Alexander and his mind

[Paralus]

That is, in my opinion, a poor explanation. Philip was about to fight the most important battle of his life. Had he lost, then it would probably have been the end of the Macedonian empire. And before this battle, he made a relatively inexperienced 18-year old second in command. I think "why" is a very good question. And "sending a message" is not good enough an answer.

I'm intrigued at your continued use of "second in command" and your insistence on what you see as a "good enough" answer. The implication is that there was something far more important - militarily - about Alexander that saw him promoted to "second in command".

Philip left for operations against Perinthus and Byzantium in late 340. When he did this, he left the royal seal with his annointed heir, the sixteen year old Alexander who acted as regent. Later, in 339, Philip summoned his son "to join him, and learn the rudiments of war in the camp of his father" (Justin IX.1.8) whilst campaigning on the northern frontiers.

At Chaeronea he posted his son on the left wing whilst the king. Philip, commanded from the right. The young Alexander was given the Zimmer-frame of Philip's "most important commanders" in Diodorus' words. Thus the prodigy was provided with a group of hardened and experienced campaign generals to provide advice and keep the young fellow with the programme.

After the battle Philip sends his diplomat, Antipater, to Athens so as to settle matters in Philip's stead. Along with him he sends Alexander. Does this indicate that Antipater was getting old and needed help in his job? Not likely.

What all of this clearly shows is that Alexander, coming into manhood, is being clearly singled out by Philip as his successor. All of this is an expression of confidence by Philip and training to boot.

Philip well knew the issue was up for grabs at Chaeronea. That will have been the same with or without Alexander.That the king's eighteen year old son is on the left wing is no great surprise - he is hardly likely to have been found amongst the lochoi of the infantry. Nor is the fact that Philip's most experienced generals are placed there about him.

[the_accursed]

I'm intrigued at your continued use of "second in command" and your insistence on what you see as a "good enough" answer. The implication is that there was something far more important - militarily - about Alexander that saw him promoted to "second in command".

I think two things about Alexander commanding the left wing at Chaeronea. I think that Philip must have thought that Alexander possessed enough talent to do so. Which is why I mentioned it in the first place. And I think it's true that Alexander had talent. But...I also think, in spite of this, that putting Alexander in that position was a very strange thing to do. Just as strange as it had been, had Alexander replaced Parmenion with an inexperienced 18-year old before the battle of Gaugamela. Whatever the justification for this would have been, and however much potential this 18-year old may have had.

I disagree that this was the right time to "send a message" to the soldiers regarding Alexander's future, or to give Alexander experience as commander. This battle had to be won, or Philip would have lost everything.

I don't think there was anything "important" about Alexander that made Philip make that decision. I think Philip took a great risk in a situation where he shouldn't have.

Philip left for operations against Perinthus and Byzantium in late 340. When he did this, he left the royal seal with his annointed heir, the sixteen year old Alexander who acted as regent. Later, in 339, Philip summoned his son "to join him, and learn the rudiments of war in the camp of his father" (Justin IX.1. whilst campaigning on the northern frontiers.

Right. Thus, any Macedonian ought to have been able to figure out that Alexander was most likely going to be Philip's successor long before Chaeronea.

At Chaeronea he posted his son on the left wing whilst the king. Philip, commanded from the right. The young Alexander was given the Zimmer-frame of Philip's "most important commanders" in Diodorus' words. Thus the prodigy was provided with a group of hardened and experienced campaign generals to provide advice and keep the young fellow with the programme.

Which is usually mentioned to explain away that it was a rather strange thing to do to let Alexander command the left wing in such an important battle. Philip could have placed Alexander there without making him the commander. That would have been a far more reasonable thing to do.

After the battle Philip sends his diplomat, Antipater, to Athens so as to settle matters in Philip's stead. Along with him he sends Alexander. Does this indicate that Antipater was getting old and needed help in his job? Not likely.

Right. And I don't disagree that Alexander, up to that point, was the person Philip wanted as his successor. But...there's a rather great difference between sending Alexander on a diplomatic mission, and letting him command the left wing in the most important battle Philip ever fought. The reasonable thing to do, would have been to let Parmenion do it, rather than to have him act as babysitter for Alexander.

What all of this clearly shows is that Alexander, coming into manhood, is being clearly singled out by Philip as his successor. All of this is an expression of confidence by Philip and training to boot.

