Book Club: Conquest and Empire

[marcus]

I cannot accept without checking that being sent "by the community" indicates that everyone actually had a vote.

It need not mean that everyone had a vote, but it makes it plausible that the decisions were being taken by votes of large numbers of the citizens.

I agree that it's plausible - but you will agree that all this has to be taken on a certain amount of trust, as we actually don't know; and that the sources could well be describing things according to the system they are familiar with, rather than the system as it actually was, we shouldn't assume that they are describing events entirely faithfully.

Also, perhaps it is the use of a particular Greek word - but I don't have Diodorus in Greek - but my version just says that they voted, not that it was a pebble vote.

The verb used by Diodorus derives from psephis being a small pebble. Hence it means literally to vote in the fashion of casting pebbles into an urn (Diodorus says literally that the Tyrians "pebbled" on whether to send their women and children to Carthage). It is also used to describe votes in the Athenian democracy. There is at least an implication in the use of this verb that the voting was on a large scale - not just a show of hands by a few council members.

Thanks for the clarification - although I still refer to my above point about the care we should take over the veracity of the description.

Still, even if they didn't use pebbles in the same way, I accept that this could well be Diodorus' way of indicating a large-scale vote.

What purpose a king if you maintain a democratic system of government?

The Macedonians also submitted key issues to a vote of all soldiers of fighting age, despite having a king. Perdiccas had them vote on the implementation of Alexander's Last Plans. The Tyrian king was evidently away when the Tyrians killed Alexander's envoys.

Yes, they did - but you will agree that the "oriental" monarchies did tend to be less democratic monarchies. I don't know the Phoenician system, but I would be wary of assuming that it worked with anything like the freedom of expression that pervaded the Macedonian.

You might well be perfectly right in everything you assert, Andrew - it's just that I don't think we should take the sources entirely at face value over this.

And it doesn't alter the fact that, once the Macedonians had taken the city after a long and bloody siege, they were almost certainly going to vent their frustrations on the populace, due course or not!

ATB

[athenas owl]

I am having difficulty recalling where i read that the Phoenician's on ATG's side actually helped large numbers of the residents of Tyre escape the slavery...am I imagining that, or I have read the conjecture of modern scholars, none of whom I can recall right now?

This topic has been fascinating, btw...

[SKY]

[
Hi, no, the book of David Lonsdale's that I have read is called 'Alexander, Killer of Men: ATG and the Macedonian Art of War'. I can't recommend it highly enough, especially for anyone who, like me, looks at diagrams covered with arrows with a certain bemusement.
He's not a historian, he's a strategic analyst, and he looks at all the battles and all the campaigns from the military point of view. He explains military terminology so you understand the difference between tactics and strategy, and looks at everything from an almost timeless perspective, understanding that there are things about war that have never changed and probably never will. Best of all, he explains what no history book, to my way of thinking, has ever explained properly - WHY Alexander was a military genius, why what he did was so clever.
It is like watching the battles happen, with an expert standing at your shoulder and explaining what's going on, and seeing him point out all the particularly brilliant things.
Fiona[/quote]



Thank you, Fiona for the review and your time.

[Fiona]

I am having difficulty recalling where i read that the Phoenician's on ATG's side actually helped large numbers of the residents of Tyre escape the slavery...am I imagining that, or I have read the conjecture of modern scholars, none of whom I can recall right now?

This topic has been fascinating, btw...

Hi, this is right, it's in Curtius - as well as the ones who were evacuated to Carthage, we read in 4:4 that:
"Many, however, found safety with the Sidonians among the Macedonian troops. Although these had entered the city with the conqerors, they remained aware that they were related to the Tyrians (they believed Agenor had founded both cities) and so they secretly gave many of them protection and took them to their boats, on which they were hidden and transported to Sidon. Fifteen thousand were rescued from a violent death by such subterfuge."

Fiona

[Paralus]

With all due respect, it is you who is arguing from silence. I am arguing from the statement at Curtius 4.2.15.

The fact that Arrian writes nothing to contradict a notice in Curtius in no way confirms that notice is correct. Again, Curtius is the only source to note Alexander having second thoughts about laying siege and his envoys seeking peace being murdered.

Arrian quite fully describes the diplomatic exchanges before hostilities and I doubt that he (or his sources) will have missed such a notice explaining the savagery visited upon the Tyrians at the siege's end. Arrian seems not to miss many other "apologetic" notices.

[Paralus]

What purpose a king if you maintain a democratic system of government?

