pydna (via Scipio Nasica who was present); Polybios’ critique of Kallisthenes’ account of Issos as well as his account of Cynoscephalae and Sellasia.

What comes through these descriptions – particularly the latter three – is the fact that the phalanx, having deployed from column into line, would seem to be able to contract from “open order” all the way down to “locked shields” (synaspismos) prior to or during battle. It would seem that reformation back the other way – in action – was not possible. The only clear attestations of how this occurred indicate that the phalanx actually contracted. At Cynoscephalae (18.24.8) Philip V orders his phalanx to “close up to the right”. In his criticism of Kallisthenes Polybios (12.21.3) – again – notes that the phalanx contracts when forming “close order” or “shield to shield” (depending on the usage of the Greek which is not technical) as he states that it occupies half the width of the more open order.

At Sellasia Polybios describes the “peculiar” double phalanx employed by Antigonus. Walbank notes (in his commentary) that the nature of the peculiarity was the double depth and that the phalanx is hardly to deliver a “charge” in synaspismos. It seems the ranks closed up from behind (rather than the files closing) to lend weight to the charge here.

[rocktupac]

I, for one, would be most interested.

There are actually few attestations in the extant literary sources that describe such. This is not to dismiss the "Tacticians"; rather to point up the dearth of descriptions of the phalanx in actual battle. The most celebrated is, of course, Polybios’ explanation of the phalanx’s defeat by Roman manipular armies of the second century. Others include Plutarch’s account of Pydna (via Scipio Nasica who was present); Polybios’ critique of Kallisthenes’ account of Issos as well as his account of Cynoscephalae and Sellasia.

What comes through these descriptions – particularly the latter three – is the fact that the phalanx, having deployed from column into line, would seem to be able to contract form “open order” all the way down to “locked shields” (synaspismos) prior to or during battle. It would seem that reformation back the other way – in action – was not possible. The only clear attestations of how this occurred indicate that the phalanx actually contracted. At Cynoscephalae (18.24. Philip V orders his phalanx to “close up to the right”. In his criticism of Kallisthenes Polybios (12.21.3) – again – notes that the phalanx contracts when forming “close order” or “shield to shield” (depending on the usage of the Greek) as he states that it occupies half the width of the more open order.

At Sellasia Polybios describes the “peculiar” double phalanx employed by Antigonus. Walbank notes (in his commentary) that the nature of the peculiarity was the double depth and that the phalanx is hardly to deliver a “charge” in synaspismos. It seems the ranks closed up from behind (rather than the files closing) to lend weight to the charge here.

Thank you for the insight! The way I have decided to approach this is to look at the ancient sources and note every detail or description of the sarissa-phalanx in action, how it was used, references to it, etc. Then, I categorized the descriptions into groups of noticeable characteristics or reoccurring themes of the sarissa-phalanx. From this plenty has emerged and it became clearer that modern authors have somewhat misunderstood the sarissa-phalanx (in general) and its role in battle. The lack of detail that modern authors use to describe the sarissa-phalanx is alarming (although it seems that this is accepted by many, to some degree, due to the overall lack of information we actually have on the sarissa-phalanx -- as Paralus rightly pointed out). While I don't claim to have found the 'hidden meaning' of the sarissa-phalanx, I have certainly come to understand it far better than if I were to read a dozen books on Hellenistic warfare.