Long Unmechanised Marches.

[kennyxx]

Hi Pothos

Just recently I have done what I considered a long trip in a motorcar. From York to Cornwall it took us about 7 hours at an average speed of 80mph. Whilst doing this I reflected on Alexanders long marches on foot or horse and indeed other such marches.

I reflected Harolds march to and from Stamford Bridge. It made me realise also just how mentally soft we as people are. To be honest 400 miles in a car was a killer. I recall Michael Woods phrase. These Macedonians were tough old birds. And to think after a long march there was probably a scrap at the end.

I would say that after such a hardship the soldiers were ready for a battle to sweep away the fatigue and bumb numbing of the whole thing.I never looked into the rate of march of Alexanders army. We know his cavalry could cover some miles. I wonder just how many miles on average these boys covered in a day?

It also brought home just how painful the Makran must have been. For all the mysteries about Alexander. That march has gotta be the worse and nearly the most castarophic blunder Alexander ever made and to be realistic he got way with it. Statistics logics and shear law of averages should have gone against him with that one. I doubt any other military commander would have done it knowing the risks. Napoleon did it in Russia but he didnt really know the risks.

Kenny

[Paralus]

It also brought home just how painful the Makran must have been. For all the mysteries about Alexander. That march has gotta be the worse and nearly the most castarophic blunder Alexander ever made and to be realistic he got way with it.

G'day Kenny.

Like all polls, the politician I'd elect isn't there! I ticked "because it was there" as the most appropriate out of the three.

This is one of the greatest blunders of the bloke's career.The desert was known about and it hardly needs saying that the locals will have duly informed the king's intelligence gathering people of the extent of what was to be crossed. Arrian, naming Nearchus as his authority, tells us that Alexander was well aware of the difficulties as well as the fact that - ostensibly - Queen Semiramis and Cyrus had accomplished the feat (though both with horrendous loss of life) and that he was "inspired to go one better" than the pair of them. Time to restore that "invincible" reputation?

Either way, very much in character if not wilful to the extent of a deathwish.

In some quarters it has been suggested that a pruning of the city that followed him might have been thought in order. I think a little of that may also be true. Alexander had to know that the weaker (many of the non-combatants in particular) will not have seen the other side. Still he struck off into the desert.

As to march times and the extent of Alexander's marches, I'll have to have a read. Alexander (as with Philip before him) was renowned for the alacrity of his military movement. The main reason being the trimming down of the numbers for portage . As well, the troops were allowed only so much that would be carried.

One of the main reasons for the swift marches of Alexander's armies is the size. It is well to note the numbers we are given at his major engagements. These range between some 30,000 or so (Jhelum) to 47,000 (Guagamela). A reading of the history of the Diadochoi (and their successor kingdoms) shows the difficulties involved in marshalling, moving, provisioning and commanding armies of much larger numbers.

[agesilaos]

Alexander's army marched 15 miles per day on average although detachments such as the cavalry/light infantry force pursuing Darius managed 45. Despite a reputation for speed this is the same as the Ten Thousand averaged from Sardis to Cunaxa and they were essentially a Persian army.

It would seem the speed of these commanders is more in the decisiveness of their movements, frequently from unexpected quarters and their tactical adroitness rather than any strategic speed advantage. Engels digests the Macedonians march rates in 'Logistics' and the opening chapters of book I of Xenophon's 'Anabasis' give the distances and days taken on his march.

[dean]

Hello,

The full horrible picture I think is found in the following data - Alexander took 60-70000 soldiers into the desert and came back with 15000- so at least 45000 lives were taken by that stretch of desert.

The soldiers resorted to eating pack animals- that is how bad it got. In spite of Alexander's heroic gesture before his troops- it is simply unbelievable that he wasn't priviliged as to his water ration; not twelve months earlier had Perdiccas extracted the Mallian arrow buried in his lung.

If it was a punishment then it was possibly one of the worst imaginable- in Auschwitz the dreaded gas chamber apparently wasn't most feared but the starvation bunker where prisoners were deprived of food and water.

Many on the Gedrosian march died as much from dehydration as from overdrinking water when finally found- jumping into well armour and all.

As Green points out, Alexander's Aniketos was seriously called into question and why he was so keen to find a scapegoat

Best regards,
Dean

[marcus]

Disaster it might have been, but let's be careful about assuming that Alexander meant it to end up as it did. He planned the trip extremely carefully, intended to stick to the coast to support, and be supported by, the fleet. Sure, he probably knew it was going to be a hard slog; but he wasn't intending things to get as bad as they did. Events and weather conspired against him, and one could argue that it is remarkable that he brought so many out of the desert alive.

ATB

[kennyxx]

Marcus

I really think you are correct. He must have had a basic idea of the difficulties and as you say intended to hug the coast. As we know things did go wrong and had to head in land which made it a lot worse. Indeed it went badly wrong. I doubt even the sceptics could call it a malicious move to punish his troops. I dont think he was that stupid. I would say if he was going to punish them its fare to say he would have gone the easy way himself and let some out of favour commander to leadit.