The Macedonians also submitted key issues to a vote of all soldiers of fighting age, despite having a king. Perdiccas had them vote on the implementation of Alexander's Last Plans. The Tyrian king was evidently away when the Tyrians killed Alexander's envoys.

Yes, they did - but you will agree that the "oriental" monarchies did tend to be less democratic monarchies. I don't know the Phoenician system, but I would be wary of assuming that it worked with anything like the freedom of expression that pervaded the Macedonian.

You might well be perfectly right in everything you assert, Andrew - it's just that I don't think we should take the sources entirely at face value over this.

And it doesn't alter the fact that, once the Macedonians had taken the city after a long and bloody siege, they were almost certainly going to vent their frustrations on the populace, due course or not!

ATB

The notion of the "constitutional assembly" of the Macedonians as a binding organ of state upon the king has been seriously challenged over recent years. The example of Perdiccas is not a real guide: Perdiccas is no king when he puts Alexander's plans up to be "voted" down.

[athenas owl]

I am having difficulty recalling where i read that the Phoenician's on ATG's side actually helped large numbers of the residents of Tyre escape the slavery...am I imagining that, or I have read the conjecture of modern scholars, none of whom I can recall right now?

This topic has been fascinating, btw...

Hi, this is right, it's in Curtius - as well as the ones who were evacuated to Carthage, we read in 4:4 that:
"Many, however, found safety with the Sidonians among the Macedonian troops. Although these had entered the city with the conqerors, they remained aware that they were related to the Tyrians (they believed Agenor had founded both cities) and so they secretly gave many of them protection and took them to their boats, on which they were hidden and transported to Sidon. Fifteen thousand were rescued from a violent death by such subterfuge."

Fiona

Ah...thank you Fiona! I am glad I wasn't imaging that...I've been busy remodling this old house and my books are in boxes somewhere in the pile.

I do wonder how much "subterfuge" was really involved...15K is a lot of people to sneak out...and Alexander's people in Sidon would certainly have been aware of the influx of refugees. Was it part of ATG's patronage of the new Sidonian king Abdalonymus that he strategically turned a blind eye to the "subterfuge"?

[Fiona]

Ah...thank you Fiona! I am glad I wasn't imaging that...I've been busy remodling this old house and my books are in boxes somewhere in the pile.

I do wonder how much "subterfuge" was really involved...15K is a lot of people to sneak out...and Alexander's people in Sidon would certainly have been aware of the influx of refugees. Was it part of ATG's patronage of the new Sidonian king Abdalonymus that he strategically turned a blind eye to the "subterfuge"?

I bet you're right. It was a lot of people to sneak out, and someone must have noticed. I think it might depend on whether it happened during the storming of the city or afterwards. If it was during, then maybe Alexander was letting his men have their heads - killing or rescuing, he didn't mind, so long as he took the city.
If it was afterwards, it might have been Ptolemy or Hephaistion or Perdiccas doing the blind-eye-turning - Alexander already had his head in the A-Z of Gaza.
Fiona

[marcus]

I bet you're right. It was a lot of people to sneak out, and someone must have noticed. I think it might depend on whether it happened during the storming of the city or afterwards. If it was during, then maybe Alexander was letting his men have their heads - killing or rescuing, he didn't mind, so long as he took the city.
If it was afterwards, it might have been Ptolemy or Hephaistion or Perdiccas doing the blind-eye-turning - Alexander already had his head in the A-Z of Gaza.

I would imagine that those 15 thousand probably weren't actually "hidden". I suspect that the Sidonians took them under their protection and maintained that they were related, and therefore should be saved - and that the subterfuge was more that they weren't necessarily blood relatives. Creating a tenuous link on what was actually purely racial grounds, and using that to facilitate spiriting them away, could be considered subterfuge.

I doubt 15,000 people could have been hidden at all.

ATB

[Fiona]

