Phoebus wrote:Paralus wrote:It really comes down to guesswork: Arrian says that the 20,000 infantry, offered no quarter by the king, was slaughtered; Diodorus from memory, claims ten thousand dead and I can’t recall Curtius.
I'm curious: do you beleve a single one of those figures?
Beyond that, I reiterate. The main difference between the battles you cite and the ones from earlier in the 4th century (and 5th century) BCE is a matter of scale and capability..
Are you a
cutting grown from my good self?
You have my view of the figures.
Ya reads your books; ya forms your view.
Again, can we agree that both will have been necessary? And, further, that both were not always present?
The battle of Leuktra, which you equate with the death toll at Granicus, is a case in point. The Thebans owed the Lacedaemonians far more than a beating in the field. It is surprising that, after the rout of the Spartan right, a full-on bloodbath did not occur. One of the believable aspects of the thoroughly appaled Xenophon’s account is that the Spartans must have retreated in
some order to their camp and palisade as they manged to get Kleombrotus’ body back there.
Xenophon, horrified at the fall of his idolised state, even writes of the fact that (some of) the Peloponnesian allies were actually pleased with the result. As the Spartan left played little – if any – role in the battle, one might be excused for thinking that the Thebans will have surrounded the Lacedaemonians and slaughtered them. This seems not to have happened.
Ditto Mantinea in 418 “certainly the greatest battle that had taken place for a very long time among Hellenic states”. In a battle, which was absolutely crucial for the Spartans, Thucydides documents a furious clash of arms that resulted in some 1,100 of the “allied” force dead (Thuc 5.74). The Spartans were buried before the armistice and so are guessed at 300. These numbers due to the fact that:
The Spartans will fight for a long time, stubbornly holding their ground until the moment they put their enemy to flight; but once this moment comes, they do not follow him up a great way of for long. (Thuc. 5.73)
One suspects that, had Alexander been in charge, that they will have followed the enemy for some considerable distance. And, yes, there was cavalry on both of the Spartan wings. No, they were not the Companion Cavalry. They did not pursue though. Rather they were happy to ensure the mastery of the field.
Phoebus wrote:I might add that there was no “great slaughter” at Chaeronea (such as it is attested). ... The “slaughter”, such as it occurred, was at the Theban end where the “Sacred Band” was surrounded and spitted to death by the phalanx. Oddly enough, this was the end commanded by Alexander. We have, from memory, no reliable Boeotian casualty figure, just “many”.
The political situation wasn't the same the first time as it was the second. Killing the Sacred Band, on the other hand, was not just good policy--it may well have been justified given the course of the battle. I don't recall any record of the 300 select Thebans offering to surrender, and I'd be surprised if this were the case.
I was making no such comparison between any first or second time. I was referring
only to the battle of Chaeronea in 338. They may well not have surrendered, they may have asked for quarter. We do not know. We know only that Alexander “was the first to break the ranks of the Sacred band” and that they were slaughtered. Indeed their mound has turned up some 254 skeletons. It is most likely this was done on foot by use of the sarissa which far outstripped the hoplite spear in reach.
Again, how many other Boeotians “many” constitutes is anyone’s guess.
Phoebus wrote:There was no “chase down” of fleeing foes at the Granicus; nor at the Hydaspes. The infantry, on both occasions, was hemmed in by cavalry and slaughtered by the Macedonian infantry.
I'm not sure where the confusion lies. The very presence of a cavalry force thousands strong necessitated that the Granicus hoplites make their defensive stand where they did. Making a run for it would have been suicide..
Well the descriptions we have might argue otherwise:
Alexander soon checked the pursuit of them (the Persian cavalry) in order to turn his attention to the foreign mercenaries, who had remained in their original postion, shoulder to shoulder – not, indeed, from any deliberate intention of proving their courage, but simply because the suddenness of the disaster had deprived them of their wits. (Arrian, Anab, 1.16)
The enemy, however, did not resist vigorously, nor for a long time, but fled in a rout, all except the Greek mercenaries. These made a stand at a certain eminence, and asked that Alexander should promise them quarter. But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate. (Plut. Alex, 16.13-14)
One, I suppose, could take his or her pick. I rather suggest a combination of the two. The asking for quarter though rings true – to my ears. They were not ever going to seriously make a stand against the entirety of Alexander’s army. In the event, citing the “League of Corinth”, Alexander surrounded and massacred them.
My view of the “garrison” towns of empire is clear. That some survived the empire they were ostensibly to protect is of little import in a "spreading of Hellenic culture" sense. These belong to a flourishing well after Alexander and during the decline of the Seleucid Empire. They are an entire subject to themselves. Yes indeed the Greek hangovers remained: the temples, gymnasia et al. These are most aptly demonstated by Ai Khanum.
The kings, beginning with a certain rebellious Greek Seleucid satrap Diodotus (though it might well be argued that Stassanor, the Greek satrap that Antigonus could in no way remove was the first) were “separatists”. Diodotus’ son (of the same name) expanded the territory of the enclave until Euthydemus killed him and continued the process. This fellow ended up seeing-off Antiochus III (the “Great”) and fathering Demetrius I and so down through Menander and eventually to the inevitable overrunning by Saca nomads and the death of Helocles its last king.
All the way through, though, this was an enclave – an implant. Indeed, the enclave had so well cut itself from its surrounds that it succeeded in cutting itself off from the Greek west even more so.