But there's a right time and place for everything. This was hardly the right time or place to experiment, "send messages", or give Alexander command experience.

Philip well knew the issue was up for grabs at Chaeronea. That will have been the same with or without Alexander.That the king's eighteen year old son is on the left wing is no great surprise - he is hardly likely to have been found amongst the lochoi of the infantry. Nor is the fact that Philip's most experienced generals are placed there about him.

No, the "surprise" isn't that Alexander was on the left wing. Nor that there were many experienced generals there too. The "surprise" is that Philip allowed Alexander to command it.

[marcus]

But there's a right time and place for everything. This was hardly the right time or place to experiment, "send messages", or give Alexander command experience.

Philip well knew the issue was up for grabs at Chaeronea. That will have been the same with or without Alexander.That the king's eighteen year old son is on the left wing is no great surprise - he is hardly likely to have been found amongst the lochoi of the infantry. Nor is the fact that Philip's most experienced generals are placed there about him.

No, the "surprise" isn't that Alexander was on the left wing. Nor that there were many experienced generals there too. The "surprise" is that Philip allowed Alexander to command it.

All of which could suggest, of course, that Alexander's post-336 propaganda machine was in full swing, and described his being "in command" of the left wing, while in fact he was merely "there", perhaps commanding the agema (although ref. a previous discussion about whether it was the Companions or infantry that he had with him there), very closely looked after by the more experienced officers, who were really in command.

ATB

[Paralus]

I think that Philip must have thought that Alexander possessed enough talent to do so. Which is why I mentioned it in the first place. And I think it's true that Alexander had talent. But...I also think, in spite of this, that putting Alexander in that position was a very strange thing to do.

It is what Alexander was trained to do. The Macedonian kingdom had been at war since Philip's "usurpation" of the throne. It was a court geared to war as much as to wine, women, boys and song. The king lead his army in the field. Alexander, as presumptive heir, would need to learn and to be seen to do similar. It was hardly likely he'd be left at Pella with Arrhidaeus.

Philip might quite likely have died on the field that day even though his army was victorious. Had that happened, his heir was close at hand.

Which is usually mentioned to explain away that it was a rather strange thing to do to let Alexander command the left wing in such an important battle.

I don't necessarily think so. I'd think it is mentioned by Diodorus' source by way indicating that Philip made certain that what he'd planned would be executed and that his heir was well protected. No matter how much a prodigy Alexander might have been, he'd seen nowhere near the battles and death as had his father and his generals.

... and letting him command the left wing in the most important battle Philip ever fought. The reasonable thing to do, would have been to let Parmenion do it, rather than to have him act as babysitter for Alexander

...No, the "surprise" isn't that Alexander was on the left wing. Nor that there were many experienced generals there too. The "surprise" is that Philip allowed Alexander to command it. ..

...Philip could have placed Alexander there without making him the commander. That would have been a far more reasonable thing to do

I will cease arguing the case based on the evidence presented as a whole for you will only break it up and deal with as individual and distinct items. My point has been the whole indicates the advertising and grooming of Alexander as the heir presumtive.

What source underpins your claim that Philip placed Alexander in command of the left wing? Diodorus, our only real narrative guide, states that "on one wing the King posted his son" whilst adding that "He stationed alongside him his most important commanders..." Justin does not mention him at all until the diplomatic mission to Athens to secure the surrender and "alliance" of the city. I'm with Marcus here.

In the end it was neither here nor there as to whether Alexander "commanded". The Macedonians had to prevail in the field and will have decided the issue one way or the other regardless of Alexander being in command of the left - with a coterie of experinced generals. The kingdom was on the line no matter what.

It might be added that, while we possess no decent evidence of any other Argead doing this (they'd needed to have had the chance), it became the norm with his successors, beginning with Antigonus.

Also intriguing is Plutarch's account of this episode. Whilst Plutarch is rarely one to be engaged with the deatail of military matters, he conversely rarely passes up an opportunity to laud his hero. He especially delights in retailing stories - likely most post eventum I believe - that show his Alexander as a prodigy possessed of precocoius brilliance. The man to come in the boy so to speak. Yet here he notes only that Alexander "took part" in the battle against the Greeks. Yes he notes that Alexander "is said" to have been the first to break the ranks of the sacred band but nowhere does he describe his prodigy as being in "command" of the left.