2:8 The occupation of Egypt

Quite a short chapter, this one, but another masterly piece of summarising, with some interesting choices of emphasis.
He makes the journey to Egypt sound relatively simple, with things well-organised in advance. I think he might even be implying that the Egyptians knew Alexander was coming and that Alexander already knew they weren’t going to fight.
The Games at Memphis are interesting, because it makes me wonder how long it would have taken for an invitation to get back to Greece for all the A-list stars to come to Egypt, and how long it would have taken them to get there. Maybe Amyntas took the invitation, when he sailed home for reinforcements? It sounds to me as if this was all set in motion before they left Gaza.
I do like the estimate of Alexander’s amount of interest in Egyptian gods – Apis included as an act of deference, “may have been curious enough to visit the bull in his sanctuary”, but the “Egyptian deities remained alien, to be honoured and respected but in no way absorbed into the Macedonian pantheon”, and “his stay in the capital was brief and he had no time for more than a cursory acquaintance with the native institutions.”
The main focus of the chapter is on Siwah, with a lengthy and fine summary of all the reasons which would have led Alexander to be so interested in Ammon.
“The motivation to visit Siwah was complex but it was indubitably strong and far more than a casual impulse.”
I do think Bosworth might have drawn attention to the fact that this is not the typical behaviour of a hard-headed conqueror who was only after power and loot, as the mechanics of conquest is his main theme. Alexander could have been back in Memphis counting the gold, but he was not.
Still, I did like the way Bosworth accepts the rain, the sandstorm and the crows as natural phenomena that were just given prominence in the accounts – he doesn’t discard them. I was puzzled though by his assertion that “there is unlikely to have been serious danger on a track so well-beaten.”
This is a sandy desert, isn’t it? The sort where one strong wind and the path’s gone? It sounds absolutely frightful to me, and very dangerous indeed.
Lots of interesting detail about how the oracle actually worked, and a very moderate and even generous estimate of what might have been going on in Alexander’s head, what his motives and questions and answers and response might have been, neatly summed up as
“He had visited Siwah to consult the deity which, in some form, he considered his father, and he was emphatically confirmed in his belief.”
Fiona

[marcus]

Hi Fiona,

I was puzzled though by his assertion that “there is unlikely to have been serious danger on a track so well-beaten.”
This is a sandy desert, isn’t it? The sort where one strong wind and the path’s gone? It sounds absolutely frightful to me, and very dangerous indeed.

The oracle at Siwa was a famous oracle, which people visited often. Therefore, it stands to reason that the journey there would be relatively straightforward - not necessarily easy, and at times dangerous, as it is indeed a desert (pilgrims travelling to Santiago in the Middle Ages didn't find it easy in the slightest, but thousands went every year). While a sandstorm or flash floods would be dangerous, the sand in the northern Sahara around there isn't quite as bad as it further inland, so there wouldn't be as much problem of dune-shifting as there is in the desert further south. Also, to get to Siwa you pretty much take a point on the coast and go due south - if you go west along the coast from Paraetonium (modern Mersa Matrouh), so long as you know when to turn left, you can't really go wrong.

To be honest, what is more surprising is if Alexander actually did return to Memphis by marching directly from Siwa to the Nile, as is suggested by one of the sources at least (can't remember which one but my gut says it's Arrian). While it is 'merely' a case of travelling due east until you hit the river, it is a much longer desert journey and a darn sight more dangerous than retracing one's steps to the coast.

ATB

[Fiona]

Ah, right, not the toiling up and down sand dunes type of desert journey, then - could be hazardous, and requiring a lot of effort and endurance, but safe enough under normal conditions.
Thanks, Marcus, that's very helpful. Interesting you should mention Santiago, because this trip of Alexander's seems to have had a lot in common - from the point of view of motivation - with medieval pilgrimage journeys.
Interesting that Gedrosia wasn't the first time he chose to take the more difficult route back, too.
Fiona

Hi Fiona,

The oracle at Siwa was a famous oracle, which people visited often. Therefore, it stands to reason that the journey there would be relatively straightforward - not necessarily easy, and at times dangerous, as it is indeed a desert (pilgrims travelling to Santiago in the Middle Ages didn't find it easy in the slightest, but thousands went every year). While a sandstorm or flash floods would be dangerous, the sand in the northern Sahara around there isn't quite as bad as it further inland, so there wouldn't be as much problem of dune-shifting as there is in the desert further south. Also, to get to Siwa you pretty much take a point on the coast and go due south - if you go west along the coast from Paraetonium (modern Mersa Matrouh), so long as you know when to turn left, you can't really go wrong.

To be honest, what is more surprising is if Alexander actually did return to Memphis by marching directly from Siwa to the Nile, as is suggested by one of the sources at least (can't remember which one but my gut says it's Arrian). While it is 'merely' a case of travelling due east until you hit the river, it is a much longer desert journey and a darn sight more dangerous than retracing one's steps to the coast.