One thing is for sure it was about the best chance any one had of takingAlexander by force. An enemy only had to wait for his bedraggled forces to emerge from the Makran. I doubt Alexander or even Superman could have made a fight of that.

Going with strategy and long term. The idea to navigate and cross the Makran digging wells as was the plan would make further expeditions east a little easier. Were it to be supplied by sea. Indeed a nearly fatal error but as you said Marcus I feel Alexander had calculated but calculated wrong.

Further more this episode rienforces the steem the common soldier etc held Alexander. Even after the Makran they were pretty pissed off when Alexander tried to pension some off at Babylon. It further throws into doubt that they had mutinied at the Beas. If they had Mutinied at the Beas and marched across the Beas. Then why were they so adamant to stay with Alexander when they could have benn pretty cosy back in Macedon with a nice pension.

I really sometimes think the real effection the troops had for Alexander is sometimes belittled. I think there is more to the Beas mutiny than appears. And if Alexander really wanted to go further at that time I am sure he would have. The fighting and conquests didnt stop at the Beas as we know so really did Alexander turn back under duress. I believe he wanted to turn back and as the ultimate strategist and long term planner consolidate. His march back to Babylon was furthe conquest and creation of communications and supply lines.

Kenny

[Paralus]

It further throws into doubt that they had mutinied at the Beas. If they had Mutinied at the Beas and marched across the Beas. Then why were they so adamant to stay with Alexander when they could have benn pretty cosy back in Macedon with a nice pension.

I don't doubt that there was a "mutiny". This had been building for some time. here were those who did not wish to leave Bactria and campaign in India GÇô Alexander "shamed" and cajoled them into it. This time the shaming failed. The fighting and conquests did not, as you say, stop after Alexander "turned back" following the revolt. Indeed they were all the more violent, bloody and intense.

I think the prime driver behind the anger at the demobbing was not separation from a beloved king but, rather the fact that they were to be replaced by Iranian units. The audacity of the king, to replace these men who'd conquered the world for him with those they'd recently been "wiping the floor" with. It rankled something fierce. Even unto creating an Iranian "Silver Shields" GÇô one can only imagine how well that went down with those grizzled, bellicose bastards. Any wonder the "rapprochement" featured them well placed around the king at the feast.

I really sometimes think the real effection the troops had for Alexander is sometimes belittled. I think there is more to the Beas mutiny than appears. And if Alexander really wanted to go further at that time I am sure he would have.

Highly unlikely GÇô unless as Marco Polo several centuries early GÇô as the army was not going with him, no matter the affection still extant.

[kennyxx]

Paralus Well never know. But to put a slant even more. The Mutineers didnt really get what they wanted. Maybe it was Alexanders Trickery with his Charisma and mouth.

Imahine Alexander saying to his soldiers

"Ok boys you win well go back. But we will go back a different way a stady little Cruise down the riverto the Ocean then A nice little trip down the coast, With the fleet keeping us company and fed. You know it makes sense, It maybe a bit harsh in places but itll be a steady littlr trip compared to what weve done". Or something like that .

Then the troops cheer rub there hands and say. "ok King sounds good to us off we go"

But Alexander gets nearly what he wants contunual conquest and adventure.

To add to this thought I wonderif Alexander ever realised the region couldnt be pacified, kinda like cutting the lawn it always needs doing again. And history shows it cant be pacified Armies up to todays British cant get a grip. Eventually even a guy like Alexander has to walk away. Ok he defeated them and smashed them to the ground but they were alaways getting up and having another go. Terror tactics and all didnt work.

The area was I guess like today seperatist where rulers cant get on they never will.

I would urge some members to look in some religios chat rooms only to look at hatred all across the human spectrum. Amm religions and sect have one thing in common not love peace nor forgiveness. Only hatred for anything different to there own misguided beliefs. Common sense plays no part.

Kenny

[dean]

Just as an afterthought about your post of unmechanised marches- it just occured to me that apart from the Makran or Gedrosian desert march- we didn't mention "crossing the Hindu Kush"- in the centre of Afganistan a mountain range 6000 metres up and snow tipped- suppose it is the kind of journey that Alexander and his Macedonian troops wouldn't have minded.

Yet, it must have been a logistical nightmare- not to mention supplying the troops with food.
Even today, it is crossable only on foot- or horseback.

Best regards,
Dean.

[marcus]

Just as an afterthought about your post of unmechanised marches- it just occured to me that apart from the Makran or Gedrosian desert march- we didn't mention "crossing the Hindu Kush"- in the centre of Afganistan a mountain range 6000 metres up and snow tipped- suppose it is the kind of journey that Alexander and his Macedonian troops wouldn't have minded.