Plutarch was availing himself of a number of sources - mostly to locate anecdotes I'm sure. Even so, one might have thought that had one of those sources indicated that Alexander commanded the left of the Macedonian army, Plutarch will have mentioned same. Even as he mentioned Philip being pleased (after this) at the Macedonians speaking of Alexander as their king and Philip their general.

Seems Philip got the message across.

[Phoebus]

I agree with Paralus on this one. Trying to deduce a specific rank or command role for Alexander at Chaeronea is like so much splitting hairs.

I'm fairly sure that, as already stated, Alexander's role in this battle was largely another step in his "royal apprenticeship", as it were. As heir apparent, yes, he was technically the "highest ranking" person in the left wing. I'm also sure that he was part of the command briefings and intimately familiar with the battle plans. As a young man with limited experience, though, I'm certain Phillip gruffly told him to look at, listen and learn from the senior, experienced men he had posted with him.

[marcus]

I agree with Paralus on this one. Trying to deduce a specific rank or command role for Alexander at Chaeronea is like so much splitting hairs.

Although it has to be said that Alexander is normally referred to as "leading" the left flank, so the_accursed has merely picked up on the "accepted" state of affairs. How interesting it is when one really starts looking at the sources critically!

There must be a book in here somewhere ...

ATB

[Phoebus]

Eh, don't get me wrong. My opinion is what it is largely because of what battle we're talking about.

I think there's a difference between "leading the left wing" in a battle such as Gaugamela, where the commander there was responsible for the timing between feeding units into the defensive effort and counterattacks, maintaining pace at the same time with a moving front, etc.; and a Chaeronea, where (and I could be wrong here), where we're talking about engaging a largely infantry army of roughly equal size that could only engage in certain ways and had no additional echelons to reinforce it.

The Sacred Band was certainly a crack unit and I don't imply that it was all as simple a matter as the Macedonians steamrolling their opposition... But I don't think that whoever was leading the left flank was exactly going to be faced with a major tactical dillema. It strikes me as very much the sort of situation where you could insert a young heir and have a series of experienced officers go over the scenario as a sort of "final exam": the observation of large scale command and control, coordination and drill between spheirae of Pezhetairoi, the employment of supporting assets and (maybe) cavalry.

[Paralus]

Well the words here are hêgemonôn for those about Alexander and hêgemonian for Philip. This presents difficulties in usage as hegemon is usually translated as “first among” or "chief". The plural denotes the experienced generals and the later clearly denotes Philip as the boss. And that would be how Polyaenus describes matters. There are those who would dismiss Philip’s actions as described by Polyaenus but, unless proven an utter liar, one cannot choose one’s sources.

It is interesting that Alexander does not rate either of those versions of hegemon in Diodorus’ text. Instead he is described – in the literal – as being “set down upon one horn of the animal”; obviously better said as “placed on one wing”. He is then described as having “those who lead” stationed beside him.

I would suggest that even where he “leading” the left his position was titular.

The Sacred Band was certainly a crack unit and I don't imply that it was all as simple a matter as the Macedonians steamrolling their opposition... But I don't think that whoever was leading the left flank was exactly going to be faced with a major tactical dillema. It strikes me as very much the sort of situation where you could insert a young heir and have a series of experienced officers go over the scenario as a sort of "final exam": the observation of large scale command and control, coordination and drill between spheirae of Pezhetairoi, the employment of supporting assets and (maybe) cavalry.

I agree. The other side of this discussion leads to Alexander being placed upon the left wing due to his preternatural military brilliance. Any other presumptive heir will have found himself on this field of battle and likely in some similar position. It is clear that he is not in sole command here.

As to the sacred band, Plutarch clearly describes them (Pelopidas 18.5) as having died facing the sarisa-bearing phalanx when he describes Philip seeing them dead “all where they had faced the long spears of his phalanx, with their armour, and mingled one with another”. It sounds like the end of an infantry engagement…

[the_accursed]

Philip might quite likely have died on the field that day even though his army was victorious. Had that happened, his heir was close at hand.

Alexander, though, could also have died that day (in spite of his many babysitters). And the best thing to do, under such circumstances, would have been to not let Alexander take part in the battle at all. Not only would it have guaranteed Alexander's survival, in case of Philip's death, but it would also have let the generals on the left wing focus on the battle, rather than have to spend half their energy watching over Alexander.

