Artabazus

[swan]

Hi all

I’ve just joined the forum and have really enjoyed reading previous posts.

Can anyone tell me why Artabazus fled to Macedonia, specifically? As I understand it, he’d recently done away with the Theban general, Pammenes, who was on friendly terms with Philip.

Thanks

[athenas owl]

Good question. I'm not near any of my books, so I am winging it here. With some "original thoughts" pretty much.

I do believe that Daskyleion (Hellespontine Phrygia) was in closer contact with Macedon than the Greek centered writers knew, thought proper or whatever. We don't know the actual relationship of Artabazus and Philip, or their families or how far back it went (though a Macedonian "princess" was married to a Persian Daskyleion satrap's son, some 150 years or so before.)

side note: Off topic, but I have wondered why, when Alexander went into exile, he went to Illyria and not some Greek city-state. And even more off topic, did Alexander speak Illyrian? Was his Illyrian connection family related, possibly, through his grandmother Eurydike or his step mother, Audata (what is the correct term in a polygamous marriage? ). Again, Macedonian royal family connections outside of the Greek world.

It would have also been a nice political chip for the canny Philip as well. Pammenes may have known Philip very well, but Artabazus had revolted against the Great King, something that Philip may have approved of highly and if memory serves, Pammenes might have been double dealing. Also remember that in a few decades, it would be a Macedonian king that razed Thebes to the ground. So who knows the actual internal politics. We have scant information about it, sadly, sadly.

[swan]

Thanks for this. It seems likely that Philip was just being a pragmatic politician.

Re Alexander and Illyria, I wondered about a possible connection with Eurydike and Audata too, but Philip would have those connections too. Perhaps, Philip having had so many problems with the Illyrians, Illyria was a destination calculated to irritate/worry his father. Also convenient if he was dropping Olympias off in Molossia first?

[agesilaos]

As regards Alexander and the Illyrians it is quite possible that it was to Langaros of the Agrianians that he actually fled; Arrian I 5 ii 'Langarus, king of the Agrianians, had shown his regard for Alexander even in Philip's lifetime,...' Langaros de ho ton Agianon basileus ede men kai Philippou zontos aspazomenos Alexandron deplos en....

To make the point ' EVEN in Philip's lifetime' implies a period of strain between the two as it would be natural to court the crown prince in other circumstances. The Greeks were often confused, or just did not care, about the specific cultural affiliations of the nortern tribes and could call them Thracians, Illyrians or something more specific almost on a whim. The Agrianes are variously described and so could be Illyrian to a Greek and the source for Alexander's flight could well be Greek.

As for Artabazos, he seems to have had philo-hellenic leanings, his daughter was married to Mentor the brother of Memnon and subsequently Memnon himself. Being in revolt from the Great King he would have needed the protection of a powerful ruler, history would show him that the Greek states were liable to sell him off Philip was close and powerful enough to follow his own lead. I don't think the protection of a Demosthenes nor an Aeschines would have appealed.

Pammenes had just helped re-conquer Egypt for Artaxerxes III and, as well as being a bit crazy (he fought dressed as Herakles) so was clearly a Royal agent sent to put down the satrapal rebellion and fair game. Diodorus should have that but I am without him so am guessing! Credit this as Livy then and not Tacitus

[swan]

Thanks, agesilaos, for comments about Illyrians. I’d been assuming that the Illyrians were split into different political factions, but your comment shows that the situation was more complex than that.

Not sure about all of this:

‘Pammenes had just helped re-conquer Egypt for Artaxerxes III and, as well as being a bit crazy (he fought dressed as Herakles) so was clearly a Royal agent sent to put down the satrapal rebellion and fair game.’

According to Diodorus 16.44 ‘But the Thebans, choosing Lacrates as general, dispatched him with a thousand hoplites. And the Argives sent three thousand men; they did not, however, choose a general themselves, but when the King requested Nicostratus specifically as general, they concurred. [3] Now Nicostratus was good both in action and in counsel, but there was madness mingled with his intelligence; for since he excelled in bodily strength, he would imitate Heracles when on a campaign by wearing a lion's skin and carrying a club in battle.’

I’m not quite sure when Pammenes died, 354? Artaxerxes first Egyptian campaign was around 351/350, the 2nd, to which Diodorus refers, is 344/343?

But as for your comment about Pammenes as Royal agent ‘Artabazus instructed Pammenes, who was suspected of communicating with the enemy’ Polyaenus: Stratagems Book 7. I’ve not managed (yet!) to track anything further about whether Artabazus was right to suspect Pammenes. I’ve been assuming Pammenes was motivated to work for Artabazus because Thebes needed money, but maybe he was playing a double game and receiving money from Artaxerxes as well.