ATB

[Fiona]

2:9 The campaign of Gaugamela

I thought this was a very exciting chapter, full of good stuff. Every time I read about this battle, I get a different picture of it, as each writer emphasises different things.
Some very interesting political details at the beginning, and I thought it was quite funny about the Athenians being miffed that all the good actors were going off to Alexander instead of appearing at the Dionysia. But it was good to read in such detail what was going on back home, and why this was a good moment for Alexander to release the prisoners taken at the Granicus.
It would have been nice to see something about Hephaistion’s possible role in keeping Athens sweet, but you can’t have everything.
Great description of the build-up of Darius’ forces, I liked the way this part was from his point of view.
What’s a cataphract?
Got a bit confused about Alexander’s choice of route from the Euphrates. When he says:
“The reason given by Arrian is that fodder and provisions were more plentiful and the heat less intense. The latter is perhaps dubious, but there is little doubt that northern Mesopotamia was more fertile and productive than the south: the forests around Nisibis were famous even in Trajan’s time.”
does he mean, no, it wasn’t really fertile, it was only forest, not farmland, or does he mean, yes, it was fertile, trees grew there?
Then the battle itself – well, the description of the line-up was great, could see all that, and marvel once again at the clever way Alexander constructed a line-up that could fight in any direction. But as soon as they start moving, I get confused. I thought I had got my head round this, thanks to a wonderful description from Paralus on a previous occasion, but then I read this:
“The Macedonian line forged inexorably rightwards and equally inexorably the overlap on the Persian side transferred from the left to the right.”
So far, so good – Macedonians moving right to tempt the Persians to follow them and spread out too much and create a gap – but then we read:
“Parmenion and his troops on the left had an increasingly greater mass of Persians to counter.”
Huh? If the Persian overlap is moving from left to right, that would pull troops away from Parmenion, wouldn’t it?
Obviously I am missing something here, but never mind. The important thing is seeing what Bosworth wants us to notice most, and here I see that his emphasis is on the excellent work done by Parmenion, because he really brings out what a good job he did with a very difficult task.
He also brings out how comparatively little Bessus did – was his heart really in it, I wonder?
I noticed too the way that when the gap developed to the left of the phalanx while Alexander was doing his Prince Rupert bit after Darius, it was infiltrated by Persian troops, but this was neutralised by the reserve phalanx in the rear.
Now, that’s brilliant, isn’t it? To have your reserves exactly where they’d be needed – it’s like he foresaw everything. Amazing.
Finally, I noticed how what he calls the tail-piece was one of the bloodiest bits of the battle, when the returning companions encountered the Persian troops who were fleeing and they found themselves blocking each others’ way. Hadn't seen quite how separate that bit was, before.
Brilliant ending to the chapter, describing the two almost opposite themes of Alexander’s public actions, taking the place of the king of Asia, but also evoking the memory of the Persian War.
“…promising the restoration of Plataea and remitting a portion of the spoils to distant Croton in honour of the services of Phayllus in 480 BC.”
It strikes me that for Alexander to know his history in such detail, and to give such thought to this, shows that his avowed motive of revenge for the Persian Wars was not the mere propaganda we are sometimes encouraged to believe.
Fiona

[Paralus]

What’s a cataphract?

A cataphract is a heavy cavalryman whose mount is armoured as is the rider. This will be the “scale” armour sometimes described. Those depicted for the battle of Magnesia might offer some idea. These, though, are later and Seleucid.

“The Macedonian line forged inexorably rightwards and equally inexorably the overlap on the Persian side transferred from the left to the right.” […]
“Parmenion and his troops on the left had an increasingly greater mass of Persians to counter.”

Huh? If the Persian overlap is moving from left to right, that would pull troops away from Parmenion, wouldn’t it?

That is, Alexander moves to his right and, so, the Persian overlap moves to Alexander’s left (the Persian right). Alexander, if we follow the description, was near opposite to Darius (in the Persian centre) when he commenced the advance. Darius thus overlapped Alexander on his right. Alexander moves forward and to his right (Darius’ left) and thus the phalanx line and, naturally, the Macedonian left follows in the same direction. Mazaeus (Persian right wing) then winds up with a decent overlap of the Macedonian left (Parmenion). This movement to the right by the Macedonians is abruptly halted when the left two taxies are, with Parmenion, left rooted to the spot by the flanking assault on the Macedonian left as the Macedonian right “wedges” or drives into the Persian centre-left.

The important thing is seeing what Bosworth wants us to notice most, and here I see that his emphasis is on the excellent work done by Parmenion, because he really brings out what a good job he did with a very difficult task.

This was a towering performance. If the details of the battle are correct (ignoring the cowardly Parmenion topos) it is here that Alexander will have lost the battle. The Macedonian left - well outflanked as a direct result of Alexander's tactical plan - simply had to hold long enough for the assault by the Macedonian right to succeed. Had the Macedonian left crumbled and perished, the game was up.

He also brings out how comparatively little Bessus did – was his heart really in it, I wonder?