And regarding “close at hand”: He didn’t need to be on the battlefield. Had Philip died, and had the battle been lost, then the battlefield would have been the worst possible place for Alexander to be. Had Philip died, and had the battle been won, then the Macedonian army would have been just fine without Philip’s teenage son “close at hand” to lead them. Parmenion – or some other commander – would have led them.

What source underpins your claim that Philip placed Alexander in command of the left wing? Diodorus, our only real narrative guide, states that "on one wing the King posted his son" whilst adding that "He stationed alongside him his most important commanders..." Justin does not mention him at all until the diplomatic mission to Athens to secure the surrender and "alliance" of the city. I'm with Marcus here.

I don’t read Greek. I can only rely on the translations. This is what Diodorus writes:

The armies deployed at dawn, and the king stationed his son Alexander, young in age but noted for his valor and swiftness of action, on one wing, placing beside him his most seasoned generals, while he himself at the head of picked men exercised the command over the other; individual units were stationed where the occasion required.

Philip, apparently, “exercised command over "the other" wing. It certainly seems to me that Diodorus is saying, that while Alexander was in command of one wing, Philip was in command of the other.

I’m skipping the part where Diodorus talks about the Greeks, and how the battle was “hotly contested.” Then:

Then Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight.”

“Ably seconded by his men”. This would indicate to me, again, that Alexander was in command.

Diodorus continues:

Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for victory.”

“…not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander”. What would Philip have seen on the right wing? Probably the left wing advancing, and the Greeks fleeing. But I doubt he saw Alexander himself. If someone else was in command...why would Diodorus write “not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander” when Philip under such circumstances would have had no reason to suspect that Alexander had anything to do with putting the Greeks to flight?

I agree with you and Marcus that all this might be propaganda, as Alexander not taking part in this particular battle at all to me would make a whole lot more sense. But it’s at least clear to me that Diodorus himself thought that Alexander commanded the left wing, and that it, for that reason, was to him that Philip did not want to concede credit.

I disagree that this would have been the right time and place to experiment by letting Alexander command the left wing (or command anything at all) – however many capable generals that were there with him. This was the battle that would decide everything. Philip should have put the most capable person in every position, and let all his generals focus on winning the battle, rather than on babysitting his son. Alexander should not only not have commanded the left wing: he shouldn’t have commanded anything at all, or even been on the battlefield.

But then again, maybe he wasn’t?

[Paralus]

I disagree that this would have been the right time and place to experiment by letting Alexander command the left wing (or command anything at all) – however many capable generals that were there with him. This was the battle that would decide everything. Philip should have put the most capable person in every position, and let all his generals focus on winning the battle, rather than on babysitting his son. Alexander should not only not have commanded the left wing: he shouldn’t have commanded anything at all, or even been on the battlefield.

You insist on hyperbole to make a point. In so doing you obstinately refuse to see the fact that there was no other place for the King's presumptive heir to be other than the battlefield. This was the way of things. Your view is entirely modern and bears little resemblance to the world about which you are writing. It would have such important personages, like some ancient Alexander Haigh, forty miles or more behind the battle.

I do not know if you read my previous post, perhaps that is the reference to not reading Greek. The words Diodorus uses do not place Alexander in any command. Only on the wing. Either way, as I said, it doesn't matter. Alexander will have been there. Events subsequent to this will amply demonstrate how the heir will have viewed his father's ignoring of him for a place in this battle.

“Ably seconded by his men”. This would indicate to me, again, that Alexander was in command.

Excuse me paraphrasing, but that is a poor hook upon which to hang the entire wardrobe of 42nd Street.The general translation is the “men contending with him” or “by his side” based on the word used by Diodorus. It is better rendered as: “… with the support of the many brave men contending by his side…” (Translation by E.I McQueen).

Diodorus continues:

Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for victory.”

“…not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander”. What would Philip have seen on the right wing? Probably the left wing advancing, and the Greeks fleeing. But I doubt he saw Alexander himself. If someone else was in command...why would Diodorus write “not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander” when Philip under such circumstances would have had no reason to suspect that Alexander had anything to do with putting the Greeks to flight??