[Paralus]

But as for your comment about Pammenes as Royal agent ‘Artabazus instructed Pammenes, who was suspected of communicating with the enemy’ Polyaenus: Stratagems Book 7. I’ve not managed (yet!) to track anything further about whether Artabazus was right to suspect Pammenes. I’ve been assuming Pammenes was motivated to work for Artabazus because Thebes needed money, but maybe he was playing a double game and receiving money from Artaxerxes as well.

Much confusion here it would seem.

The clue to that “stratagem” of Polyaenus lies in the convoluted politics of the first half of the fourth century – particularly second quarter. As is well known this was a time of constant internecine warfare as Sparta filled the void left by Athens’ defeat. The power politics involved in the keeping of this Spartan “empire” alienated allies and in large part enabled the rise of Thebes. It also provided the raison d'être for the Second Athenian Confederacy. The constant wars between these competing blocks - and other incidental states often used as causus belli - resulted in a number of what became known as “common peaces”. There are two constant features of these peaces (outside of 362/1): Persia as “sponsor” or guarantor and, secondly, the prostatai of the peace.

For that concluded in 387 (the “King’s Peace or that of Antalcidas) and its subsequent reaffirmations, that prostatai (or “policeman” / interpreter) was Sparta with the inferred threat of Persian interference should “the Greeks” not comply. The exceptions to this were 375 (where Athens was constituted “hegemon on sea”) and 367 where Xenophon in full florid outrage details Thebes’ gaining of that position which he dare not mention in regards his beloved Sparta: the King’s “chosen instrument” for control in Greece.

The final “common peace” was enacted after Mantinea in 362/1. This was done without the input of Persia. Artaxerxes II, old and dilatory, was facing unrest and rebellion in the west and was little interested. It remains, though, that Thebes was still friendly towards the empire and so a general from that city is most liable to be suspect given that relationship.

Just as important is the context of Artabazus’ suspicion. This occurs in the aftermath of what is sometimes called the “satraps’ revolt” (below) – a period of insurgency of some eight years. In this period Athenian imperial ambition, in the absence of Persia, had burgeoned. Artabazus’ erstwhile “ally”, the rather “whatever it takes” Chares, had been collecting (extorting) money to fund an ever poorer Athens and had taken service with Artabazus for this purpose. Having won a victory (which he described, in full hyperbole, as another Marathon) the new Great King – Ochus, a different proposition to his predecessor – demanded that Athens remove him or he would enter the Social War on the side of her rebellious allies. Athens, in quisling fashion, recalled the general for hire.

What of Pammenes were Ochus in contact with Thebes? Pammenes is no ordinary “general for hire” as Chares; he is most certainly among the leading Thebans along with men like Pelopidas and Epaminondas. He will have been well involved in Theban / Persian relations.

As to the wider situation, details of the happenings in Phoenicia, Anatolia and the Hellespontine region are desperately patchy for this time. Diodorus telescopes what most likely took place over 366/5 – 358/7 into his archon year 362/1. Thus we have what appears a “satraps’ rebellion”. More likely is that this was an “insurgency” that ran for some eight or nine years. It suits Diodorus’ (or Ephorus’) purposes to present the “empire” – or at least great parts of it – as in rebellion. This suits the “Persian decadence, decay and weakness” topos as does his inaccurate, Hellenocentric descriptions of Greek generals having to lead Persian armies (Mentor). In this aspect all is connected to Egypt and this province is somehow accorded the role of coordinator of this uprising. That there was some coordination is true: Tachos, the Egyptian Pharaoh, took an army into Phoenicia. If this was simply local he need not have done so.

To present Egypt as rebelling against the “authority of the king” and resisting attempts at recovery as surprising is akin to expressing surprise at the Pope for saying mass.

In fact, Egypt in this period had been “free” for most of the century - it was logical for Phoenician satraps or hyparchs to look to it. It was also in a mess. Tachos, having marched into Phoenicia, suffered a revolt at home as his son Nectanebo II took control. Tachos immediately went over to Artaxerxes Ochus (III) and Sidon too returned to the fold (after the dissidents were turned over). These machinations went on for some considerable time as Ochus, Mazaeus and others put the area to rights. That accomplished, Ochus sent a royal army to win back the province too far. Problem was, there had been several “market gardens” prior to this successful invasion and others had taken note.

Which brings us back to Artabazus. He had disobeyed the new king’s instruction to the satraps to disband their mercenaries and had, in fact, hired more. This has been presented as part of a wider rebellion in league with Egypt but the two are – almost literally – at opposite ends of the empire. The likely cause of his “revolt” is his ultra-blue blood – he was a grandson of Artaxerxes Mnenon – rather than any western empire-wide uprising. Certainly after Ochus had made his intentions clear, and Chares sailed home with his diekplous between his legs in obedience to the King’s demand, Artabazus will have been in no doubt that he was confronted with a king who meant business. Accordingly he seems to have summed up the situation and decided that a holiday elsewhere - preferably overseas - was a most promising option.