I think Bessus did as he was ordered: attack the Macedonian right and stop the drift to the Persian left. What he was not to know was that Alexander had mixed the cavalry of his flank guard (and Companion cavalry for that matter) with infantry. Thus the job was rather more difficult than it appeared at first glance. Whatever Bessus’ inner ambitions he was on the field of battle with the Great King and his “Friends” and this was a battle for empire. There was little gain for him if the empire fell.

Now, that’s brilliant, isn’t it? To have your reserves exactly where they’d be needed – it’s like he foresaw everything. Amazing.

I’d think the main reason was in the event of being outflanked and encirclement. The general view is that the reserve phalanx “shadowed” the main line.

Finally, I noticed how what he calls the tail-piece was one of the bloodiest bits of the battle, when the returning companions encountered the Persian troops who were fleeing and they found themselves blocking each others’ way.

I’ve always believed that this has been massaged in the tradition. The sources focus heavily on the “cowardly” Darius and the dashing, brave-to-a-fault Macedonian invader and a part of that is the headlong pursuit of Darius from the field. To me it beggars belief that Alexander – well aware that his left had to hold the field against greater numbers – would race from the field with his cavalry whilst his army was locked in a bitter struggle for survival. Alexander – like Demetrius and Antiochus III after him – might well have found himself the commander of a crack cavalry corps and little else had he raced off whilst the battle was in the balance. I agree with Marsden that this is more likely the result of Alexander internally folding up the Persian left upon its centre. The Persians “met escaping” are those about the centre and centre right attempting to avoid encirclement.

It strikes me that for Alexander to know his history in such detail, and to give such thought to this, shows that his avowed motive of revenge for the Persian Wars was not the mere propaganda we are sometimes encouraged to believe.
Fiona

Few Greeks would not have been well versed in the great wars against the barbarian. That is why it is such a powerful propaganda tool.

[Fiona]

Hi Paralus/Rowdy,
I thought your new avatar was you at first. Was thinking, wow, never guessed Paralus was so good-looking! But now I see it’s really Clint Eastwood, isn’t it?
That is so cool that your real boat is called Paralus too. Hope the repairs are doing well.

A cataphract is a heavy cavalryman whose mount is armoured as is the rider. This will be the “scale” armour sometimes described. Those depicted for the battle of Magnesia might offer some idea. These, though, are later and Seleucid.

Ah, right, thank you! Heavier than the companion cavalry, then.

That is, Alexander moves to his right and, so, the Persian overlap moves to Alexander’s left (the Persian right). Alexander, if we follow the description, was near opposite to Darius (in the Persian centre) when he commenced the advance. Darius thus overlapped Alexander on his right. Alexander moves forward and to his right (Darius’ left) and thus the phalanx line and, naturally, the Macedonian left follows in the same direction. Mazaeus (Persian right wing) then winds up with a decent overlap of the Macedonian left (Parmenion). This movement to the right by the Macedonians is abruptly halted when the left two taxies are, with Parmenion, left rooted to the spot by the flanking assault on the Macedonian left as the Macedonian right “wedges” or drives into the Persian centre-left.

Again, thank you! I see – they are getting the overlap by keeping still, while the Macedonians move.

This was a towering performance. If the details of the battle are correct (ignoring the cowardly Parmenion topos) it is here that Alexander will have lost the battle. The Macedonian left - well outflanked as a direct result of Alexander's tactical plan - simply had to hold long enough for the assault by the Macedonian right to succeed. Had the Macedonian left crumbled and perished, the game was up.

Indeed, I can see from your previous paragraph that Parmenion was brought to a halt as the Macedonian right wing turned as a wedge, and if Parmenion was then right in front of Mazaeus then they held on very well.

I’ve always believed that this has been massaged in the tradition. The sources focus heavily on the “cowardly” Darius and the dashing, brave-to-a-fault Macedonian invader and a part of that is the headlong pursuit of Darius from the field. To me it beggars belief that Alexander – well aware that his left had to hold the field against greater numbers – would race from the field with his cavalry whilst his army was locked in a bitter struggle for survival. Alexander – like Demetrius and Antiochus III after him – might well have found himself the commander of a crack cavalry corps and little else had he raced off whilst the battle was in the balance. I agree with Marsden that this is more likely the result of Alexander internally folding up the Persian left upon its centre. The Persians “met escaping” are those about the centre and centre right attempting to avoid encirclement.

Right, that makes sense, I’m happy to believe that Alexander was far too good a commander to go rushing off, at least not too far. But he must have gone a certain distance, mustn’t he, or they wouldn’t have come upon the Persian centre and centre right from behind.
Many thanks for all these useful and interesting comments.
Fiona