And so you rely on simply one strand of the “tradition” that has come down to us about this battle. It is not fulsome it must be said and nor is it the most satisfactory. There is much we’d like to know but we work with what we have. In that regard you might find the following interesting:

Polyaenus 4.2.2
At Chaeronea, Philip being in formation facing the Athenians, gave way and retired (or made a “sham” retreat). The Athenian general, Stratocles, shouted out “We must not stop pressing the enemy hard until we drive them into Macedonia” and he did not slacken the pursuit. Philip saying “The Athenians do know not how to win”, was retiring step by step, keeping his phalanx contracted and being protected inside the weapons. After a little, on gaining higher ground and after exhorting the troops, he reversed direction, charged powerfully at the Athenians and by his brilliant fighting won the victory.

Polyaenus, 4.2.7
At Chaeronea Philip, realising that the Athenians were impetuous and untrained, and that the Macedonians were experienced and trained, extended his formation a lot, quickly loosened the Athenians and made them easy to defeat. (Translation NGL Hammond and above)

Front. 2.1.9
At Chaeronea, Philip purposely prolonged the engagement, mindful that his own soldiers were seasoned by long experience, while the Athenians were ardent but untrained, and impetuous only in the charge. Then, as the Athenians began to grow weary, Philip attacked more furiously and cut them down.

It seems that there was far more going on than Alexander’s heroic wining, by his own brilliance and valour, the engagement on the left and the battle as well. And so: “What would Philip have seen on the right wing?” I would hazard a guess at very bloody little. He was engaged in rather delicate tactical manoeuvring of his own. Indeed I would think that manoeuvring was, in large part, responsible for any discombobulating of the allied phalanx that might have allowed a point of attack. This will have been the tactic one thinks.

To my mind the best reconstruction of this engagement has been that of Hammond’s in his Philip of Macedon (Duckworth, 1994). He walked the field and identified the anchor points of the Allied phalanx. Theirs was an entirely defensive strategy: the initiative was ceded to the Macedonian king. Philip, for his part, will have been mainly concerned with dislodging the defensive hoplite line and creating a thinning or break. Diodorus, as with so many of his battle descriptions, leaves us questioning how that was achieved whilst concentrating on the personalities.

Unless Polyaenus and Frontinus have invented these “stratagems” there is a source tradition strongly indicating that the work was being performed on the right so as the left – or near to it – would be availed of a crack or thinning in the Allied line when the Thebans and the Sacred Band refused to budge to their left. When that happened Alexander and his “babysitters” were to press that advantage – as instructed one would think.

[the_accursed]

Philip should have put the most capable person in every position, and let all his generals focus on winning the battle, rather than on babysitting his son. Alexander should not only not have commanded the left wing: he shouldn’t have commanded anything at all, or even been on the battlefield.

You insist on hyperbole to make a point. In so doing you obstinately refuse to see the fact that there was no other place for the King's presumptive heir to be other than the battlefield. This was the way of things.

Sure there was. Another place, that is. And the argument that Philip ought to have put the most capable person in every position in his most important battle is hardly "hyperbole". Nor the argument that, in case of Philip's death, it would have been a good thing if Alexander had not been on the battlefield. And as far as "obstinately refusing" something...what I'm doing is, I'm not agreeing with you.

I do not know if you read my previous post, perhaps that is the reference to not reading Greek. The words Diodorus uses do not place Alexander in any command. Only on the wing. Either way, as I said, it doesn't matter. Alexander will have been there. Events subsequent to this will amply demonstrate how the heir will have viewed his father's ignoring of him for a place in this battle.

“Ably seconded by his men”. This would indicate to me, again, that Alexander was in command.

Excuse me paraphrasing, but that is a poor hook upon which to hang the entire wardrobe of 42nd Street.The general translation is the “men contending with him” or “by his side” based on the word used by Diodorus. It is better rendered as: “… with the support of the many brave men contending by his side…” (Translation by E.I McQueen).

Diodorus continues:

Then the king also in person advanced, well in front and not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander; he first forced back the troops stationed before him and then by compelling them to flee became the man responsible for victory.”

“…not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander”. What would Philip have seen on the right wing? Probably the left wing advancing, and the Greeks fleeing. But I doubt he saw Alexander himself. If someone else was in command...why would Diodorus write “not conceding credit for the victory even to Alexander” when Philip under such circumstances would have had no reason to suspect that Alexander had anything to do with putting the Greeks to flight??