Why would Artabazus go into exile in Macedonia? Following on from Athena’s Owl’s observation about likely contacts between Hellespontine Phrygia and Macedonia, the rest is simple deduction. Athens, her imperial impotence laid bare by a single demand from the Great King, was no safe haven. She - and more importantly her politicians - in no way could be relied upon. Thebes, involved in a ruinous and costly war without immediate end, was not the power of the 360s. Further she was Persia’s last prostatai in Greece. She was scarcely more reliable than Athens. Macedonia, ever strengthening and with no exposed naval ambitions in the Aegean to worry Ochus, was a logical choice for a European vacation.

Pehaps, also, the exchange rate for Darics was good...

[agesilaos]

Quite right swan I have blundered royally; always pays to check the sources first, doh!

[Semiramis]

Which brings us back to Artabazus. He had disobeyed the new king’s instruction to the satraps to disband their mercenaries and had, in fact, hired more. This has been presented as part of a wider rebellion in league with Egypt but the two are – almost literally – at opposite ends of the empire. The likely cause of his “revolt” is his ultra-blue blood – he was a grandson of Artaxerxes Mnenon – rather than any western empire-wide uprising. Certainly after Ochus had made his intentions clear, and Chares sailed home with his diekplous between his legs in obedience to the King’s demand, Artabazus will have been in no doubt that he was confronted with a king who meant business. Accordingly he seems to have summed up the situation and decided that a holiday elsewhere - preferably overseas - was a most promising option.

In 'From Cyrus to Alexander', Briant dismissed this as a reason. He has a good go a Diodorus for exaggerating the role of the Greek mercenaries and their commanders in several accounts, including in the events involving Artabazus, Chares and Pammenes. His analysis of the Greek vs. Barbarian dichotomy in Greek accounts of conflicts can't be dismissed easily.

As for Artabazus, Briant proposes that there may been no real rebellion. That perhaps Artabazus was "denounced" to the King (as he had been before) and there was no changing the King's mind this time. I think Briant proposes this for two reasons. 1. He doesn't see what Artabazus could have gained from the rebellion 2. Artabazus' history of being loyal to the Great King and fighting other rebellious satraps. But in the end, Briant admits that the events are shrouded in mystery.

Agesilaus, you mention Artabazus' familial ties with Memnon and Mentor. Did they have any association with Macedonian Royalty that we know of? Not counting the Alexander-Barsine tryst of course - precocious as he was, our hero.

[Paralus]

In 'From Cyrus to Alexander', Briant dismissed this as a reason. He has a good go a Diodorus for exaggerating the role of the Greek mercenaries and their commanders in several accounts, including in the events involving Artabazus, Chares and Pammenes. His analysis of the Greek vs. Barbarian dichotomy in Greek accounts of conflicts can't be dismissed easily.

And nor should it for he is correct I fear. The language that Diodorus uses when discussing Greek mercenary commanders is similar throughout several eras (and books) and, as a result, smacks of a topos. The idea that Greeks commanded Persian armies is a notion that, whilst appealing to Greek ideas of superiority over the effete barbarian, is at odds with reality. It is Persians that we see settling matters in Egypt. Persians who accept surrender and - a fortiori - Persians who are in command.

Mentor is a classic case. Diodorus (16.52.2) accords him the position of "satrap of the Asiatic coast" (likely 343 or 342) and explains that Ochus "advanced him over and above his other friends". This is a position similar to that of Cyrus at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Whilst it is understandable that a son of the Great King might be accorded such it is unthinkable that a Greek would. Diodorus (or Ephorus) exaggerates both the position and the abilities for effect. Indeed not long after (341), as Philip attacked Perinthus,the Great King writes to the "satraps on the coast" (16.75.1). Mentor has been demoted it appears.

Briant may well be correct about the satraps denouncing Artabazus to the King. That it is believed is as a result of Artabazus' right royal blood. As grandson of Mnemon he bulks as a powerful dynastic player. He may well not have been in rebellion but found himself in the unenviable position of having to defend himself against the King's forces. Hence Chares and Pammenes. Such would also explain his reconciliation in the 340s.

[Semiramis]

The reconciliation angle hadn't occurred to me. I like it. Amusing how we've constructed a nice little saga with so little evidence.

[Paralus]

The reconciliation angle hadn't occurred to me. I like it. Amusing how we've constructed a nice little saga with so little evidence.

That is ancient history.