A good point. On the way into Bactria the army had to cross the Paropamisadae, the more southerly part of the range that 'becomes' the Hindu Kush at the border with what is now India. It was a hellish crossing, in which men became snow-blind, others died of altitude sickness and exhaustion (and no-doubt exposure too), they lost pack animals down ravines; and they were only 'saved' when they came across a tribe of people who were barely scratching a living on the lower slopes of the mountains.

In true fashion these people "gave what food they had" to the army ... which I suppose means that the army took it, whether the tribespeople were willing or not.

I think the Macedonians minded that mountain crossing very much indeed!

ATB

[dean]

Hello,

Yes I suppose that they did mind- I just meant that his soldiers were accustomed to hardship.

The Hindu kush rises up to 6000 metres(over 11000 feet)- the alps rises up to just over 2000-
and according to Livius website on the crossing of Hannibal the appearance of snow in the alps would have been just over 2000.There is a significant difference in height between the crossing of the Alps and the crossing of the Hindu Kush which I think can only increase the amazing feat that Alexander pulled off- he may not have taken any elephants but he took thousands of men along the khawak pass.

Best regards,
Dean

[Madog]

One thing is certain is that you have to respect the guys who managed to do all this and to do it while fighting on some occasions. I am reminded of Alexander's assault on the Sogdian Rock and how he managed to get some of his men to climb up the steep cliff edge in almost complete darkness. Even though some fell to their deaths they still persisted and no doubt any modern commander (or most generals through history) would have avoided it. It just goes to show the determination of the army and of Alexander himself.

[Efstathios]

Ok he defeated them and smashed them to the ground but they were alaways getting up and having another go

Not in Alexander's reign though.

As for the marches, Alexander was stubborn.I think that he tried to cross the Makran because he had done so many great things until that time, and he may have thought that he could do that too better than the people that tried it before he did, as he was generally more succesfull than them in his campaign.And maybe because his men were tested in these kind of Marches, at the Hindu Kush for example, and he thought that if they could pull off that, they can pull off this.But he misjudged the harsness of the Makran.

Surely not he wasnt aiming to punish anyone.He loved those men.And we have said it again, if he wanted to, he could continue at india with the Persians and the Macedonian reserves, the new ones.But he listened to the few, the old guard and went back.

[Paralus]

And we have said it again, if he wanted to, he could continue at india with the Persians and the Macedonian reserves, the new ones.But he listened to the few, the old guard and went back.

Pardon me, but as I remarked to Kenny, this is an utter fiction and needs to be put away. The time for Alexander pressing on had come and gone. At the Beas the army had made its view quite plain: it was going nowhere that wasn't back west. That army was the one that had fought at the Jhelum - an army of some 30-35,000. There were no reinforcements. Alexander went with that army or GÇô possibly with the company of a few companions, Hephaestion first among them GÇô he went alone.

He might have chosen to have done that. Reserves were on the way, though Alexander in all likelyhood had no way of knowing exactly how far behind they were. Having waited on propitious sacrificial omens (for three days), he turned back and traipsed the 180-200 odd kilometres (best guess by my maps) back to the Jhelum. Going on Agesilaos' information, we can assume a march GÇô in monsoon conditions GÇô of ten days to a fortnight (maybe longer GÇô Alexander received a delegation from Abisares whilst resting at the Chenab). Having returned to the Jhelum, Diodorus records he was reinforced by some 30,000 fresh troops. These had to have been a minimum of two weeks behind him.

It is most unlikely that he will then have sent his veterans GÇô in total GÇô home and proceeded with fresh, untested levies, particularly when that army will have been severely undermanned in Macedonian troops. Diodorus states these troops were made up of allies and mercenaries from Greece. As Bosworth remarks: "It is conceivable that the infantry included troops from Macedon as well as the allied troops from southern Greece and Asia. If so, they will have been a small minority within a much larger contingent." (The Legacy of Alexander)

Again, after the troops mutinied at the Beas, Alexander was going no further east unless as a tourist.

[amyntoros]

Having returned to the Jhelum, Diodorus records he was reinforced by some 30,000 fresh troops. . . . It is most unlikely that he will then have sent his veterans GÇô in total GÇô home and proceeded with fresh, untested levies, particularly when that army will have been severely undermanned in Macedonian troops.

A good argument and one that is even more convincing if we donGÇÖt accept DiodorusGÇÖ figure of 30,000 infantry recruits. (IGÇÖm a little skeptical each time I see that number because of the frequency with which it occurs and am rather inclined to translate it as GÇ£a great number.GÇ¥) In this instance Curtius (9.3.21) gives a figure of 5,000 cavalry from Thrace plus 7,000 infantry from Harpalus. If those were the true numbers then there was even less likelihood of Alexander giving consideration to sending his veterans home. ItGÇÖs interesting, however, that most historians seem to accept and use DiodorusGÇÖ figure. I did a quick scan through some of my books this morning and found only Hamilton using CurtiusGÇÖ numbers (while still referencing Diodorus).

Best regards,