And so you rely on simply one strand of the “tradition” that has come down to us about this battle. It is not fulsome it must be said and nor is it the most satisfactory. There is much we’d like to know but we work with what we have. In that regard you might find the following interesting:

You criticized me for, as you perceived it, not considering your argument as a whole. All I'll say is this: I think the picture Diodorus paints is quite clear. What the truth is, I don't know. But it seems to me that Diodorus himself thought that Alexander was in command of the left wing.

It seems that there was far more going on than Alexander’s heroic wining, by his own brilliance and valour, the engagement on the left and the battle as well. And so: “What would Philip have seen on the right wing?” I would hazard a guess at very bloody little. He was engaged in rather delicate tactical manoeuvring of his own. Indeed I would think that manoeuvring was, in large part, responsible for any discombobulating of the allied phalanx that might have allowed a point of attack. This will have been the tactic one thinks.

Here, it's not clear to me what you're arguing against. What I'm saying is, it's quite reasonable to assume, from reading Diodorus, that he himself thought that Alexander was in command of the left wing. And I don't think I'm the first one to have interpreted Diodorus this way. Even Peter Green, hardly "romantic", claims that Alexander commanded the left wing. And I'm also saying: IF this was indeed the case, then it would have been a strange thing to let Alexander do so.

Your quotes, interesting as they are in themselves, say nothing about who the commander of the left wing was. Rather, you seem to be arguing against Alexander "heroically" winning the battle for the Macedonians. To which I can only say...have I argued that he did? Have I tried to portray Alexander as "heroic"? Haven't I, rather, said that if Philip did let Alexander command the left wing, then allowing him to do so would have been a poor decision? And haven't I also agreed that it's entirely possible that Diodurus' account is, simply, propaganda? If you're going to argue against me, argue against what I'm actually saying.

Regarding translations of Diodorus, I can't really have any opinion. As I don't read Greek, there's not much for me, in this regard, to base any opinion on. However, in my opinion, as I think I've made clear, this was not a battle that Philip ought to have let Alexander take part of at all - whether Alexander was a commander or not, and whether he performed "heroically" or not. I simply think that there was too much at stake, and that the benefit of having Alexander on the battlefield - the experience he would gain - would not have outweighed the cost - the generals having to watch over him, Alexander (possibly) being in command instead of a more experienced commander, and also the risk that Alexander could have died that day, which would have been troublesome, particularly if Philip had died too.

[athenas owl]

Alexander, at 16, led a force that defeated the Maedi in the Strymon Valley.

It isn't like Chaeronea was his first rodeo..and sadly his childhood and adolescence is sketchy in the sources. What kind of batle experience did he have in the 2 years between the Strymon valley and Chaeronea? The Triballi, the Scythians of the Ister..and? When ATG supposedly saved his father's life against the mutiny, he used his own shield to protect dad...

As for having the heir in a battle with you, don't forget that the "spare" was still in the picture at the time, Amyntas, husband of Kynane. He would have been at least 20 at the time and who knows what kind of education he had hed in statehood and war (perhaps even at Meiza, as well). Amyntas is one of those who have suffered from the historical focus and revision on Alexander, little is known except his throne being usurped by his uncle who then married him to his daughter and then rightly or wrongly being executed because of Philip's death. I'd give my eye teeth for a source to be discovered that talks about internal politics of the Macedonian court before 336.

Speaking of Kynane, supposedly she, too, was quite the young fighter....something about killing an Illyrian queen, or so says Polyaenus anyway. Perhaps the royal kidlets were on the fast track when it came to war.

[marcus]

Philip should have put the most capable person in every position, and let all his generals focus on winning the battle, rather than on babysitting his son. Alexander should not only not have commanded the left wing: he shouldn’t have commanded anything at all, or even been on the battlefield.

You insist on hyperbole to make a point. In so doing you obstinately refuse to see the fact that there was no other place for the King's presumptive heir to be other than the battlefield. This was the way of things.

Sure there was. Another place, that is. And the argument that Philip ought to have put the most capable person in every position in his most important battle is hardly "hyperbole". Nor the argument that, in case of Philip's death, it would have been a good thing if Alexander had not been on the battlefield. And as far as "obstinately refusing" something...what I'm doing is, I'm not agreeing with you.

I think Paralus is being a bit harsh by accusing you of hyperbole. However, I do agree with him that there really wasn't any other place for the heir presumptive to be. It would have looked very odd, in a warlike culture such as Macedonia, for an 18-year-old heir to be denied a place on the battlefield - irrespective of whether or not it was a command position. While you make a very good point, of course, that had Alexander died it would have left Philip in a fix - and if they had both been killed it would have been even worse - I think it would have appeared extremely strange to the rest of the Macedonians if Alexander had been left behind.

Ultimately, of course, Philip did have another son, in waiting (as it were), and a nephew, who was already at least 20 years old, and who could have taken up the prince in waiting role had Alexander been killed at Chaironea - the old "heir and a spare" ...

ATB

[amyntoros]

Regarding translations of Diodorus, I can't really have any opinion. As I don't read Greek, there's not much for me, in this regard, to base any opinion on. However, in my opinion, as I think I've made clear, this was not a battle that Philip ought to have let Alexander take part of at all - whether Alexander was a commander or not, and whether he performed "heroically" or not. I simply think that there was too much at stake, and that the benefit of having Alexander on the battlefield - the experience he would gain - would not have outweighed the cost - the generals having to watch over him, Alexander (possibly) being in command instead of a more experienced commander, and also the risk that Alexander could have died that day, which would have been troublesome, particularly if Philip had died too.

(Apologies if I appear to be echoing comments from others at this point, but this thread is moving so fast and I started this post earlier today! )

Although I've had little time to actively participate I've been reading this thread with interest and must ask: How worthy as king would Alexander have been in Macedonian eyes if Philip had died in the battle that day and Alexander had not taken part? It would mean that they had a new king who had been protected from injury and who had had no personal experience of how a major phalanx battle is fought, his experiences as a 16 year old temporary regent notwithstanding. Macedonian kings were expected to lead from the front; to take the same risks (and more) as the rest of the army. And they were admired, loved and appreciated for doing so.

If "the best thing to do, under such circumstances, would have been to not let Alexander take part in the battle at all," (from an earlier post of yours) then when and how was Alexander to gain the experience? One might as well say that Philip should have waited until he had two able, adult sons who were potential heirs (discounting Arrhidaeus) before allowing one of them to risk his life. Or even that Philip himself should not have endangered his own life in the thick of battle before he had sons old enough to inherit and lead the kingdom. As Paralus said, this was not the ancient way. Their warrior kings literally led their armies into battle and the only way to prepare for this eventuality was to learn by doing – this being where the guidance and supervision of others beforehand and on the battlefield comes into play. The idea that generals and/or other important military leaders should be protected from harm arises, I think, from the advent of so many weapons which can kill indiscriminately from a distance. Still, even in the Great War the protection of higher military commanders was not well appreciated by the soldiers who fought under these circumstances.

Base Details, by Siegfried Sassoon

If I were fierce, and bald, and short of breath,
I'd live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
And speed glum heroes up the line to death.
You'd see me with my puffy petulant face,
Guzzling and gulping in the best hotel,
Reading the Roll of Honour. 'Poor young chap,'
I'd say - 'I used to know his father well;
Yes we've lost heavily in this last scrap.'
And when the war is done and youth stone dead,
I'd toddle safely home and die – in bed.

As for whether or not Alexander commanded the left – I think that he probably did in a nominal sense although I'm sure that instructions were given to the experienced generals to intervene if he should fail in his duties in any way. That he didn't fail was to be expected, IMO, as he had been trained his whole life for this. Whether he was literally given the title of second-in-command is an unanswerable question.

Best regards,

[marcus]

The idea that generals and/or other important military leaders should be protected from harm arises, I think, from the advent of so many weapons which can kill indiscriminately from a distance.

An interesting question, to which I have to confess I don't know the answer. There might be something in that; then again, generals were still in the "thick" of things once guns and artillery were being used - throughout the Napoleonic Wars, for example. By that time the general officers might no longer have been leading from the front (i.e. Wellington, Napoleon himself), but regimental colonels were expected to - and the body count of officers at Waterloo was shocking. Wellington was in danger of being killed many times, especially at Waterloo; and he famously wouldn't let one of his gunners aim at Napoleon.

So I'm not sure it was the advent of weapons which can kill indiscriminately from a distance - perhaps, rather, the much larger armies that were being marched around, which required more overview generalship?

ATB